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ABSTRACT 
 
This project expands S. Brent Plate’s “invented religious aesthetics” by bringing it 
into conversation with Umberto Eco’s theory of ambiguity. It articulates the space that 
ambiguity opens within the field of religious aesthetics when viewed as a liminal or 
interdisciplinary theory that neither privileges the starting points of transcendental 
aesthetics nor the “neo-arches” of theories of materiality. It hints at new ways of studying 
and describing religious worlds while also illustrating the porous borderlines between 
narrative and theory. It argues that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes 
both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Many years later she does do that—pour an offering for Shen Liu—but only after the 
immediate past has become the distant past. How we remember changes how we have 
lived. Time runs both ways. We make stories of our lives.”1 
—Guy Gavriel Kay, Under Heaven 
While I was writing about ambiguity in religious aesthetics, Philip Salim Francis 
published his 2017 work, When Art Disrupts Religion: Aesthetic Experience and the 
Evangelical Mind.2 Whereas his book approaches aesthetics from the social scientific 
divide of religious studies, mine is thoroughly theoretical. What is important about When 
Art Disrupts Religion, however, is that, at the outset of Narrativizing Theories, it offers 
an important reminder while also setting up the questions that I explore.  
Francis rightly points out that much of modern aesthetic theory focuses on what 
he calls aesthetic disruption. “The arts,” he writes, “possess a unique capacity to unsettle 
our entrenched ways of thinking and believing . . . When we are immersed in an aesthetic 
experience, it is argued, our conceptual, categorical, and binary ways of thinking give 
way.”3 This line of reasoning inevitably leads to questions of art’s salvific potential, 
                                                
1 Guy Gavriel Kay, Under Heaven (New York: ROC, 2010). 
2 Philip Salim Francis, When Art Disrupts Religion: Aesthetic Experience and the Evangelical 
Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
3 Ibid., 4–5. 
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secular aesthetic religions, and the universalization of aesthetic theories. Francis 
recognizes this and argues that modern aesthetic theory is “in dire need of a dose of its 
own historicizing medicine.”4  
I could not agree more with Francis. Aesthetic theory assumes categorical rupture, 
universalizes it, and then foists it onto aesthetic experience. And yet, as the conclusion of 
Narrativizing Theories shows through Jonathan Gottschall’s The Storytelling Animal: 
How Stories Make Us Human,5 this is not always the case. Art also has the frightening 
tendency to reify beliefs and practices that are unpalatable to the liberal, academic world. 
While Francis does not present a solution to this conundrum of aesthetic theory, 
he does, unwittingly, open a space for me to inject my theory of ambiguity. If art does not 
always disrupt, and there are alternate ways of moving in the world, then how does one 
choose between competing narrativizing theories? “It may be,” Francis writes:  
that much of the failure to understand ‘fundamentalism’ results from a refusal to 
place the structure of one’s own mind in familial relation to that of one’s 
relatively conservative cousins . . . Do we not all, in our different ways, maintain 
certain beliefs intractably? Shouldn’t we? Are not some beliefs worth 
preserving?6  
 
He goes so far as to say, in fact, that some beliefs and practices are worth maintaining 
even amidst the defamiliarizing experience of aesthetics.7 
                                                
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Jonathan Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human (New York: 
Marines, 2012). 
6 Francis, 140. 
7 Ibid., 141. 
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The question that follows then is the question that governs much of this text. How 
do we “distinguish acceptable (or ethical) methods of belief and identity preservation 
from the unacceptable?”8 I answer this question, though articulated differently at times, in 
six academic chapters, two excursuses, and one short story embedded throughout the 
length of this book. These parts argue that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity 
emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality.  
In Part I of this work I define ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility so that, in 
Part II, I can turn my attention to analyzing Umberto Eco’s theories and novels through 
that lens. Grossly summarizing both parts, I claim that ambiguity, seen as a coexistent 
incompatibility, is that which violates, questions, and challenges to expose the 
epistemological provisionality of any given narrativizing theory, which is an arrangement 
of a cultural encyclopedia. While that last sentence reads as if ripped from the jargon 
riddled text of a continental philosopher, I promise, I do define my terms and carefully 
unpack my argument. But the “Introduction” is a place of signaling, not arguing.  
It might be helpful to think of ambiguity as a boiling cauldron filled with the 
churning verbs: “violate,” “question,” and “challenge.” Whereas I do not add my 
definition of “coexistent incompatibility” to the pot, I paint it on the front of the cauldron 
in capital letters. It is important to remember that coexistent incompatibility is not a 
binary construction. It is, rather, an awareness of the plurality of equiprobable realities 
that can arise from any given encyclopedia. And before you accuse or dismiss my 
argument as something akin to a naïve relativism, know that Chapters Two and Three 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
 
 
4 
deal with just that issue by tossing Charles S. Peirce’s “Firstness” and Eco’s “lines of 
resistance” into the boiling reality of ambiguity.     
In the excursuses then, I employ my theory of ambiguity outside the orbit of 
Echian planets. In the first of two, I engage Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed: An 
Ambiguous Utopia. In the second, Emmanuel Carrère’s The Kingdom. I show, rather than 
tell, the arguments of Parts I and II. The last part of this work is the short story, “The 
Composer,” which is hidden throughout various parts of this text. Though I run the risk 
of didacticism, I have my reasons for doing this.  
“The Composer” performs or shows the title of this work, Narrativizing Theories. 
If the arrangement of an encyclopedia is a kind of narrative that is embodied in the world, 
then this dissertation is the encyclopedia to the arrangement of “The Composer.” This 
interweaving of dissertation and short story might, perhaps, feel like didacticism, but only 
because the reader is confronted with the unique opportunity to encounter both 
encyclopedia and narrative simultaneously, which so rarely happens. The reader is 
oftentimes solely confronted with “The Composer” and is given the difficult task of 
working backwards to the matter of arrangement. The desire to reverse engineer any 
given text is, of course, dependent upon the operative hermeneutic, but, in my case, the 
dissertation/short story entanglement serves to show the way in which a given percept is 
intimately connected to the encyclopedia that swirls around it. Imagine confronting “The 
Composer” outside the confines of this dissertation and asking yourself: Could this story 
have been arranged otherwise than it is? If your answer is, “Yes,” then you are well on 
your way to understanding the role of ambiguity in religious aesthetics.          
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While violating, questioning, and challenging sounds a lot like Francis’ 
“disruption,” my coexistent ambiguity is both more and less than modern aesthetic 
theory. First, when I speak of “aesthetics,” I do so in such a way that holds its etymology 
in tension. Aesthetics is both art criticism and sense perception or intuition. I am not 
saying that art only disrupts, but rather experience itself has the potential to open 
unforeseen potentialities. These potentialities, however, are value neutral, as judgment 
can only take place within an already given cultural encyclopedia. 
Second, even though my project is theoretical in nature, the world of things is 
never far off. I am using theory and narrative to understand better the fictions that we 
map onto reality and embody subjunctively, thereby constructing equiprobable worlds 
that can be held up against and compared to other, similar worlds. The question of choice 
or judgment then is always lurking beneath my argument, like a lidded cauldron waiting 
to explode. It is one of my assumptions that religious aesthetics, however, can play an 
important role in articulating the choices of any given community, in so far as it uncovers 
the communal practices and embodied narrativizing theories that comprise any given 
community’s encyclopedic stew.  
Third, I am most interested in the material, religious aesthetics as espoused by S. 
Brent Plate. And while what I have written up to this point might seem to be at odds with 
Plate’s work on materiality, it is not. I, too, am interested in discovering “a religious 
aesthetic that does not take as its starting and ending point, Beauty, Truth, or God.”9 But 
rather than focus on only one side of materiality, I am, in this project, exploring the ways 
                                                
9 S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion, and Aesthetics: Rethinking Religion Through the Arts 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), viii. 
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in which “beliefs preserve practices as practices preserve beliefs” and how both function 
“to signify a sufficiently coherent identity to self and other.”10 
Fourth, and finally, it is only fair at the outset that I define religion and how it 
connects to narrativizing theories. While much more is said below, “religion” is, in this 
project, something akin to the theories of implicit religion that define their subject matter 
as the various conscious or subconscious “commitments” that I hold and embody in the 
world. Implicit religion is useful in that it intentionally nudges the secular/sacred balance 
off kilter and allows me to conceive of religion as something other than that which slots 
so easily into Western, Protestant categories.11  
One way to view my project then is as an analysis of both the commitments that I 
make in response to ambiguity but also how I navigate the choice between one 
commitment over another. Pointing towards Part II of this work, my reading of Captain 
Simone Simonini in Eco’s The Prague Cemetery is simply an analysis of Simonini’s 
commitments that he seeks to map onto the world as if they were true. It is a study of 
Simonini’s implicit religion. In my view, I can conceive of nothing more important than 
connecting ambiguity to implicit religion and analyzing the embodied commitments that 
any individual or community makes in the vast sea of experience.  
In the end, as the epigraph suggests, time runs both ways in the fictions that 
construct an embodied existence. We do make stories out of our lives, we live them as if 
                                                
10 Francis, 139.  
11 Edward Bailey, “Implicit Religion,” Religion 40, no. 4 (2010): 271–78 and “Implicit Religion,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. Peter B. Clarke (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
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they were true, and, embedded in the concrete world, they are in the constant process of 
emergence. It is not my intention to universalize a theory of ambiguity in a world that 
defies universalization. In fact, it is the opposite. For even ambiguity is a narrativizing 
theory that, like all the rest, is provisional. 
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PART I: A THEORY OF AMBIGUITY 
 
Part I of this work seeks to define ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility so that, 
in Part II, I can turn my attention to analyzing Umberto Eco’s theories and novels through 
that lens. Taken together, both parts will argue the thesis that a religious aesthetic rooted 
in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of 
reality.  
In Chapter One, I outline three modes of engaging ambiguity: literary, 
philosophical, and scientific. I examine current trends in ambiguity theories and religious 
aesthetics as both transcendental and material. I also define religion, aesthetics, and 
ambiguity, and, of course, an ambiguous religious aesthetic. If ambiguity is a coexistent 
incompatibility that highlights the proliferation of meaning and the polyvocal nature of 
reality, then religious aesthetics is the provisional exploration into the commitments and 
narratives that humans subjunctively embody. 
In Chapter Two, I outline Eco’s theory of ambiguity by contextualizing it in his 
theories of information and communication. I then look at various essential concepts of 
Eco’s that go into fully understanding ambiguity: semiotics, cultural units, and the 
encyclopedia. I connect all of this to current trends in ambiguity studies and material 
religious aesthetics. Ambiguity, in the end, is that which violates, challenges, and furthers 
 
 
9 
knowledge, while also constructing a religious aesthetic that both creates and highlights 
religious commitments and narratives as they mutually exist as polyvocal percepts.  
In Chapter Three, I discuss Charles Sanders Peirce’s influence over Eco and the 
way in which Peirce’s theories of Firstness and the Dynamical Object are essential to 
grounding ambiguity. I then look at Eco’s seminal essay on the creation of aesthetic 
messages. I conclude Part I by fully defining ambiguity and its connection to a material 
religious aesthetic. The goal of Part I is to set out the parameters in which I articulate how 
a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge 
and the narrativization of reality. 
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CHAPTER ONE: AMBIGUITY AND RELIGIOUS AESTHETICS 
 
You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a winter’s night a 
traveler. Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. 
—Italo Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveler 
Introduction 
How does one begin a book? It seems easy. After the reading ends and the outline 
has been fleshed out, one simply sits down and allows the muses to flow through her. 
That which was thought materializes into, well, material. But it is the opening sentence 
that always causes me to stumble. I want it to zip, to catch the reader off guard while 
simultaneously inviting her into another world. The pressure is too great. What if I fail? 
What if the opening sentence falls flat and the reader closes the book, lays it down, and 
picks up her smartphone instead? Perhaps underlying the anxiety of the opening sentence 
is the question: How does one invite the reader into a space of interpretation, a space that 
is clear and concise, to be sure, but that allows her to complete that which confronts her? 
Perhaps this is too much to ask of any first sentence and I should move on to other, 
pragmatic urges. I find, however, that it introduces my topic in an irregular and tangential 
way.  
In this chapter, I have a few goals, the primary of which is to introduce my topics: 
ambiguity, religious aesthetics, and, of course, the need for putting both in conversation 
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with S. Brent Plate and Umberto Eco. More fully, after situating this project within the 
academic discourse of ambiguity, I sketch out religious aesthetics and its various 
approaches. I then introduce S. Brent Plate’s religious aesthetic as a counter weight to 
much of what has come before it. While Plate was certainly not the first, his emphasis on 
materiality has shifted the way in which religious scholars tackle aesthetics. While I tend 
to agree which much, if not all of Plate, the last section in this chapter takes Plate’s 
religious, material aesthetic and begins the long process of placing it in conversation with 
ambiguity. Not just any ambiguity, mind you, but as I will show,12 the ambiguity of 
Umberto Eco, which is rooted in the quantum revolution, information theory, and the 
semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. 
Before I begin, however, I need quickly to answer one, niggling question. Why 
does religious aesthetics need a theory of ambiguity to inform it? Far too long has 
religious aesthetics been held captive by the transcendentals. Not only has it concerned 
itself with Beauty, Truth, and the Good, but also with that mother of all transcendentals—
God. Left to rot in the sun, materiality, sense perception, and embodiment were eschewed 
for their perfect brethren. In other, generalizing words, religious aesthetics has been 
traditionally Plotinian over against the πάντα ῥεῖ of Heraclitus or the swerve of Lucretius. 
Plate, however, sets out to fix this minor imbalance, by introducing Walter Benjamin’s 
aesthetic to the religious subspecies. This resulted in a turn towards materiality, and one, 
quite frankly, that I celebrate.  
                                                
12 In later chapters.  
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While I accept religious aesthetic’s turn towards materiality (a story that I will tell 
below), I do not embrace it naïvely. To take in the continuum of sense perceptions and 
from that to formulate any kind of understanding about the world one needs both thing 
and concept.13 The thing, object, or percept, should not be taken for granted. While it is 
there, confronting and pushing back on me, I cannot know it fully for it is already a 
semioticized thing. And, to finally answer my question, that is why religious aesthetics 
needs ambiguity. One is neither confined by the object nor the concept. When I confront 
a percept,14 it has the ability to open new possibilities, categories, and ways of 
understanding. Neither I nor it—nor its category—is fixed.15 This is what ambiguity 
brings to religious aesthetics and what I will begin to discuss in this chapter. Ambiguity is 
like the opening sentence of an exciting new book, it confronts the reader and establishes 
itself as that which is while also beckoning her towards the horizon of the unknown.  
On Ambiguity 
Ambiguity, at the outset, should not be confused with vagueness.16 It is not the 
antithesis of clarity. And while the Oxford English Dictionary lists several definitions,17 
                                                
13 And the question of which came first, thing or concept, is too tiring and laborious a 
conversation. We simply do not know. But we need both to make sense of the world and if one needs a 
priori categories to accept that, then so be it.   
14 By “percept,” I mean, simply, an object of perception. 
15 As a brute and physical fact, the percept, obviously, is fixed. I cannot, in other words, by a sheer 
bending of the mind manipulate the physical compound of a rock. I can, however, change both my 
understanding of it and its position within my cultural encyclopedia. In doing so, the rock’s cultural 
category is subject to changing, stretching, and slipping between categories. In this way, a brute, physical 
fact is not fixed.   
16 Cf. Adam Sennet, “Ambiguity,” ed. Edward N. Zalta in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016): 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/ entries/ambiguity/; Christoph Bode, “The Aesthetics of 
Ambiguity,” in Actas Del XII Congreso Nacional de La Asociacion Espanola de Estudios Anglo-
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all of which leave something wanting to those concerned with the academic literature, 
what I am interested in is that which is capable of “being understood in two or more 
ways.” Artificial, perhaps, but I would like to divide ambiguity into three separate but 
overlapping academic discourses: literary,18 philosophic, and scientific. Building towards 
the latter, I will finally show how Eco’s theory of ambiguity fits into the larger, and 
current, academic discussions on ambiguity19 before turning my attention to religious 
aesthetics. 
Literary Ambiguity 
When one thinks of ambiguity, one most likely brings to mind literary ambiguity. 
Immortalized by William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity, ambiguity is defined “as 
an indecision as to what you mean, an intention to mean several things, a probability that 
one or other or both of two things has been meant, and the fact that a statement has 
                                                                                                                                            
Norteamericanos (Alicante 19-22 Dez. 1988, 1991): 73–83; Dario Gamboni, Potential Images: Ambiguity 
and Indeterminacy in Modern Art (London: Reaktion, 2002); Israel Scheffler, Beyond the Letter: A 
Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in Language (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1979); Craig J. N. de Paulo, Patrick Messina, and Marc Stier, eds. Ambiguity in the Western 
Mind (New York: Peter Lang, 2005); William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (New York: New 
Directions, 1966); Susanne Winkler, Ambiguity: Language and Communication (Berlin: De Gruyter 
Mouton, 2015); Guiseppe Caglioti, The Dynamics of Ambiguity (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2012); and Patrizia Violi and Wendy Steiner, “Ambiguity,” in Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Semiotics, Tome 1: A-M, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 1986). 
17 “ambiguity, n.,” OED Online, (Oxford University Press, March 2017): 
http://www.oed.com.du.idm.oclc.org/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/6144 (accessed May 02, 2017): “wavering 
of opinion . . . an uncertainty . . . capability of being understood in two or more ways . . . a word or phrase 
susceptible of more than one meaning.”  
18 By literary, I mean, generally speaking, aesthetics, where aesthetics means the academic study 
of art. In other words, this is a broad section in which visual and pictorial art are also represented.   
19 Admittedly, the majority of this work is taken up in the remaining chapters of this book. What I 
say of Eco here, is simply an appetizer.  
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several meanings.”20 A literary ambiguity then can be summarized as a lexeme having 
two or more lexical entries or, as I suggested, a word or cultural artifact capable of being 
understood in two or more ways. When I come across the word “bank” in any text, I am, 
due to its lexical possibilities, struck by an instance of ambiguity. Does it mean “a place 
where money is exchanged” or “the place whereupon young lovers meet to ingest their 
egg salad sandwiches?”   
Ever so close to literary ambiguity is the definition posited by semioticians. 
Writing the entry for ambiguity in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, Patrizia 
Violi and Wendy Steiner extend ambiguity to that of the context of a given lexeme. “A 
sentence,” they write, “is ambiguous when it can be interpreted in two or more different 
ways.”21 For them, ambiguity is tangled up with both homonymy and polysemy, an 
entanglement, they argue, that is the base of creative language in so far as “aesthetic 
messages are generally of an ‘ambiguous’ nature.”22 
Why is that? Because literary texts are less constrained in their communicative 
goals than nonfictional texts (a proposition that I will later call into question).23 This is 
seen, for example, in the New Critics who located the essence of poetry in the tension 
between word and context, between the intensional and extensional meanings of its 
terms, and in the polysemy and compression of meaning of its metaphors.24 Literary 
                                                
20 Empson, 5. 
21 Violi and Steiner, 23.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Winkler, 17. 
24 Violi and Steiner, 25. 
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ambiguity is also discussed, to name a few, by Charles Morris25 in regards to the icon and 
the Prague Structuralist school, most notably by Jan Mukarovsky.26 It is there that the 
sign has a dual semiotic orientation, referencing both “outward toward the extra-aesthetic 
world and inward toward itself.”27 Jacques Derrida’s differance is at play here, too, 
wherein nothing but ambiguity is possible.  
The central question that literary ambiguity now sets itself, according to Susanne 
Winkler, is how do the tools which are used in the construction of the text influence the 
interpretation of the reader? Though old, this is not, she insists, a trivial question, since 
“ambiguity triggers are manifold.” Literary ambiguity, in other words, seeks to address 
the problem of multiple interpretations coexisting at the same time.28 This is similar to 
the visual arts wherein, for example, Dario Gamboni asks the question: who is 
responsible for generating meaning—the viewer or the creator? For him, ambiguity is 
“the character of what is susceptible to several interpretations” and that which “can also 
be said to express the character of what belongs to two categories” and “of what lacks 
precision and disturbs.”29  
                                                
25 Cf. Charles William Morris, Writings on the General Theory of Signs (Paris: Mouton, 1972). 
26 Jan Mukarovsky, “Standard Language and Poetic Language,” in A Prague School Reader, ed. 
P.L. Garvin (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1964), 17–30.  
27 Violi and Steiner, 25. 
28 Winkler, 17.  
29 Gamboni, 13. 
 
 
16 
Before drawing any provisional conclusions about literary ambiguity, it is 
important to consider the work of Christoph Bode.30 Ambiguity, for him, is “the 
conspicuous proliferation of multiple meanings.”31 What is different here is that which 
generates the multiple meanings. For many, it is the text or object in concert with the 
reader or viewer that generates any meaning. For Bode, however, that which generates 
meaning is the event. Why is that? Because those who would say a sign or a text in its 
literariness—that which is outside the use of everyday language—is both ambiguous and 
self-referential commit an error. A sign, at its most general, is that which points to 
something else.32 If it must point to something else in order to signify, Bode asks, then 
how can it also be self-referential? This question, far from naïve, devastatingly calls into 
question so much of semiotic aesthetics. A sign that is self-referential is no longer a sign 
and, hence, cannot signify. This, of course, poses a problem for literary critics who want 
to claim both that Moby Dick as a text signifies x and is simultaneously self-referential in 
that it breaks from everyday language and therefore opens new possibilities for the 
condition of language itself. Both cannot be true. Rather than seeking a referent or that to 
which a sign points, Bode’s aesthetics of ambiguity searches out events or that which 
“just is.”  
                                                
30 Frauke Berndt and Stephan Kammer, eds. Amphibolie, Ambiguität, Ambivalenz (Würzburg, 
Germany: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009); Christoph Bode and Rainer Dietrich, Future Narratives: 
Theory, Poetics, and Media-Historical Moment (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013); and Christoph Bode, “The 
Aesthetics of Ambiguity,” in Actas Del XII Congreso Nacional de La Asociacion Espanola de Estudios 
Anglo-Norteamericanos (Alicante 19-22 Dez. 1988, 1991), 73–83. 
31 Bode, “The Aesthetics of Ambiguity,” 73. 
32 Umberto Eco, “Sign,” in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics: Tome 2, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok 
(New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994), 936. 
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Bode takes us dangerously close to Eco, which I will later show, when he argues 
that for a writer to create an event, he or she must break all primary codes.33  
The aesthetics of ambiguity offers access to <<meaning as an event>>, to the 
experience of experience . . . art and a literature which, by striving after auto-
referentiality, transcend their former semiotic status and present themselves as 
free offers of experience meet with an aesthetics which, knowing it can never 
prove conclusively the objectivity of what it talks about, can only submit the same 
offer: to enter, to expose oneself to an experience and to see what happens.34 
 
While there is much here that is admirable and important, I do not wholeheartedly agree 
with all that Bode is doing. Or, rather, I think that some of Bode’s work deserves more 
qualification than I can now give it.35 What I do affirm, however, is that which I will 
continually revisit throughout this project—the nature of experience to call into question 
our cultural categories and concepts while also simultaneously probing the boundaries of 
that which we define as “reality.”  
In the end, I think it best to define literary ambiguity as that which takes a word, 
sentence, text, object, or visual artwork and sees it as pointing to multiple meanings in 
any given cultural encyclopedia.36 To some this object is aesthetic only insofar as it is 
self-referential, but to others self-referentiality is an undoing of the concept of the sign 
itself. In these cases, the focus is shifted ever so slightly to the category of experience 
                                                
33 Bode, 82. 
34 Bode, 82–3. 
35 For instance, Peirce’s category of Thirdness might call into question Bode’s notion or 
understanding of experience if by experience Bode means something that is outside a cultural semiosphere. 
Cf. James Hoopes, ed., Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce (Chapel Hill, NC: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1991).   
36 I will use “cultural encyclopedia” throughout this chapter, but I will not define it until Chapter 
Two, wherein I turn my full attention to Umberto Eco.  
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over against the concept of sign. Literary ambiguity is concerned with the coexistence of 
multiple meanings and the way in which the artifact and the reader or viewers work 
together to create or establish a possible meaning. 
Philosophic Ambiguity 
While much of that which literary ambiguity is concerned overlaps with 
philosophic ambiguity, it is important to reiterate that my categories of ambiguity are 
arbitrary, if useful heuristics. They are not concrete, even though my handprints are 
permanently set in them. If my understanding of literary ambiguity houses both semiotics 
and the visual arts, then my definition of philosophic ambiguity holds within it classic, 
analytic, and speculative philosophy, as well as some good old fashioned metaphysics. 
Where the distinctions that I draw are most porous, however, is in the distinction that I 
pencil between philosophic and scientific ambiguity, but I will save that for my next 
section. 
Both Aristotle and the stoics discussed ambiguity. Where Aristotle defined 
ambiguity as an instance of an expression or name having more than one meaning,37 the 
Stoics, or at least Chrysippus, argued that one person may understand a word in various 
ways.38 So far this is little different from literary ambiguity. Things changed, however, 
when analytic philosophers started to analyze lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic 
ambiguities. It was important for them, in doing so, to say what ambiguity was not.  
                                                
37 Aristotle, “On Sophistical Refutations,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised 
Oxford Translation, ed. J. Barnes and trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984): 280–1. 
38 Cf. Sennet, 5 and Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
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Philosophic ambiguity is not polysemy, vagueness, context sensitivity, under-
specification and generality, or sense and reference transfer. If ambiguity is here an 
instance of two lexical entries corresponding to the same word, then polysemy is a single 
lexeme with multiple meanings,39 vagueness is a lack of precision in meaning or 
reference,40 context sensitivity is variability of content due to changes in the context of 
utterance without change in the convention of word usage,41 under-specification and 
generality fails to specify some detail without being ambiguous to that detail,42 and sense 
and reference transfer is the phenomena of taking, “I am parked on Third Street,” to mean 
the car and not the driver.43  
So then, what is philosophic ambiguity? A distinction is often made between 
lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic. Lexical ambiguity is having more than one entry in the 
lexicon for a lexeme.44 Syntactic ambiguity occurs when there are many Logical Forms 
(LFs)—where LFs have replaced the notion of the lexicon to study the rule-governed 
derivation of syntactic forms—that correspond to the same sentence.45 Pragmatic 
ambiguity deals with both speech acts and truth conditional pragmatics.46 While Adam 
                                                
39 Sennet, 6.  
40 Ibid., 7. 
41 Ibid., 8. 
42 Ibid., 8–9. 
43 Ibid., 10.  
44 Ibid., 12–3.  
45 Ibid., 11 and 13–20.  
46 Ibid., 20–2.  
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Sennet discuss numerous other cases of philosophic ambiguity, for my purposes his 
introduction should be sufficient to show the ways in which philosophic ambiguity differs 
from the literary variety. For philosophic ambiguity, at least in its current state, is both 
analytic in nature and concerned with logical forms. If a reader is confused by the 
proliferation of philosophic ambiguity, however, then she can consult “Ambiguity Tests 
and How to Fail Them,” which should, I believe, help her to avoid any common errors of 
ambiguity in her day-to-day speech.47 
An important book in this vein of inquiry is Israel Scheffler’s Beyond the Letter,48 
wherein he defines ambiguity as reference to difference in intension or the converse of 
synonymy. Given that definition, he then goes on to distinguish several types of 
ambiguity. Elementary ambiguity corresponds to what most people call semantic or 
lexical ambiguity.49 Indecision ambiguity corresponds to psychological ambiguity, where 
we are unable to decide which of two meanings a speaker intends on a given use of a 
semantically ambiguous expression.50 And, finally, there is a third type of ambiguity, 
multiple ambiguity, in which a semantically ambiguous expression is used in two ways at 
once, so that we have to assign it multiple interpretations.51 For my purposes, again, this 
                                                
47 Arnold M. Zwicky and Jerrold M. Sadock, “Ambiguity Tests and How To Fail Them,” in 
Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 4, ed. John P. Kimball (New York: Academic, 1975), 1–36. 
48 Israel Scheffler, Beyond the Letter: A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness, and 
Metaphor in Language (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). 
49 Ibid., 13. 
50 Ibid., 16. 
51 Ibid., 17. 
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summary is meant to be useful in carving out philosophic ambiguity’s unique space, over 
against literary ambiguity. 
While on the surface, Ambiguity in the Western Mind sits within the world of 
literary ambiguity due to its aim of rethinking the great books of the western canon, I 
want to end this section by looking at one philosophic essay, “In Praise of Ambiguity.”52 
Ambiguity is here “the condition that makes meaning possible by making pure and 
unambiguous meaning impossible.”53 For John D. Caputo, in other words, binaries not 
only found each other but make each other possible. If unreadability is the condition of 
possibility for reading, then, to take another example, progress is only possible when 
anomalies force any smoothly running system to reconfigure.54 By analogy then, 
ambiguity is the ground that makes meaning possible. “Clarity and ambiguity,” he writes:  
should not be viewed as simple logical opposites on a timeless spectrum but 
different stages in the process of making meaning, or producing meaning as an 
effect. Clarity is a late product . . . at the end of the process . . . Ambiguity . . . 
belongs to an earlier matinal stage, to a deeper stratum of meaning . . . Ambiguity 
is ambi-valent . . . bristling with multiple values, indeed poly-valent, alive with 
possibilities that cannot be neatly ordered or contained.55 
 
Philosophic ambiguity, in the end, is distinct from literary ambiguity in its focus. 
Whereas literary ambiguity is concerned with the proliferation of meaning, holding 
multiple interpretations in tension, and the role of the reader, philosophic ambiguity is by 
and large analytic in its focus on the systems of language, communication, and Logical 
                                                
52 John D. Caputo, “In Praise of Ambiguity,” in Ambiguity in the Western Mind, eds. Craig J. N. 
de Paulo, Patrick Messina, and Marc Stier (New York: Peter Lang, 2005): 15–34. 
53 Ibid., 20. 
54 Ibid., 22.  
55 Ibid., 25.  
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Forms. But as Bode ended the former section with a shift away from sign to that of event, 
Caputo does the same for philosophic ambiguity. For him, ambiguity is the condition of 
possibility for meaning in its insistence on making unambiguous meaning impossible. 
Ambiguity, in other words, is a constant reminder to philosophic ambiguity that its quest, 
while admirable, is ultimately quixotic.  
Scientific Ambiguity 
While so much of science values clarity and precision, which is a good and 
necessary thing when my daughter is ingesting her dose of amoxicillin, it is not without 
its ambiguities. But here, ambiguity takes on the strange properties of paradigm shifts, the 
breaking of symmetry, and quantum indeterminacy. It is also, I show, an ambiguity 
rooted in theories of information and chaos.56  
To begin with the most general, ambiguity can be understood as something akin 
to Thomas Kuhn’s meaning of “anomaly.”57 Rather than incremental progress by the 
accumulation of signs, an anomaly arises that contradicts the prevailing paradigm. When 
the anomaly can no longer be ignored, scientists are forced to grapple with it, test it, and 
ultimately account for it. This, of course, leads to a scientific revolution or to a new, 
unforeseen possibility in the description of reality. Anomaly then is a scientific 
ambiguity—it is that which calls into question the traditional codes. 
                                                
56 Though a full analysis of ambiguity and information theory will have to wait until the following 
chapter wherein I discuss information theory’s influence over Eco’s theory of ambiguity.  
57 Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996) and Roald Hoffmann, The Same and Not the Same (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995). The latter is a study of ambiguity from the perspective of chemistry.  
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Another way to think about scientific ambiguity is through the concept of 
oscillation in sense perception. Confronted with a constant stimulus, pattern perception 
fluctuates between two or more possible interpretations. This plurality of possibility is 
called, “multistability,”58 which can be understood as switching between two or more 
different attractors.59 Looking at figure 1.1,60 
fig. 1.1 
I find ambiguity best represented by the six “possible organizations” that correspond to 
“A,” the one, concrete stimulus. Notice, too, that how one organizes a sense perception is 
separate from that sense perception’s meaning, and that three different meanings are 
possible given six possible organizational schemes. Aligning with Eco’s theory of 
ambiguity, as I show later, the possible organization of “a2” is interesting in that it 
represents an organizational schema that is not given, automated, or spontaneous. It has, 
                                                
58 Peter Kruse and Michael Stadler, “The Function of Meaning in Cognitive Order Formation, in 
Ambiguity in Mind and Nature: Multistable Cognitive Phenomena, eds. Peter Kruse and Michael Stadler 
(New York: Springer, 1995), 5. 
59 Ibid., 11. 
60 Ibid., 10. 
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in other words, no entry in the cultural encyclopedia and must, therefore, be learned, 
which, of course, then leads to the possibility of new meanings.  
Ambiguity, according to Giuseppe Caglioti, can also mean “the coexistence or 
confluence of two or more incompatible aspects in the same reality.”61 While this, at first 
glance, seems paradoxical, it is the result of having to rethink science and human 
perceptions of reality in the wake of the quantum revolution. If Aristotle can say that no 
substance can simultaneously host opposites, then one can say of Aristotle that he has a 
non-procedural view of essences. Ambiguity, in other words, is not something that 
Aristotle’s substance can account for and is therefore seen as something negative. This 
changed in the twentieth century, however, via a fresh analysis of time and probability.62 
Ambiguity came positively to mean: the coexistence or confluence of two or more 
incompatible aspects in the same reality.63 With discoveries in science (Albert Einstein, 
Werner Karl Heisenberg, etc.), philosophers began to focus on the “dynamics of the 
processes of transformation rather than on Aristotle’s statics of the objects.”64 “In 
conclusion,” Caglioti writes: 
complex concepts of quantum physics and the structure of matter are intimately 
connected with optical illusions, paradoxes, and ambiguities, features usually 
attributed to the world of art rather than to science. Both art and science are 
produced, emotionally and rationally, by our thinking. And our thinking proceeds 
chaotically, on the jagged watershed of a permanent cultural value: ambiguity.65  
                                                
61 Giuseppe Caglioti, “Ambiguity,” in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Maryanne Cline 
Horowitz (Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 53. 
62 Cf. James Gleick, Time Travel: A History (New York: Pantheon, 2016). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 54. 
65 Ibid., 55. 
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This cannot be stressed enough for Caglioti, ambiguity, “taken as bivalency,” is the 
“simultaneous presence of two aspects of reality that are incompatible with each other.”66 
Rather jarring to the mind, the reader is well within her rights to ask the question: How 
can reality have two simultaneous presences? To understand this conundrum fully, one 
needs to view ambiguity as holding the center between entropy and conservation, on the 
one hand, and symmetry and information or order, on the other (cf. fig. 1.2).67  
  fig. 1.2 
                                                
66 Paolo Fenoglio, “Preface to the Italian Edition,” in The Dynamics of Ambiguity, Guiseppe 
Caglioti (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), xv. Cf. Guiseppe Caglioti, 
“Perception of Ambiguous Figures: A Qualitative Model Based on Synergetics and Quantum Mechanics,” 
in Ambiguity in Mind and Nature, eds. by Peter Kruse and Michael Stadler (Heidelberg, Germany: 
Springer, 1995), 463–78. 
67 Caglioti, The Dynamics, 14.  
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What does all this mean and how can a humanities scholar understand that which 
appears to be a “hard science?” The point is that ambiguity shows up in the sciences as 
well as in the humanities, and that Caglioti’s brand of scientific ambiguity bleeds into 
literary theory via Eco. In other words, when Eco describes ambiguity as that which 
“must be defined as a mode of violating the rules of the code”68 or as an important device 
that functions as an introduction to the aesthetic experience,69 he is not elucidating 
literary, semiotic, or philosophic ambiguity. He is, rather, drawing on a scientific 
ambiguity rooted in information theory70 and bringing that to bear on aesthetics, an 
aesthetics understood as a discourse on art and literature but not wholly divorced from 
sense perception.71 I am, however, getting ahead myself.  
Let me conclude this section with a clearer description of Caglioti’s ambiguity. 
For him, ambiguity can be defined as the breaking of symmetry (where symmetry is 
defined as invariance under transformation), the “coexistence, at a critical point, of two 
                                                
68 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 263. 
69 Ibid., 274. 
70 Again, I will show this in the following chapters.  
71 Not alone in this pursuit, see also, to name a few: N. Katherine Hayles, “Turbulence in 
Literature and Science: Questions of Influence,” in American Literature and Science, ed. Robert Scholnick 
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 229–50; N. Katherine Hayles, Electronic Literature: 
New Horizons for the Literary (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008); N. Katherine 
Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990); N. Katherine Hayles, The Cosmic Web: Scientific Fields & Literary Strategies in 
the 20th Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Bruno Latour and Michel Serres, Michel 
Serres with Bruno Latour: Conversations on Culture, Science, and Time, Trans. by Roxanne Lapidus (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); Michel Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, 
ed. Josue V. Harari and David F. Bell (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982); Michel Serres, 
The Birth of Physics, ed. David Webb, trans. Jack Hawkes (Manchester: Clinamen, 2014); Ilya Prigogine 
and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (London: Bantam, 1984); and Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With 
Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011). 
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aspects or schemes of reality which are mutually exclusive and which have become 
physically observable”72 or “as the coevolution or coexistence of two mutually 
incompatible aspects of a same reality inside a  single structure.”73 Imagine turning an 
empty wine bottle in your hands, labels removed, and being unable to perceive any 
change in the structure even though the bottle is changing over time. That is symmetry. 
When it is broken, because of, let’s say, a bubble or streak in the glass, your perception of 
the bottle will alter. The reality of the bottle spinning or changing over time will be made 
visible. Symmetry breaking, for Caglioti, is a prerequisite for not only obtaining an 
information (measured in bits), but also as a foundation for the process of perception.74 
While the spinning wine bottle elucidates the idea of invariance under 
transformation, it is not entirely accurate. Perhaps better would be to picture an ice cube 
sitting on a table under the high sun of Colorado. As the cube begins to melt, a phase 
transition takes place that implies symmetry breaking. The cube, at some point, will 
arrive midway between entropy (transformation) and conservation, and it is at this point 
that one perceives the coexistence of two aspects of the same reality—incompatible with 
each other.75 This is, of course, one aspect of figure 1.2. The other feature is the cube’s 
middle point between “symmetry or indiscernibility on one hand, and information or the 
removal of uncertainty on the other.”76 Will the cube remain cube-like or will it melt into 
                                                
72 Caglioti, The Dynamics, 17. Cf. Caglioti, “Perception of,” 464.  
73 Caglioti, “Perception of,” 477. 
74 Ibid., 468.  
75 Caglioti, The Dynamics, 12. 
76 Ibid. 
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something that a human could drink? Knowing the answer, it is easy to see how 
information arises. For Caglioti then, ambiguity is a crossroad or intersection placed 
squarely between natural structures and humanity’s cultural relationship with them.77   
Perception then is a dynamic instability that implies ambiguity. It leads, Caglioti 
writes, “from a disordered state of the functionally engaged part of the mind to an ordered 
state via a dynamic instability involving a symmetry breaking.”78 He continues:  
At the level of conceptual synthesis, a structure appears qualitatively symmetrical 
until the moment in which, following a scansion of the structure itself, a dynamic 
instability of the perceptive process is produced: and one realizes that he has 
extracted information, or given a new meaning, or has been enlightened by an 
idea.79 
 
This is true in science, art, music, and even those funny pictures that oscillate between 
both a duck and a bunny. How a mind decides what to see given any percept is wrapped 
up in chaos theory’s notion of the attractor. But, here, I have strayed a little too far from 
my purpose.  
What I set out to do was not to indulge a scientific curiosity, but to establish the 
distinctions between literary, philosophic, and scientific ambiguity. These heuristic 
categories were not meant to be exhaustive, but rather representative of their general 
fields of inquiry. In summary, literary ambiguity is concerned with the proliferation of 
meaning, holding multiple interpretations in tension, and the role of the reader; 
philosophic ambiguity is by and large analytic in its focus on the systems of language, 
                                                
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 463.  
79 Caglioti, The Dynamics, 110.  
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communication, and Logical Forms, but also deals with the foundation of meaning itself; 
and scientific ambiguity—rooted in the quantum and chaos revolutions—concerns itself 
with the possibility of two simultaneous realities inside a single structure, but also, I 
think, with quantum entanglements, strange attractors, and the generation of information. 
Ambiguity’s Conclusion 
In her introductory essay in a 2013 book on the state of ambiguity theory across 
disciplines, Winkler suggests that the governing question of modern ambiguity theory is 
the question of where ambiguity occurs—in the production or perception of a given 
precept?80 Following from this is another, though connected, question: Is ambiguity—
produced or perceived—strategic or nonstrategic? For Winkler and others, this results in 
four potentialities: 1) strategic production, 2) nonstrategic production, 3) strategic 
perception, and 4) nonstrategic perception.81 All four potentialities are present in both 
literary and philosophic ambiguity, but perhaps not in scientific, where scientists set out 
to analyze and understand nonstrategic perceptual ambiguity.  
For my purposes, however, I am interested in examining the strategic production 
of ambiguity in literary texts. Why? “Strategic production of ambiguity,” Winkler writes:  
is a central issue in literary criticism and rhetoric . . . While the premise that 
ambiguity is employed strategically in literary texts can be deemed valid, it is 
often difficult to identify its effects. It is precisely for this reason that literary texts 
lend themselves extremely well to examining the functions of ambiguity.82  
 
                                                
80 Winkler, 17.  
81 Ibid., 18. 
82 Ibid. 
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If this section on ambiguity has helped my project in any way, then it has established 
what I mean by ambiguity and therefore has set up its confrontation with religious 
aesthetics, which will come in the next section.  
First, I am interested in what I have called literary ambiguity: the proliferation of 
meaning, holding multiple interpretations in tension, and the role of the reader. I am not, 
however, concerned with any literary ambiguity, but that which is best depicted by Eco. 
The question you are no doubt asking yourself, however, is why Eco? Because, as I will 
begin unpacking in the next chapter, Eco’s literary ambiguity is an ambiguity rooted in 
scientific, perceptual ambiguity. Without saying too much here, I can say that Eco’s 
ambiguity takes the polysemy of “aesthetics” seriously. It is an ambiguity that stresses 
both the creative construction of meaning and the hard perception of the senses. And, in a 
strange twist, it also takes into consideration Caputo’s foundational ambiguity, which can 
best be seen in Eco’s use of Charles Sanders Peirce.  
Second, by ambiguity I mean the coexistence of two or more incompatible aspects 
in the same reality. This coexistent incompatibility is what I propose to bring into 
conversation with religious aesthetics generally and S. Brent Plate’s material aesthetic 
more specifically. Ambiguity taken this way can arise from any given percept, whether 
that percept is an object or a cultural artifact, like a text. Given my emphasis on a literary 
ambiguity informed by its scientific sibling, it is no surprise that most of this project will 
be focusing on literary analyses or the strategic production of ambiguity.  
Finally, as I turn my attention to defining what I mean by a material religious 
aesthetic, I ask that you keep in mind my definition of ambiguity as a coexistent 
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incompatibility in both senses of the aesthetic endeavor of which more will be said 
below. Religious aesthetics, in short, has traditionally focused on the transcendentals of 
Beauty, Truth, and God. In recent years, however, religious aesthetics has shifted towards 
the material realm and that which confronts the senses. The question, moving forward, is 
How does an ambiguity understood as a coexistent incompatibility inform both a 
transcendental and a material religious aesthetic? 
 
THE COMPOSER 
I 
“Are you familiar with the Voynich manuscript?” 
“No. Should I be?” I sat back, searching my memory. 
“The Atlantic ran a story about it—a fifteenth-century manuscript written in 
gibberish. No one knows what it means.” 
“And?” 
 “The claim is that someone solved it. Figured it out. Some old lady’s,” Gina 
glanced at her MacBook, “herbiary.”  
“Herbiary?” 
“Like bestiary, but with plants.” 
“Bestiary? Look, I—” 
 “Spare me your jokes, Ed. Point is that The Atlantic story had over two-hundred 
thousand clicks, and we need that kind of traffic.” 
“So you want me to write a story on Voynich?” 
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“No, not that. It’s been done. We need another angle.” Gina ran a hand 
through her thin hair. “A Da Vinci Code kind of story.” 
“What do you have in mind?” 
She turned the rose-gold computer to face me. “This.” 
“C’mon. That’s legend. It never happened.” 
 “Couldn’t care less, Ed. That’s not the point. Clicks are. You write it, they’ll 
click. Get out there, dig around. Find someone who was there.” 
“They’re all dead, Gina.” 
“Then a daughter or a granddaughter of someone who was. I don’t really care. 
I just want a copy on my desk by the fourteenth.” 
“Three weeks?” I titled back my chair. The tiled ceiling suddenly felt 
confining, a prison of dunces. “Who’s paying for this?” 
“Whatever you need, Ed. Just ask. This is serious. Patrick wants to see it, too.” 
“Why the hell does corporate care if The Atlantic beats us on clicks? They 
always beat us.”    
“That’s the wrong question. In fact, questions are meaningless when it comes 
to Patrick. Just get it done.” 
“Okay, fine. But why not Paguyo or Martinez? Both know music better than I 
do.” 
“True. But that’s the point. Patrick wants someone to write it who can 
communicate it to the masses without all the jargon. So don’t use ‘tonic’ or ‘allegro’ 
or even ‘measure.’ Write it so I could understand and enjoy it.” 
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“You hate music.” 
“Exactly.”  
——— 
I left Gina’s office and caught the “Q.” I exited three blocks from the public 
library. Walking always cleared my mind. The white noise. The anonymity. The sheer 
movement of city streets. I was part of a process from which I couldn’t extricate 
myself.  
There’s a word. “Extricate.” Couldn’t use that in my story. Or “from which.” 
Ending with prepositions is fine now. Why? Because people need simplicity, and 
journalists need a third-grade intellect. It’s our screens, and our all-consuming 
Google.  
Once upon a time.  
That’s how I should begin, since this whole thing’s a fairytale anyway. Like 
Atari’s E.T. or UPN’s South Beach, a story like this could ruin my career. 
I turned the corner and saw the pillared building. It loomed overhead, stern 
and imposing. The marble steps, leading upwards, implied an ordered reality, an eye 
in the middle of process’s storm. As much as I loved this place, desired it even, it 
frightened me. 
——— 
“Classical music?” 
The librarian looked up. “Yes?” 
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“I’m looking for anything you have on the composer, Zuravel Ostrava 
Martynov.” 
His fingers were a blaze of clicking. “Floor three. Section seven. Would you 
like me to show you?” 
“No. I can find it.” 
The thick stacks ran endlessly beneath the vaulted ceiling. I could smell the 
bindings. Feel the ink. The vertigo of knowledge hit me.  
I always left the library with three or more novels. Books I wanted to read, but 
couldn’t find the time. Maybe Saturday. Didn’t Gaiman just release a new one? Now 
there was a storyteller. I wonder what he could do with Martynov?  
Here it was. The book that Gina had told me about, The Composer: A Symbol Burnt 
in St. Petersburg by Nikolayevich Romanov Diletsky. 
 
On Religious Aesthetics 
Aesthetics is a strange category rife with slippage. Its use is often indeterminate, 
idiosyncratic, and disparate.83 While it did not begin properly as an academic field until 
1750 when Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten coined the term “aesthetics” from the Greek 
aisthesis (perception by the senses),84 aesthetics has a much older lineage wherein the 
Greek τεχνή (craft, skill, or technical trade), ποιήσις (making, creation, or the poetic arts), 
and τὸ καλόν (beautiful, useful, or good) are all jumbled together in a grab-bag of curios 
                                                
83 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (New York: Blackwell, 1991), 3. 
84 Alexander Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. 
Holther (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954). 
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and miscellany. Aesthetics, on the one hand, is concerned with that which is beautiful—
or Beautiful—and therefore with the fine arts or, when capitalized, with theology.85 That 
is, until recently, when aesthetes turned their attention towards culture, pop or 
otherwise.86 On the other hand, aesthetics is interested in perception, cognition, and 
knowledge. It questions how one might come to know reality through the continuum of 
the senses, while problematizing the role of language, categories, and culture in 
understanding the world.87 But it also has a long and august theological and religious 
tradition that considers the role that the senses play in divine revelation,88 as well as, 
more recently, the materiality of religious practices.89  
                                                
85 This is a tradition that moves from Hegel to Bell to Adorno, to name a few. Cf. Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (2 Volumes), trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975); Clive Bell, Art (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2015); Theodor W. Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
86 Cf. S. Brent Plate, “Inventing Religious Aesthetics: Word/image/body/other in Walter Benjamin 
and Gary Hill” (PhD diss., Emory University, 1999); Umberto Eco, Apocalypse Postponed: Essays by 
Umberto Eco, ed. Robert Lumley (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000); and Mark C. Taylor, 
Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
87 This is a tradition, to name a few, that runs from Kant to Croce to Crowther. Cf. Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Judgment, ed. Nicholas Walker, trans. James Creed Meredith, rev. Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic, trans. Douglas Ainslie (Boston: Nonpareil Books, 
1978); Paul Crowther, How Pictures Complete Us: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Divine (Redwood 
City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). 
88 Cf. Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988); Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics 
(San Francisco and New York: Ignatius Press, 1983–1991); Jeremy Begbie, Voicing Creation’s Praise: 
Towards a Theology of the Arts (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991).  
89 S. Brent Plate, A History of Religion in 5½ Objects: Bringing the Spiritual to Its Senses (Boston: 
Beacon, 2015); S. Brent Plate, “The Skin of Religion: Aesthetic Mediations of the Sacred. Crosscurrents 
62, no. 2 (June 2012): 162–80; S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion, and Aesthetics: Rethinking 
Religion Through the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2005); Manuel A. Vasquez, More Than Belief: A 
Materialist Theory of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Though not religious studies 
scholars, this trend towards materiality can also be seen, to name a few, in Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: 
The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) and Bruno Latour, 
On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2010). 
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 With these possible meanings and launching points, it is the burden of any 
aesthete to describe what she means when using the word “aesthetics.” That is my 
purpose in this section wherein I not only carve out my usage from the muddled history 
of the term, but also begin to describe what an aesthetics of ambiguity might look like. I 
focus mostly on religious aesthetics and its trajectory towards materiality, but also on the 
way in which my understanding of ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility confronts 
religious aesthetics. Moving forward, I discuss two forms of religious aesthetics before 
turning my attention to an aesthetic informed by ambiguity. These two forms of religious 
aesthetics are distinct but mutually informing. They are what I call transcendental 
religious aesthetics and material religious aesthetics. In both cases, however, the two 
camps overlap in their usage of the term. Depending upon the scholar, aesthetics can 
mean sense perception, art criticism, or a conflation of both. And, as I will show, the 
category of “aesthetics” is far from regulated. 
Transcendental Religious Aesthetics       
A transcendental religious aesthetic engages the categories of the Beautiful, the 
True, and the Good (not to mention God) and considers how these transcendentals 
illuminate divine revelation. While this field of discourse has a long history, of which 
Eco is a part (though, it must be said, from a non-confessional standpoint),90 it has been 
most recently dominated by Hans Urs von Balthasar. It is nearly impossible to summarize 
                                                
90 Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas; Umberto Eco and David Robey, The Aesthetics of 
Chaosmos: The Middle Ages of James Joyce, trans. Ellen Esrock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989); Umberto Eco, On Ugliness (New York: Rizzoli, 2011); Umberto Eco, History of Beauty 
(New York: Rizzoli, 2010); Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, trans. Hugh Bredin (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). 
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the voluminous writings of von Balthasar. While I do not have the time, space, or 
inclination to do so, it is important to get a sense of what von Balthasar was up to. I must 
stress, however, that I grapple with von Balthasar, ever so briefly, not to understand him 
better, but to understand what I mean by religious aesthetics. 
 Von Balthasar’s basic aim is to treat beauty (pulchrum) as the way God’s 
goodness (bonum) “gives itself and is expressed by God and understood by man as the 
truth (verum).”91 What is key is that Balthasar sets out to distinguish between an aesthetic 
theology and a theological aesthetics. The former tries to comprehend the experience of 
divine beauty by means of some preconceived notion of the beautiful and thus corrupts 
biblical values and limits Christian perception. The latter beholds the unique beauty of a 
revelatory form as something freely given by God. In the end, Balthasar seeks to give an 
account of the “subjective evidence” of revelation, considering how the beautiful form(s) 
of the divine are beheld by the faithful, before turning to the “objective” basis for such 
experiences of revelatory beauty, which is absolutely and inescapably God’s Incarnation 
in Christ—a reality that Balthasar regards as the foundation of any possible Christian 
theological aesthetics. 
If I can put it bluntly, von Balthasar takes the two-thousand-year history of 
aesthetics and rethinks it through the “injected narrative” of Jesus’ incarnation or forma 
Christi.92 By positing this as a starting or initial point, von Balthasar is able to order his 
                                                
91 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (San Francisco and 
New York: Ignatius Press; Crossroad, 1983–1991), 13 and 151. 
92 Cf. Benjamin John Peters, Sigurd’s Lament: An Alliterative Epic (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017), 
53–5 and 206–8 for what I mean by an “injected narrative.” See also, E. Thomas Lawson, “Cognition,” in 
Guide to the Study of Religion, eds. Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (London: Cassell, 2000), 83 
and Adam B. Seligman, et al., Ritual and Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25 for 
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cosmos in such a way that he can arrive at a properly understood aesthetic (in the sense of 
both perception and art). But, as Paul Crowther has shown, much of von Balthasar’s 
logic, even when read generously, falls flat.93 Perhaps another way to examine von 
Balthasar regarding my project is to suggest that his aesthetic seeks to do away with any 
coexistent incompatibilities in the Christian worldview. In this way, von Balthasar’s 
univocal aesthetic is extremely low in ambiguity.    
Helpful, here, however is the definition of Christian transcendence that one of von 
Balthasar’s main commentators provides:  
Christian transcendence is the encounter of the human person with God in the 
world, an encounter in which the empirical facticity of the external world is 
sacralized in light of God’s creative activity, and in which those subjective human 
limitations that can be ascribed to egoism are healed by a grace whose ever-
receding horizon makes any exhaustive understanding of salvific transcendence 
impossible to attain.94  
 
If this kind of transcendence can be understood as a human’s encounter with God in the 
world, then an aesthetic informed by this focuses on the phrase “in the world” and the 
ways in which Beauty enraptures a human as she beholds an object. Before I move on 
then, I can summarize von Balthasar’s transcendental religious aesthetic as that which 
focuses on Beauty, Truth, and the Good in so far as they reveal the form, from within 
themselves, of the divine, which is the forma Christi or the illumined humanity and 
divinity of Jesus.  
                                                                                                                                            
a similar phenomenon known in ritual theory as the “initial point.” 
93 Paul Crowther, How Pictures Complete Us: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Divine 
(Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 159–160. See also, Karen Kilby, Balthasar: A 
(Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 167.  
94 Christopher D. Denny, A Generous Symphony: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Literary Revelations 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2016), 8. 
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While von Balthasar has constructed a house that most transcendental religious 
aesthetes cannot escape, very few engage von Balthasar without eventually remodeling. 
One example of this is Christopher D. Denny’s critical extension of Balthasar. To Denny, 
one does not just behold a percept and through it that to which it points, but rather 
participates with the percept. It is in that participation or performance that the form is not 
only revealed but also appropriated for any given community95—likewise, Frank Burch 
Brown, Alejandro García-River, and Jeremy Begbie96 all of whom, in some way, build 
upon, critique, and extend that which von Balthasar has done. In most cases, the operative 
transcendental religious aesthetic seeks to place the transcendental—Beauty, Truth, 
God—into conversation with culture, power, or identity. Brown’s “neo-aesthetics” 
exemplifies this approach, “which is distinguished by the attempt to take seriously such 
complex aesthetic responses and judgments and to recognize the extent to which they are 
an ingredient in all of culture, and not least in religion.”97  
In an interesting move, Brown takes a transcendental aesthetic and, placing it in 
conversation with culture, argues that there is no pure aesthetic object and therefore 
nothing outside of the gaze of the religious aesthete. In fact, he argues, many artists—
though materialists—seek to account for the “unknowable more” of experience.98 In this 
                                                
95 Denny, 275.  
96 Alejandro García-Rivera, The Community of the Beautiful: A Theological Aesthetics 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999); Frank Burch Brown, Religious Aesthetics (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1993); Jeremy Begbie, Voicing Creation’s Praise: Towards a Theology of the Arts 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991). 
97 Brown, Religious Aesthetics, 13. 
98 Cf. Amy Hungerford, Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 1960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Magdalena Maczynska, The Gospel According to the 
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way, a transcendental religious aesthetic focuses on neither religion nor art, but rather an 
integration of the two that has the power to formulate a theological ethic. And, in the end, 
that is the concern for a transcendental religious aesthetic.  
Whether of the von Balthasarian type or the more culturally oriented approaches 
of Denny, Brown, and García-Rivera, a transcendental religious aesthetic is preeminently 
concerned with how either God illuminates experience or experience engages, 
appropriates, or symbiotically relates to God. A transcendental religious aesthetic, in 
other words, is theologically driven and rarely, if ever, operates outside the “reality” of 
God. This, of course, raises the question: Is the very idea of God antithetical to a theory 
of ambiguity understood as coexistent incompatibility? Or could someone like Brown 
argue that all ambiguities resolve in a Christian conceptualization of God even if not all 
are accounted for in a theological ethic? If God implies a univocalization of reality, then 
how does one account for a plurivocality in perception, and particularly regarding 
incompatible perceptions that are coexistent?     
A transcendental religious aesthetic, in the end, can be summarized by Gesa 
Elsbeth Thiessen, who writes:  
Beauty is not an extra, it is essential to all existence. Truth or goodness without 
becomes dull, lifeless, boring, formalistic and cold. It is beauty . . . which excites 
and nourishes human feeling, desire, thought and imagination. It is the splendour 
of beauty that makes the true and the good whole. The magnitude of beauty in 
nature and in all human creation, wherever it is experienced, gives us a glimpse of 
the beauty of God, therein lies its saving power. In this way beauty becomes a 
                                                                                                                                            
Novelist: Religious Scripture and Contemporary Fiction (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); John 
McClure, Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and Morrison (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2007). 
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way to God and a manifestation of God at the same time. God’s beauty is what 
draws us to God.99  
 
 I am not, however, interested in a transcendental religious aesthetic. If this section 
has done anything for me, then it has fulfilled an apophatic function. When I say religious 
aesthetics, I do not mean a transcendental religious aesthetic or an aesthetic that either 
starts from God, desiring to illuminate experience via Beauty or an aesthetic that seeks to 
explore a perceived fundamental Beauty and its entanglement with creation. If there is a 
critical unawareness in this perspective, then it is in the thoroughly western assumption 
(rooted in τὸ καλόν) that the beautiful and the good are somehow intertwined or 
entangled. This raises the question: Could one imagine an aesthetic that accounts for both 
sense perception and the philosophy of art that is not caught in the transcendental traps of 
beauty and goodness equaling a neo-Platonic unity, oneness, or God? 
S. Brent Plate’s answer to this question is a simple, “yes.”100 He desires “to see a 
religious aesthetic that does not take as its starting and ending point, Beauty, Truth, or 
God.”101 Turning my attention to what I call a material religious aesthetic, I will show 
how Plate’s project differs drastically from that of von Balthasar’s, how it relates to what 
                                                
99 Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, ed. Theological Aesthetics: A Reader (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 2004), 6. 
100 S. Brent Plate, “Inventing Religious Aesthetics: Word/Image/Body/Other in Walter Benjamin 
and Gary Hill,” PhD diss. (Emory University, 1999); S. Brent. Plate, A History of Religion in 5½ Objects: 
Bringing the Spiritual to Its Senses (Boston: Beacon, 2015); S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion, and 
Aesthetics: Rethinking Religion Through the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2005); S. Brent Plate, “The Skin 
of Religion: Aesthetic Mediations of the Sacred,” CrossCurrents, 62, no. 12 (June 2012): 162–80. 
101 Plate, Walter Benjamin, viii. This raises the question, of course, of why is a material aesthetic 
more appealing than a transcendental one? Though this has to do, no doubt, with the inclinations of the 
scholar, it also opens up aesthetics to new potentialities and directions.   
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I mean by religious aesthetics, and, finally, how ambiguity fits into a religious aesthetic 
that spurns the transcendentals. 
Material Religious Aesthetics  
If philosophical aesthetics (via Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant) at first asked the 
question of how materiality, sense perception, and the body related to the supersensible, 
reason, and logic, then this was largely forgotten after Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
who transformed aesthetics into a discourse on fine arts. Terry Eagleton, though certainly 
not the first to recognize this, recalled the foundation of aesthetics as sense perception 
and began to hold that in conversation with aesthetics as the philosophy of art. Plate 
taking his cue from Eagleton, raises this strange history of aesthetics and argues that a 
religious—as opposed to theological—aesthetic should account for both materiality and 
semiotics, for both experience and idea.  
In this way, a religious aesthetic should be concerned with what Plate calls the 
“skinscape” or that liminal space between aesthetica naturalis and aesthetica 
artificialis.102 Going back to his dissertation, Plate conceives of a different aesthetics, one 
                                                
102 “Aesthetics” can be defined in two ways: one, aesthetics is sensory perception (things 
perceived) and is distinct from conceptual knowledge (things known). Two, aesthetics is the philosophical 
study of style, art, beauty, and taste. The former is considered to be aesthetica naturalis, while the latter is 
considered to be aesthetica artificialis. By “religious aesthetics,” I am relying on Plate’s definition and 
understanding of how religion and aesthetics are mutually informing. In one sense, aesthetics focuses on 
how we perceive and create our worlds through sense perception, which is then responsible for the 
formation of community and society. Here Plate sees the dialectic between naturalis and artificialis—
between embodiment and objects/arts—as forming an originary point for the study of religion. How? 
Because “fundamental to this,” Plate writes, “is the contention that sense perception is a central point of 
mediation for the reception, creation, and reproduction of social-sacred space.” A religious aesthetics then 
is that which focuses on the liminal space between the dialectic of naturalis and artificialis and, from that 
vantage point, analyzes religious worlds. Likewise, by an “invented religious aesthetics,” Plate means that 
which is informed by Walter Benjamin’s anti-beauty aesthetic that focuses on fragments and 
interconnection over transcendentals and individual contemplation. S. Brent Plate, “The Skin of Religion: 
Aesthetic Mediations of the Sacred,” Crosscurrents 62, no. 2 (2012): 167–8; S. Brent Plate, “Inventing 
Religious Aesthetics: Word/Image/Body/Other in Walter Benjamin and Gary Hill,” PhD dissertation 
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that does not rely on transcendence and representation. His key concerns are the way the 
“body perceives the words and images of the world, and the way these bodily perceptions 
interact with other human bodies.”103 He accomplishes this shift away from 
transcendental aesthetics and towards material aesthetics by closely examining Walter 
Benjamin’s insistence that aesthetics should concern itself with communal dispersal (the 
theater) rather than the disembodied consciousness of a single individual (the novel). 
Materialist in orientation, Plate writes of Benjamin:  
Once in the realm of the corporeal, the emphasis on the aesthetics of the single 
individual is shifted outward to the aesthetic interaction in and between others. 
Among these ‘other’ interactions are the interactions between word and images, 
between bodies and technology, between words and technology, or between 
others.104  
 
This move towards materiality and the body is necessarily away from the beauty 
and goodness of τὸ καλόν. Instead of beauty, there is only fragment. Instead of the neo-
Platonic good, there is only movement (like that of Lucretius). While he changes the 
name throughout his career, Plate begins by calling his material aesthetic, “an invented 
religious aesthetic.”105 It is that which emphasizes interconnection and is beyond the 
individual logocentric self. Aesthetics, in Plate’s reading of Benjamin, is about taking the 
world apart, rummaging through its ruins, and putting it back together in creative ways.106 
This would suggest an inventive approach to studying religion, one that would pull 
                                                                                                                                            
(Emory University, 1999). 
103 Plate, Inventing, 1. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid. 
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traditions apart and put them back together in new ways. This is an allegorical model (as 
opposed to a symbolic) and viewed as a “process of demythologizing and 
remythologizing without a final stable order.”107  
The shift away from Beauty, Truth, or God then—a transcendental religious 
aesthetic—is towards a materiality, which leaves open the possibility for that which is 
“mystical.”108 Plate’s aesthetic is not an arche, but only “one fertile field from which to 
begin.”109 Plate grounds aesthetic experience “in an-other place: in a dialectic between 
material culture and the human creative activities of religious practice.”110 This “other 
place” is, of course, Plate’s skinscape, wherein natural aesthetics deals with cognition and 
perception while artificial aesthetics deals with medium and message. “The skinscape of 
religion,” he writes, “stands at the crux of the matter, the heart of religion: it happens at 
in-between, mediated places. From this focal point, it unfolds outward to become the 
foundation stone in the construction of social-sacred space.”111  
Where there is an overlap between Plate’s position and mine is in considering the 
skinscape as an instantiation of ambiguity. Plate’s aesthetic, in other words, both 
highlights and accounts for plurivocality—in distinction to von Balthasar’s univocality—
                                                
107 Plate, Walter Benjamin, 79. 
108 Cf. Mary Dunn, “What Really Happened: Radical Empiricism and the Historian of Religion,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 84, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 881–902 and Tyler Roberts, 
Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism After Secularism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013). 
109 Ibid., 3. 
110 Ibid., 4. 
111 Plate, Skinscape, 173. 
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in sense perception and meaning making. In many ways, it is an aesthetic that recognizes 
coexistent incompatibility, though by utilizing a different bibliography. The main 
difference between Plate’s skinscape and my understanding of ambiguity is that 
ambiguity seeks to show how Plate’s skinscape both arises and functions, while also 
going one step further in seeking to account for potentialities and the creation of new 
knowledge. Coexistent incompatibility, in other words, opens and extends that which 
Plate has outlined. Throughout this project, it is one of my aims to show this through 
bringing Eco’s ambiguity into conversation with Plate’s religious aesthetic.    
In summary, and before I turn to aesthetics’ confrontation with ambiguity, I have 
discussed both a transcendental and material religious aesthetic. I have shown how 
aesthetics turned from sense perception to art and from art to transcendentals (though this 
movement was never linear). I have discussed the entanglement of beauty and the good, 
and the desire for transcendental aesthetics to make lower-case beauty reveal the upper-
case Beauty that is God. I have also examined Plate’s insistence that this perspective is 
ultimately flawed and in need of a thorough revision. For him, this means not only 
accounting for but also starting from an encounter with the materiality of everyday 
experience.  
This leads me to ask the question: What does a material aesthetic achieve or do 
that a transcendental aesthetic does not? First, I think, it seeks to do away with or at least 
account for injected narratives or what I have called univocalities. It acknowledges that, 
while we all have our starting points, when considering the construction of reality via 
sense perceptions, we can, at the very least, work from the ground up. Second, it 
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maintains that this ground up approach is inextricably linked to the semiotic world. Once 
sense perception is received or the continuum partitioned, it nearly instantaneously enters 
a semiotic or cultural world. A material religious aesthetic acknowledges this and seeks 
to maintain a balance between the material and semiotic. A transcendental religious 
aesthetic, however, often takes the material as contentless, meaningless, or empty in that 
it only points to the truer reality which is revealed through form.112 In this way then, a 
material religious aesthetic is neither fully sense perception nor imaginative creativity 
(cultural semiosis). It is somewhere in between, accounting for both, while—and this is 
where coexistent incompatibility is at work—suggesting new possibilities. 
So how does this section on materiality help me to define what I mean by 
“religious aesthetics” and how does that better set up religious aesthetics’ confrontation 
with ambiguity? You will have noticed, no doubt, that I have yet to define the religion in 
my religious aesthetics. And though tedious, defining what I mean by religion is a 
necessary task, since I purport to be a religious studies scholar. If von Balthasar wears 
religion on his sleeve and Plate’s religion comes into play through his emphasis on 
analyzing religious objects, seen most clearly in one of his more recent works, A History 
of Religion in 5 1/2 Objects and his role as managing editor of the journal, “Material 
Religion: The Journal of Objects, Art and Belief,” then what exactly do I mean by 
“religion?”113  
                                                
112 Though, as I have shown via Brown, some transcendental religious aesthetes have set out to 
correct this.  
113 In both instances, Plate’s use of “religion” is indebted to William E. Paden’s work on religious 
worlds. William E. Paden’s description of religious worlds are distinct from religious beliefs. For Paden, a 
“world” is a “descriptive word for what a community or individual deems is the ‘reality’ it inhabits.” It is 
not something “out there” that we all share. In this way, a “religious reality” is constituted through mythic 
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I have previously suggested three things that I take into consideration regarding 
religion. One:114  
Religion is a cultural system or process stemming from the encyclopedia of any 
particular culture or language that, in turn, is negotiated or embodied in the 
world—an encyclopedia constructing and shaping a reality,115 a reality 
formulating and informing an encyclopedia.116 Religion is that narrative—wrested 
from the relationship between a culture’s encyclopedia and reality—by which any 
community orders and makes sense of its world. It is that subjunctive, ‘as if’ 
reality that any particular community posits and embodies.117 This understanding 
of religion is not meant to be a universal definition that transcends culture and 
language, but rather an emic category negotiated by any particular culture and 
language and that, within any framework, is both absolute and absolutely fluid.118      
 
Two, I see religion similarly to theorists of implicit religion. In this way, religion is seen 
as one or more “commitment(s)” that intentionally nudge the secular/sacred balance off 
kilter.119 And finally, “I am highly influenced by Mary Dunn’s radical empiricism, which 
                                                                                                                                            
language and prototypes, ritual times, the engaging of gods, and the distinction between pure and profane 
behavior. “These forms of religious life, the forms of the sacred,” Paden suggests, “are at one and the same 
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Ways of Viewing Religion (Boston: Beacon, 2003), 7–9 and Religious Worlds: The Comparative Study of 
Religion (Boston: Beacon, 1994), 7. 
114 Benjamin John Peters, “Reading Religion: Chivalry in the Alliterative Morte Arthure as an 
Instance of Cultural Negotiation,” Literature and Theology (September 2016): 2. 
115 In what is becoming an endless introductory chapter on definitions, I should, no doubt, define 
what I mean by “reality.” I will, however, defer to Umberto Eco and his explorations into both “lines of 
resistance” and “common sense.” Umberto Eco, Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and 
Cognition, trans. Alastiar McEwen (New York: Harcourt,1999), 54 and 133. 
116 Umberto  Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), 66–
80 and Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 46–
86. See also, Paolo Desogus, “The Encyclopedia in Umberto Eco’s Semiotics,” Semiotica 192 (2012): 506–
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117 Cf. Adam B. Seligman, Robert P. Weller, Michael J. Puett and Bennett Simon, Ritual and Its 
Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25. 
118 Stanley Fish, “Is There a Text in This Class?,” in The Stanley Fish Reader, ed. H. Aram Veeser 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 38–54. 
119 Benjamin John Peters, “Telescope + Mirror = Reflections on the Cosmos: Umberto Eco and the 
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seeks to account for the ‘unknowable more’ that juxtaposes a multiplicity of narratives in 
the hopes of engineering an encounter between the scholar’s world and that of her 
subject’s.”120 
 Taking these previous statements into account along with the preceding section, 
by “religious aesthetics” I mean, first, an aesthetic that distends into both everyday 
experience and the creative accounts of experience that humans manufacture to make 
meaning. This is an aesthetic that considers both sense perception and the poetic 
(ποιήσις) arts. By religion, I mean something like the celebration (both semiotic and 
embodied) of a communal narrative that is committedly lived in the subjunctive. And, 
slamming the two together, “religious aesthetics” is an approach to aesthetic theory that 
seeks to account for the meaning making processes—the commitments and narratives—
of humans, grounded in the everyday, but takes into consideration the unknowable more. 
In other words, my religious aesthetic is never a last word, but rather a provisional 
exploration into the meanings that humans create.      
An Ambiguous Religious Aesthetic 
If by ambiguity I mean coexistent incompatibility and by religious aesthetics I 
mean the provisional exploration into the commitments and narratives that humans 
subjunctively embody, then one final question remains: How does the one inform the 
other? In many ways, this project is founded on that question, in so far as it seeks to argue 
                                                                                                                                            
Bailey, “Implicit Religion,” Religion 40, no. 4 (2010): 271–78 and “Implicit Religion,” in The Oxford 
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that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of 
knowledge and the narrativization of reality. What I write here, however, is not 
exhaustive, but rather preparatory for what is to come. As I seek to answer this question 
and argue this thesis throughout the remaining chapters, I would like to stress that, one, 
and perhaps most importantly, ambiguity functions as a reminder that all human 
commitments are ultimately perspectives or equal centers in an infinity of meaning.121 
This is most true on micro or local levels that must be generalized the further out one 
goes. When localizations and their perspectives clash, then negotiations must ensue. But 
as far as ambiguity is concerned, there is no deferral to rules established outside of human 
experience.  
Two, ambiguity emphasizes the need in aesthetics for both semiotics and 
materiality. While its initial point is often that which is perceived, ambiguity never 
eschews the cultural encyclopedia or that which makes meaning possible given any 
percept. Three, coexistent incompatibility stresses that all knowledge is provisional, and 
that the structures that facilitate meaning are fluid, procedural, and always expanding and 
contracting.  
Finally, ambiguity is important to a religious aesthetic as I have defined it because 
it reveals, when it comes to meaning, that neither the encyclopedia nor the object is fixed. 
Both cultural knowledge and the ways in which I understand reality can grow, morph, 
and radically change. Ambiguity, in the end, is important because it asks religious 
                                                
121 Karsten Harries, Infinity and Perspective (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002). 
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aesthetes to pause before viewing the double slits and remain in the discomfort of not 
knowing, and then, when all light has passed, to consider the other, incompatible reality.    
Conclusion 
Never a fun or exciting chapter, the first part of any lengthy project both defines 
terms and provides a map for the reader. I apologize if I have droned on, but it is my hope 
that you can walk away with three things: an understanding of ambiguity, religious 
aesthetics, and the ways in which I put the two together. In summary, I have defined 
ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility, and am concerned here with the proliferation of 
meaning, holding multiple interpretations in tension, and the role of the reader. Greatly 
informed by S. Brent Plate, I have carved out a niche in religious aesthetics that moves 
towards materiality without eschewing semiotics. Religious aesthetics, for me, is the 
provisional exploration into the commitments and narratives that humans subjunctively 
embody. And, finally, placing the two together, I discussed in the final section some of 
the ways in which ambiguity informs religious aesthetics. These were, however, 
provisional claims. I will now turn my attention to Umberto Eco’s corpus so that I can 
better situate and understand his theory of ambiguity and the unique contribution it makes 
not only to theories of ambiguity, but also to religious aesthetics. 
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EXCURSUS ONE: 
THE DISPOSSESSED: AN AMBIGUOUS UTOPIA 
“But was not a theory of which all the elements were provably true a simple tautology? In 
the region of the unprovable, or even the disprovable, lay the only chance for breaking 
out of the circle and going ahead.”122 
—Ursula K. Le Guin 
Introduction 
 
Science fiction and ambiguity are strange bedfellows. Ambiguity is challenge and 
violation. It calls into question the encyclopedia and suggests new possibilities. But 
science fiction? It is escapist, low-brow, and better suited for the beach than the vaulted 
ceilings of academia. While the one conjures “art,” the other covets profit. The purpose 
of this excursus, however, is twofold. One, to suggest that science fiction is one of 
ambiguity’s strongest allies. And two, that an aesthetics of ambiguity transcends the work 
of Umberto Eco. To accomplish these two goals, I briefly ruminate on Ursula K. Le 
Guin’s novel, The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia and argue that ambiguity 
flourishes in science fiction’s potential to comment on the present. 
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Setting the Scene 
“Where, then, is Truth? . . . In the hill one happens to be sitting on.”123 
 
Imagine a future wherein capitalism and socialism are entrenched to such a degree 
that both parties can no longer inhabit the same planet. And rather than continue their 
age-old war, the two agree upon a cosmic armistice. The socialists can colonize the moon 
to pursue their communitarian project, but at the expense of never again setting foot on 
earth.  
Consider two-hundred years passing. Neither the moon nor the earth have been in 
communication. The lunar colony, having created its own language, cultural 
encyclopedia, and economic system, no longer considers itself the same race as those 
who inhabit earth. For the living, the moon is the only home they have ever known.  
Picture this new world with all of its idiosyncrasies, differences, and assumptions. 
It is not our world. It is foreign and strange. It is a culture wherein “family” has no 
meaning and sex and sexuality are shared and fluid. There is no personal property. 
Individuality is frowned upon. And intellectual property is not a functioning concept. It is 
a society that is flawed, no doubt, but one that operates well for its inhabitants.  
Now imagine a scientist on that world. He is a theoretical physicist concerned 
with the nature of time. Working on a theory of simultaneity that stitches together time as 
arrow and time as circle, he reaches out to earth. He desires to share scientific research, to 
learn, to grow, and to stretch his epistemological horizon. He not only learns earth’s 
language, but also freely shares his theories. After a time, the scientist decides to visit 
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earth. He hopes to utilize earth’s vast resources in order to solve the problem of 
simultaneity. He is the first and only lunar colonist to return to the home planet. 
While at first glance that which is violation, challenge, or epistemological growth 
is encountered when I read about the strangeness of the lunar world, I wonder if 
ambiguity is not better understood here as self-reflexive? My encyclopedia grows, in 
other words, not only when I consider the ambiguity of the other, but also when I 
consider how the other defamiliarizes my already given. When I listen to the other speak 
about my world and its strangeness. Ambiguity as novel then—but particularly science 
fiction—is about constructing a possible, as-if world in such a way that I experience or 
see my embodied, narrativizing theory in a new light or from a slanted perspective.  
What is ambiguous here is not the foreignness of the socialist, lunar colony—
though it is that—but rather seeing the earth for the first time through the eyes of the 
scientist, Shevek. In this way, ambiguity is a confrontation with the taken for granted. It 
allows me to conceive of a world in which things are ordered differently and, in doing so, 
critique my own ordering or arrangement of realty.  
Science fiction as ambiguous, read through The Dispossessed, performs this task 
by creating a critical distance between this world and that. It breaks down the dogmas of 
the present and allows for the possibility of epistemological provisionality. By entering 
into an imagined extension of the present, I am able to gain unique insights into what 
may or may not be. I am able to play with choice and consequence, and conceive of 
alternate ways of being in the world.  
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Shevek then not only encounters ambiguity in his travels—that which violates, 
challenges, and questions his own encyclopedia—but he also represents ambiguity as 
self-reflexivity for his readers. And, on a larger scale, Shevek’s genre is uniquely suited 
for strategically produced ambiguity in that it provides critical distance on the present and 
functions as a foretelling of what might be.  
Crossing the Wall 
 
“Like all walls it was ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside it and what was outside it 
depended upon which side of it you were on.”124 
There is a wall that separates the lunar colonies from the moon’s spaceport. Walls 
are enigmas, however. When one does not possess, what use are walls? And yet, this wall 
is more than its material. It represents, among many things, the boundary between 
encyclopedias, between the lunar social world and earth’s. When Shevek crosses that 
boundary in order to travel to earth, he realizes that “you shall not go down twice to the 
same river, nor can you go home again.”125 To cross that boundary is, in lunar terms, to 
become a profiteer and an egoist.  
Shevek is neither, of course. He his only hungry for knowledge and intellectual 
community. But his reception is less than he had hoped for. Befriending the ship’s doctor, 
Shevek asks why the Second Officer is afraid of him. “Oh,” the doctor responds, “with 
him it’s religious bigotry. He’s a strict-interpretation Epiphanist. Recites the Primes every 
night. A totally rigid mind.” To the Second Officer then, Shevek is ambiguous. He is an 
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event that challenges his encyclopedic arrangement, his narrativizing theory. Recognizing 
this, the Second Officer rejects the possibility for ambiguity as self-reflexive. He rejects 
provisionality. This prompts Shevek to ask: “So he [,the Second Officer,] sees me—
how?” 
‘As a dangerous atheist.’ 
‘An atheist! Why?’ 
‘Why, because you’re [from the lunar colony], Anarres—there’s no 
religion on Anarres.’ 
‘No religion? Are we stones, on Anarres?’ 
‘I mean established religion—churches, creeds—’ Kimoe [,the doctor,] 
flustered easily. He had the physician’s brisk self-assurance, but Shavek 
continually upset it. All his explanations ended up, after two or three of Shevek’s 
questions, in floundering. Each took for granted certain relationships that the 
other could not even see.126  
 
What is revealing about this exchange is not necessarily the response of the 
Second Officer to Shevek, but rather the admission at the end. “Each took for granted,” 
the narrator claims, “certain relationships that the other could not even see.” And by 
“relationships,” the narrator is suggesting, to use my language, relationships between 
cultural units in either’s respective encyclopedia, which result in a coexistent 
incompatibility. For each cultural unit, Shevek and Kimoe not only have different 
content, but also different interpretants. For both, <<Religion>> is not a shared cultural 
unit, but one that breeds ambiguity, a confrontation with the other’s unconceived of 
referent. 
For Shevek then:  
Kimoe’s ideas never seemed to be able to go in a straight line; they had to walk 
around this and avoid that, and then they ended up smack against a wall. There 
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were walls around all his thoughts, and he seemed utterly unaware of them, 
though he was perpetually hiding behind them.127  
 
And so walls return. Here, however, they are not separating cultural encyclopedias, but 
rather the potentialities of the encyclopedia—those connections that one makes leaping 
from interpretant to interpretant. Shevek is frustrated by Kimoe’s inability to navigate the 
lunar encyclopedia but, consequently, is blind to his own inability to make connections 
from Kimoe’s point of view.  
But walls are undoubtedly a repeated theme in The Dispossessed, and later 
represent that which ambiguity must challenge. “Those who build walls,” Shevek 
suggests, “are their own prisoners. I’m going to go fulfill my proper function in the social 
organism. I’m going to go unbuild walls.”128 In this way, Shevek’s encounter with 
ambiguity results in a formulation of the work of ambiguity, which is the shattering of 
cultural givens, while also facilitating new connections across the cultural network. 
The Inventor-Destroyer 
 
“Not a craftsman—a creator. An inventor-destroyer, the kind who’s got to turn 
everything upside down and inside out. A satirist, a man who praises through rage.”129 
The lunar colony is a utopia, but an ambiguous one. By that, I think, Le Guin 
meant it was not perfect. It was only utopian in that it sought to correct earth’s flaws. In 
doing so, however, it created its own set of encyclopedic imperfections. It was, in other 
words, as human as its neighboring planet. One of the ways it failed was in its inability to 
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recognize humor, satire, or any ironic critique of the socialist systems that it had 
established.  
 Tirin, a childhood friend of Shevek, was an artist. “He was,” in fact, “so funny, 
and so alive.”130 He had written a play that he endlessly edited, added to, and adjusted, 
but only performed once. In the play, “he was marvelous.”131 But it offended the 
sensibility of those in power, and so Tirin was forced to live in the moon’s therapy 
colony. He was, after, a broken man. And what broke him? “The play broke him.”  
‘The play? The Tuss those old turds made about it? Oh, but listen, to be 
driven crazy by that kind of moralistic scolding you’d have to be crazy already. 
All he had to do was ignore it!’ 
  ‘Tir was crazy already. By our society’s standards.’ 
  ‘What do you mean?’ 
 ‘Well, I think Tir’s a born artist. Not a craftsman—a creator. An inventor-
destroyer, the kind who’s got to turn everything upside down and inside out. A 
satirist, a man who praises through rage.’132 
 
 But the question must be asked: Was not Tirin a free colonist? Could he not do 
what he liked, reject what he did not? Could he not be the lunar colony’s ambiguous 
conscience? According to Shevek, no.  
‘The social conscience completely dominates the individual conscience, instead of 
striking a balance with it. We don’t cooperate—we obey. We fear being outcast, 
being called lazy, dysfunctional, egoizing. We fear our neighbor’s opinion more 
than we respect our freedom of choice . . . We force a man outside the sphere of 
our approval, and then condemn him for it. We’ve made laws, laws of 
conventional behavior, built walls all around ourselves, and we can’t see them, 
because they’re part of our thinking . . . [Tirin] never did it, he never could build 
walls.’133  
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 And so, according to Shevek, even the lunar colonies had an encyclopedia and a 
narrativized theory that they took for granted, as if. They were incapable of escaping that 
narrative, because it was muted, hidden away. It played in the background of their 
imagination, and disallowed genuine innovation. There was no room for lightness. 
Shevek recognized his culture’s low tolerance for ambiguity, and understood Tirin’s life 
as an unfortunate consequence of that fact.  
 Shevek was lucky, however. Even though he was also an innovator, he was 
provided with more leeway. But why? Because Shevek was a scientist, not an artist. “A 
scientist can pretend that his work isn’t himself, it’s merely the impersonal truth. An artist 
can’t hide behind the truth. He can’t hide anywhere.”134 The scientist, in other words, 
hides behind Firstness or capital “F” fact. Science strips poesis out of its narrativizing 
theory. It is not a making. It is that which is. But for the artist and poet, it is a different 
story.  
 What I see then, on the part of Shevek, is a strong desire to enact an aesthetic of 
ambiguity, which is the desire to peel back the layers of the already given, to question it, 
and to expose its as-ifness. It is a longing for a provisional epistemology. A knowledge 
that eschews certainty and dogma for process.135 It is an acknowledgment that Tirin could 
not hide, not like a scientist, because he was responsible for both his creation and his 
choice in mapping a fiction onto reality. But what Shevek points out is that we all—artist 
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and scientist alike—are responsible to and accountable for the creative or reifying choices 
we make.136 I am, in other words, never finitely bound by my narrativizing theory. 
The World We Know 
 
“Is there no alternative to selling? Is there not such a thing as the gift?”137 
 
Shevek encounters ambiguity and desires to enact it. He alludes to breaking walls, 
coexistent incompatibility, and choice. But he also represents ambiguity for the reader, 
the possibility of confronting that which I take for granted. Shevek, in his ambiguity, 
conjures a world in which things are ordered differently, which allows me to critique my 
own ordering, my narrativizing theory. Shevek, in other words, accounts for the self-
reflexivity of ambiguity. 
 In The Dispossessed, there is Anarres, which is the lunar colony, and there is 
Urras, which is the capitalistic home world of the socialists. But there is also our earth, 
which is encountered in the climax of Shevek’s journey to Urras.  
Shevek flies to the home world. He lives there, learning the cultural world of high 
capitalism. He is confused and often missteps, but also stretches his own cultural 
encyclopedia. Eventually, however, he comes to represent for the lower classes a 
divergent social option, one that breaks down the walls of capital oppression.  
 Shevek, as icon, unwittingly starts a socialist revolution. In doing so, he is no 
longer welcome on Urras, but he cannot yet return home. For Anarres no longer 
recognizes him as a citizen. So what is a cosmic scientist to do? He seeks asylum at 
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earth’s consulate on Urras. Once granted, his discussion with the Terran Ambassador 
implies a self-reflexivity for the reader.  
‘We are both aliens here, Shevek,’ she said at last. ‘I from much farther away in 
space and time. Yet I begin to think that I am much less alien to Urras than you 
are . . . Let me tell you how this world seems to me. To me, and to all my fellow 
Terrans who have seen the planet, Urras is the kindliest, most various, most 
beautiful of all the inhabited worlds. It is the world that comes as close as any 
could to Paradise.’138 
 
That which is repulsive to Shevek, a high capitalism that strips its lower classes of 
free choice, is a paradise to the Terran ambassador. A clash of narrativizing theories, the 
two are nearly impossible to reconcile. Shevek’s perception of Urras and the 
ambassador’s are, in fact, coexistent incompatibilities. Where the one sees greed, 
injustice, and waste, the other sees goodness, beauty, and vitality.139  
“Now,” the ambassador continues, “you man from a world I cannot even imagine, 
you who see my Paradise as Hell, will you ask what my world must be like?”140 
And here, in-between sentences, self-reflexivity rears its head. That which follows 
allows me, as reader, to encounter my world anew.  
‘My world, my Earth, is a ruin. A planet spoiled by the human species. We 
multiplied and gobbled and fought until there was nothing left, and then we died. 
We controlled neither appetite nor violence; we did not adapt. We destroyed 
ourselves. But we destroyed the world first . . . We can only look at this splendid 
world, this vital society, this Urras, this Paradise, from the outside. We are 
capable only of admiring it, and maybe envying it a little.’  
‘Then Anarres, as you heard me speak of it—what would Anarres mean to 
you, Keng?’ 
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‘Nothing. Nothing, Shevek. We forfeited our chance for Anarres centuries 
ago, before it ever came into being.’141  
 
Ambiguity here is the question that the text poses to its reader. Is this the 
trajectory upon which you see yourself? This is ambiguous because it asks me to reflect 
upon and analyze my own encyclopedia, that which is taken for granted, and the way in 
which I have ordered it, my narrativizing theory.  
Perhaps I agree with Keng, and I nod in approval. Perhaps I do not, and the notion 
of consumption is new to me, and forces me to rethink the choices I make now. For 
science fiction is rarely escapist and, I think, always about the present. It is a critique of 
trajectories, a foretelling of how a contemporary narrativizing theory might embody the 
future. But for that, I must approach ambiguity as self-reflexive. I must think, wrestle, 
and engage that which is before me. I must hold that which I know as provisional. And I 
must adjust, stretch, and grow my cultural encyclopedia.  
Conclusion 
 
“What is like,” she said, “what can it be like, the society that made you? I heard you 
speak of Anarres, in the Square, and I wept listening to you, but I didn’t really believe 
you.”142 
The Dispossessed is a narrative of ambiguity, clashing encyclopedias, and 
narrativizing theories. It is a work of science fiction, which is also a text of the present. It 
reveals, through Shevek, coexistent incompatibility and the role of ambiguity in religious 
aesthetics—the way in which I peel back the layers to understand the ordering behind the 
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embodiment. It also results in ambiguity for the reader, in so far as it allows me to rethink 
my own encyclopedia, my own present. It reveals the potentiality for provisional 
thinking, an epistemology that holds itself loosely and is always self-reflexive. The 
Dispossessed, in the end, is representative of ambiguity’s process and the alliance 
between science fiction and the aesthetics of ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER TWO: UMBERTO ECO AND THE MATTER OF TEXTS 
 
The talking fresco was just a delusion and Ern had gone round the bend like his old man. 
Or, on the other hand, he was still sane and this uncanny intervention was a real event, 
was genuinely taking place there in the dangling loft about St. Paul’s, there in Ern’s 
world, there in his life. Neither of these alternatives was bearable. 
     —Alan Moore, Jerusalem 
 
Introduction 
 
Umberto Eco has said many things about ambiguity. He has explained it as that 
which “must be defined as a mode of violating the rules of the code.”143 He has posited 
its importance as an introduction to the aesthetic experience that focuses attention and 
urges interpretation. He has claimed that it produces further knowledge because it 
“compels one to reconsider the usual codes and their possibilities.”144 And in Kant and 
the Platypus, he writes: “The work of artists always tries to call our perceptual schemata 
into question, if in no other way than by inviting us to recognize that in certain 
circumstances things could also appear to us differently.”145 If this and the next chapter 
seek to do anything, then they seek to contextualize Eco’s statements on ambiguity. This 
is necessary for a few reasons.  
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One, it usefully places Eco in conversation with other theorists of ambiguity (as 
outlined in Chapter One). Two, it elucidates the reasons why I think Eco’s ambiguity is 
best suited to confront religious aesthetics. And three, it provides me with a foundation 
upon which I can begin to analyze Eco’s use of ambiguity in both his theoretical and 
creative works. It must be stressed, however, that this chapter is not seeking to crystalize 
the career of Umberto Eco, semiotician, novelist, and literary critic. For that, you can 
look elsewhere.146 This chapter, rather, seeks to contextualize Eco’s ambiguity so that I 
can better wield it within the cross-disciplinary discourse of religious aesthetics.  
That being clear, I will proceed by first examining The Open Work’s essay on 
Information Theory.147 Though often overlooked for other exemplary essays in The Open 
Work, I see this essay as the backbone to Eco’s theory of ambiguity. Through it, I will 
show that Eco’s ambiguity is not so much literary as it is a scientific ambiguity utilized 
within the field of literary criticism. After reading The Open Work, I then turn my 
attention to Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language,148 From the Tree to the 
Labyrinth,149 and A Theory of Semiotics150 to contextualize further Eco’s ambiguity 
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through his discourses on semiotics and aesthetics, cultural units, and encyclopedias. 
While I do consider his other works, these few are the spine of my argument around 
which his other works wrap as clarifying ribs. 
To those familiar with Eco’s work, the omission of his seminal work on 
ambiguity, “On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic 
Language,”151 might seem strange. I agree, which is why this chapter is but a 
contextualization of that which is to come. To understand Eco’s ambiguity, in other 
words, one must first have a general sense of what he was up to in his larger corpus. Once 
understood, however, the pieces of any specific puzzle much more easily fall into place. 
In the following chapter then, I will take up the Peircean lines of resistance as espoused 
in Kant and the Platypus152 as well as Eco’s edenic language and engage both through the 
contextualizing lens of this chapter.  
If the larger argument of this book is that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity 
emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality, then 
this chapter further clarifies not only what kind of ambiguity I am discussing but also 
how that ambiguity is indebted to the work of Umberto Eco. In this way, an ambiguity 
defined as coexistent incompatibility is best understood as one rooted in information 
theory, encyclopedias, and cultural units. 
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Information Theory and Aesthetics 
Any time a scholar of the humanities reaches into the sciences and pulls out a 
convenient metaphor or analogy, you should be wary. I am. Why? Because there is no 
way that I can understand the ins-and-outs of another, highly specialized, scientific or 
mathematical discourse. It is enough for me to toil in the fields of texts, let alone the 
abstract worlds of probability, attractors, or bits. And yet, the revolutions in quantum 
mechanics, chaos, and information cannot be overstressed for our time. They were and 
are transformations of the modern social imaginary. We engage the world, think, and 
construct reality differently because of these monumental scientific paradigm shifts. And 
so, as I move forward, there are three questions both guiding and underlying this chapter, 
which, to thrust my cards onto the table, will probably go unanswered. Unless, of course, 
you find in the matter of this text that which resolves. One, is it enough to understand the 
implications of a scientific outcome—the philosophy of it, so to speak—without grasping 
its underlying mathematics? Two, must one get the science right to pull from it a 
meaningful observation? And three, are science and the humanities mutually informing? 
 Eco, too, feels the burden of these questions. “Some people will object,” he 
writes, “that there can be no effective connections between aesthetics and information 
theory, and that to draw parallels between the two fields can only be a gratuitous, futile 
exercise. Possibly so.”153 His solution to this conundrum is to spend the next twenty or so 
pages proving that he fully understands information theory and its consequences—an 
honorable labor. I am in a different position, however. I do not need to examine either the 
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workings of information theory or its current scholarship. Rather, I need to reflect on 
Eco’s version of information theory and how he employed it regarding aesthetics. For it 
is there, in the end, that I will find the roots of his theory of ambiguity. And so, by way of 
qualification, if you are either Claude Shannon or Norbert Wiener raised from the dead, I 
apologize in advance.154 
To Umberto Eco, information theory “calculates the quantity of information 
contained in a particular message.”155 This can be summarized in a word: surprise. If I am 
told on August 4th that it will not snow, then I am being given a message with very low 
information. If, on the other hand, Channel 9 News tells me that it will snow tomorrow 
despite my past experiences, then, “given the improbability of the event,” the information 
contained within the message is extremely high.156 Information, according to Eco, is an 
additive quantity, “something added to what one already knows as if it were an original 
acquisition.”157 This fact, seemingly inconsequential, plays large in Eco’s aesthetics of 
ambiguity.  
Tied up in probability, statistical entropy,158 and redundancy, Eco’s information is 
a measure of “the levels of order and disorder in the organization of a given message.”159 
                                                
154 Should one desire to correct any errors that either I or Eco make, then she could do little better 
than James Gleick, The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood (New York: Vintage, 2012). 
155 Ibid., 45.  
156 Ibid.  
157 Ibid. 
158 Statistical entropy is distinct from thermodynamic entropy that, in the popular imagination, 
leads to the apocalyptic doom of the cosmos. The former is, rather, “the measure of that state of maximal 
equiprobability toward which natural processes tend,” Ibid., 48. 
159 Ibid., 49.  
 
 
68 
An act of communication, a message, is an organized system governed by fixed laws of 
probability—a code—and is often disturbed from within or without by disorder. This 
disorder is Eco’s notion of entropy or noise, which he often refers to as “dis-order.” 
Because for him, disorder is only possible given a previously established order (even if 
only an order of probability). If this is all a bit confusing, then you can imagine it in 
relation to the rules of English grammar. In that case, the alphabet, along with its 
grammatical laws, serves as a probabilistic order or a code by which any message can be 
communicated. If I write, “TRLTSEE” or “TT/RLS/EE,” then I have told you nothing, 
because the given letters were not organized utilizing the code of a shared alphabet. In 
order to tell you something, I must first organize my communication according to a set of 
agreed upon probabilistic codes. Utilizing the same grouping of letters but within the 
framework of our agreed upon code, I could also write, “LETTERS.” In this way, the 
code serves two purposes, among others. One, it is redundant. Given a set of consonants 
(LTTRS), you could most likely guess at the corresponding vowels. Second, it reduces or 
constricts possibility. There is only so much that I can do within the code that will be 
intelligible to you, the receiver of any message that I might send.  
If the order of the code is what allows any message to be understood, then it is 
also what makes any message predictable. “The more ordered and comprehensible a 
message,” Eco writes, “the more predictable it is.”160 But the more predictable, and this is 
key, the less information it conveys. Counterintuitive perhaps, but according to Eco, 
TRLTSEE is richer in information than LETTERS. Why? Because the former is packed 
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with surprise given our established and agreed upon probabilistic code. This is only 
possible, however, if you separate information from meaning. “Monday follows Sunday” 
is both clear and direct in meaning, but does not, Eco urges, tell you anything that you do 
not already know. It is a statement high in meaning but low in information (and 
remember, information is additive, it must add to something that you already know). In 
this way, meaning and information are related, on one side, to order and probability and, 
on the other, entropy and disorder. If you can, think back to Figure 1.2.161 Like Caglioti’s 
symmetry then, Eco’s informational ambiguity sits at the middle point between these 
competing factors in any message. A probabilistic order allows for communication that is 
predictable, intelligible, and meaningful, but information requires a certain amount of 
entropy and dis-order. Quoting Norbert Wiener, Eco writes:  
‘A piece of information, in order to contribute to the general information of a 
community, must say something substantially different from the community’s 
previous common stock of information’ . . . [for example] great artists, whose 
chief merit is that they introduce new ways of saying or doing into their 
community.162     
 
  This transitions Eco out of information theory and into the application of 
information to aesthetics and, ultimately, to aesthetics as sense perception. In regards to 
the former, ambiguity in an aesthetic message—like a poem or novel—is the result of the 
“deliberate ‘dis-ordering’ of the code . . . precisely in order to violate that system of laws 
and determinations which make up the code.”163 When encountering an aesthetic message 
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then, you are confronting a message that deliberately violates or questions “the very 
order—order as system of probability—to which it refers.”164 In this way, a poetic 
message is also high in entropy, as it accounts for equiprobability in meaning.  
As an example of this, consider W. Scott Howard’s “Ember Amen,” a poetic text 
that intentionally calls into question the probabilistic code of the English language, while 
simultaneously reminding its readers that all languages are codes.165 The effect is 
heightened by the juxtaposition of the poetic text with its rendering in Morse code. In 
both cases, the text is pregnant with information, and particularly for one (like me) who 
does not know Morse code. To read the first line of the English text, however, is an 
exercise in information as surprise.  
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Taking the first half into consideration, “In the edges of visible things silent 
islets,” I am confronted by a text that establishes the norms of the code as predictability. 
While it is clearly an aesthetic text, it still, according Eco’s information theory, means. I 
can, in other words, understand it—on one level—with little effort. In the second half, 
however, “reversible seed hinge oft,” predictability breaks down as the probability of the 
code is thrown off kilter. I am left “unhinged.” I must—recalling the definition of 
spinnakers166— navigate what comes next with little reliance on the code itself.167 The 
whole of the line, in this way, can be taken as information rich. Given Eco’s aesthetic 
reading of information theory, I can say that Howard’s dis-order is a disorder in relation 
to the order of the codes of the English language. The sense that I make of the text is one 
among many senses and in this way is, in accordance with statistical entropy, high in 
equiprobability. Packed with surprise, Howard’s text both stretches and opens new 
possibilities for English and, presumably, Morse.   
If this connection between aesthetics and information theory makes 
mathematicians cringe, then, along with Eco, I can claim that the information contained 
within Howard’s poem cannot be precisely quantified.168 And, as unquantifiable, 
information theory morphs into a theory of communication. “Information theory,” Eco 
writes:  
                                                
166 “spinnaker, n.,” OED Online (Oxford University Press, May 2017): 
http://www.oed.com.du.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/186738?rskey=g3YhRs&result=5&isAdvanced=true#first
Match (accessed May 25, 2017): “A large three-cornered sail carried by racing-yachts, boomed out at right 
angles to the vessel's side, opposite to the mainsail, and used in running before the wind.” 
167 Ibid., 14. 
168 Eco, The Open Work, 67. 
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provides us with only one scheme of possible relations . . . as the quantitative 
measurement of the number of signals that can be clearly transmitted along one 
channel. Once the signals are received by a human being, information theory has 
nothing else to add and gives way to either semiology or semantics, since the 
question henceforth becomes one of signification.169 
 
Information theory turned communicative articulates well the role that ambiguity—and 
what kind of ambiguity—plays in Eco’s aesthetics. When Eco speaks of ambiguity, he is 
referring to the use of “conventional linguistic structures to violate the laws of probability 
that govern the language from within.”170 An aesthetics of ambiguity is concerned with 
rupture then, a rupture with or departure from the probabilistic linguistic system. It does 
not do this for the sake of rupture and disorder, however. Ambiguity pursues rupture to 
“increase the signifying potential of the message.”171 This results, conjuring Caglioti,172 
in an oscillation “between the institutionalized system of probability and sheer disorder . . 
. an original organization of disorder.”173  
 Information theory is helpful in defining an aesthetics of ambiguity as a violation 
of the rules of the code. While this makes sense of aesthetics as a reflection on art, how 
                                                
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid., 55. 
171 It is important to note that an aesthetics of ambiguity is value neutral. It is neither better nor 
worse than other aesthetic approaches, which Eco clearly articulates elsewhere. What he is concerned with 
here is showing the particular aesthetics that emerged, within Modernism, from the quantum, chaos, and 
information revolutions. For other aesthetic approaches, cf. Umberto Eco and David Robey, The Aesthetics 
of Chaosmos: The Middle Ages of James Joyce, trans. Ellen Esrock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press), 1989; Umberto Eco, On Ugliness (New York: Rizzoli, 2011); Umberto Eco, ed. History of Beauty 
(New York: Rizzoli, 2010); Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. Hugh Bredin 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, 
trans. Hugh Bredin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).   
172 I am aware that Caglioti wrote after Eco. What I am “conjuring” here is the first chapter of this 
work, not Caglioti’s influence on Eco. 
173 Eco, The Open Work, 63. 
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does it engage aesthetics as sense perception? For Eco, the latter half of an aesthetics of 
ambiguity is concerned with considering the interpretation of any message as happening 
within a context. This leads to a “transactional rapport” between a percept and the world 
of the receiver “that constitutes the very process of perception and reasoning.”174 The 
world of the receiver or cultural patterns or cultural encyclopedia are not given, they are 
learned. They are useful assumptions about reality that facilitate the construction of 
reality and, hence, embodiment in the world. These cultural patterns—Eco does not refer 
to them as an encyclopedia until later of which more will be said below175—that facilitate 
cognition’s analysis and integration of perception can be likened to a code. The role of an 
aesthetics of ambiguity regarding sense perception is to create a space in which a given 
set of cultural patterns can evolve, be interpreted, and exploited.176 
 Perception then is also seen as a probability in an aesthetics of ambiguity, in so far 
as any percept is only a “temporary stabilization of a sensible configuration resulting 
from the more or less redundant organization of useful information that the receiver has 
selected from a field of stimuli during the perceptual process.”177 What is key here is the 
idea that a receiver selects from a probable field and could, in fact, select otherwise. An 
aesthetics of ambiguity as sense perception sets out to highlight that which is otherwise, 
again, not with a telos of rupture, but so that any given cultural system stretches, grows, 
                                                
174 Ibid., 71.  
175 Umberto Eco, From the Tree to the Labyrinth: Historical Studies on the Sign and 
Interpretation, trans. Anthony Oldcorn (Harvard University Press, 2014), 3–94.  
176 Eco, The Open Work, 79.  
177 Ibid., 81. 
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evolves, and, most importantly, is revealed as a selection. For Eco, the aesthetics of 
ambiguity results in perception being a “form of commitment” in that there are “different 
ways in which one can commit oneself or refuse to commit oneself.”178  
And with that last statement, I arrive back at Plate, religion, and an aesthetics 
grounded in materiality. Before moving forward to contextualize ambiguity within Eco’s 
encyclopedia, however, let me briefly summarize where I have gone and how it connects 
to the larger picture of this work. Eco’s ambiguity best fits into the category of scientific 
ambiguity. This is an important distinction to make because it alerts his readers to the fact 
that he is utilizing a different bibliography—separate from literary ambiguity’s—to 
define his concept. He articulates, however, the shortcomings of using scientific 
metaphors and then explicitly states where science’s ambiguity breaks down and the 
communicative variety begins. In this way, I understand Eco’s scientific ambiguity to be 
a metaphor, not an endeavor to get the science “right.” It is later, of course, that I will 
show how Eco’s scientific ambiguity, via communication theory as semiotics, applies to 
the world of literature.    
Eco’s ambiguity—a violation of the rules of the code—has two important 
consequences for the study of aesthetics. One, ambiguity ruptures and then expands any 
given cultural code. Two, ambiguity highlights perception as commitment. In both cases, 
I can say that ambiguity is similar to Plate’s skinscape, that liminal space between 
perception and our cultural representations of it. The skinscape, for Plate, is the 
foundation of the construction of social-sacred spaces. This is a little different for Eco’s 
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ambiguity. He would agree with Plate before extending the scope of Plate’s skinscape, 
for it, taken as an instance of aesthetic ambiguity, can be applied to all constructions of 
reality, not just the sacred. In fact, or said differently, perception as commitment connects 
to the discourses on implicit religion, wherein religion is considered as a set of 
commitments. Linking Eco’s ambiguity to Plate’s skinscape then, raises the question: Is 
all of perception religious? 
Silly, perhaps, but this question probes the boundaries of religion179 and the ways 
in which it is utilized in cognition to order one’s perceptions. In other words, religion, on 
one hand, can be seen as a semiotic system or schema that is influential in the ordering of 
one’s reality. It can also be, through embodiment and ritual, the very means by which a 
semiotic or schema is constructed. But in so far as one perceives an oscillating percept 
and then decides upon a category to place it in—because of different schemata, embodied 
experiences, or the creation of new knowledge—I wonder if one can call that religion as 
commitment? It would seem to me that religion as perceptual commitment would only 
work in so far as one does not confront ambiguity. Insofar as, in other words, one does 
not have to choose, for the decision—through prevailing cultural forces—is already 
made.180 If ambiguity here is that which violates the rules of the code, then can ambiguity 
                                                
179 A definition that includes all things, defines no thing. 
180 Cf. An interesting case is that of Saba Mahmood who had her liberal, cultural assumptions 
challenged while embedded with an Islamic women’s group in Egypt. While she would have assumed that 
the women in question would have wanted to shuck off the authoritative Islamic discursive tradition, she 
found quite the opposite. Within this environment, Mahmood posed the question: must freedom entail 
action as a consequence of individual will rather than that of custom, tradition, or social concern? Her 
answer is that agency must be detached from the goals of progressive politics. “If the ability to effect 
change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific,” Mahmood writes, “then the 
meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in advance . . . [agency] can be understood only from within 
the discourses and structures of subordination that create the conditions of its enactment.” It is important, 
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only facilitate religion during a conversion experience, at the height of code breaking? In 
many ways, this question aligns with contemporary concerns in ambiguity theory as 
described by Winkler.181 The question there is where does ambiguity occur, in the 
production or perception of a given percept?182 
I have veered a little too far, though not for the purpose of digression. The 
questions that are here raised will be answered as I move into a fuller contextualization of 
Eco’s ambiguity. As I now turn my attention to Eco’s encyclopedia, I ask that you keep 
in mind Plate’s skinscape, religion as commitment, and, of course, my own definition of 
ambiguity—coexistent incompatibility. 
 
THE COMPOSER 
II 
DILESTKY: But you have to understand, what Martynov did was unheard of. 
No one expected it. Why? That’s the question. Why invent only to destroy? 
ABERNATHY: And you don’t have a good answer to that question? 
                                                                                                                                            
she continues, to account for a desire that submits to recognized authority. Regarding ambiguity, this poses 
an interesting question. Can a violation of the rules of the code result in a reification of tradition? As far as 
Eco is concerned, the answer is no. In Mahmood’s case, the ambiguity is present not in her subjects of 
study, but within her own shift towards a critique of her liberal, free, and Western position. Ambiguity, in 
other words, must violate the code and, in doing so, open it up to new possibilities. It cannot reject that 
which is new in favor of tradition. Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist 
Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 14–15.  
181 Cf. Chapter One, 19. 
182 Winkler, 17–8. 
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DILESTKY: No. Not really. I researched. Compiled. But could never answer 
that most basic question, at least not fully. Kseniya thought she had an answer, but it 
was ultimately of little worth. 
ABERNATHY: Martynov’s daughter?  
DILESTKY: Granddaughter. His only living relative still alive when I was 
conducting my research. According to her, he knew his ability to compose was 
derivative. Perhaps it was the anxiety of influence, as one of yours says. And who 
could blame him. Korsakov. Stravinsky. Borodin. Men of genius. Who would want to 
follow them?  
And so Kseniya, her idea, was that Martynov sought to be remembered the 
only way he could—through infamy. But that doesn’t make sense, you see? By all 
accounts, it really was the most beautiful, and beautifully structured, composition in 
history. Rubinstein was there. You can still find his journal online, circulating the 
conspiracy websites.  
ABERNATHY: Yes. I read that. “An unknown force,” he wrote, “illuminated 
by the Creator.” Strong words, no doubt. But everyone spoke that way. Religion and 
art were mixed up back then.  
DILESTKY: Ah, but aren’t they still. We have a different palate today, no 
doubt, but it is neither better nor worse. It only is. Rubinstein was a critic with no 
vested interest in Martynov. Why lie? 
 
 
80 
ABERNATHY: That is the question, isn’t it? But if there was one loophole in 
your book, and forgive me for being so blunt, then it is certainly the question of 
memory.  
DILESTKY: I see you’ve read Thomson. He hated my book. Perhaps people 
only remembered it that way, perhaps it was the act and not the music they recalled.  
ABERNATHY: Compelling.  
DILESTKY: But wrong. We all order our experiences, file them away. And 
memory, no doubt, participates in that ordering. It even manipulates it. That cannot be 
refuted. But to say that an entire audience remembered the thing in only one way or 
even participated in some kind of musical hoax is just silly.  
ABERNATHY: So if you disagree with Kseniya and Thomson, then what is 
your theory?  
DILESTKY: You read my book. It is a simple thing, really. Martynov 
preceded Bulgakov. 
ABERNATHY: “Manuscripts don’t burn.” 
DILESTKY: It’s better in Russian, but, yes, that’s the gist. Compositions are 
an arrangement of time, an ordering of experience. That’s all that music is. And that’s 
the question that Martynov was examining. Can time, once ordered and arranged, be 
undone? Can the work exist without the artifact? 
ABERNATHY: Look, I see what you’re saying, but it’s a bit naïve. Without 
the thing— 
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DILESTKY: Without the thing we have only the symbol. But symbols matter, 
as much as the thing. Music is a created order related to the dynamics of the material 
world. They run in parallel, mutually informing one another.  
But you have to remember, Martynov’s Russia was not your America. You 
believed in the power of something as simple as a flag. In Russia, it was a different 
story.  
Chernyshevskii spread his grand materialism, before he was banished to 
Siberia, by touting the power of the object. Martynov was trying to transcend that, to 
say something about the inescapable more. 
Look, you’re a writer? 
ABERNATHY: Yes. 
DILESTKY: Have you ever read a book and been so deeply moved by its 
resonance that you asked yourself—resonance with what? 
ABERNATHY: Not in those words, no, but I understand what you’re saying. 
DILESTKY: And perhaps that’s the mystery of art. It’s a thing, but not a 
thing. It’s an ordering, but not for all time. It shapes reality, but not the reality into 
which it was given. It is both thing and not thing.  
ABERNATHY: A paradox of positivism, then?  
DILESTKY: You might say that, yes. But I prefer to think of Martynov’s 
gesture as a window into reality. A glimpse into the world as it is. The audience 
created the movement that they wanted outside the constraints of the already known, 
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a known to which they could no longer visit—and then they lived it. That was 
Martynov’s gift. 
 
Encyclopedia and Aesthetics 
In the previous section, I established that Eco utilized information theory to 
elucidate an aesthetics of ambiguity. He was able, in doing so, to define ambiguity as a 
violation of the rules of the code. From this, I posed a series of questions about rupture 
(dis-order) and religious aesthetics, which, via Plate, focused both on the percept and the 
order into which a given percept is placed. With Eco’s ambiguity and Winkler’s fourfold 
approach to theoretical ambiguity in mind, imagine stumbling across, for the first time, 
someone wearing a rosary around her neck, a hijab on her head, or a kara around her 
wrist. The object itself, the categorical schema, and the percept’s signification, to both 
parties, all present opportunities for the rules of your culture’s code to be called into 
question. Not only that, but underlying the encounter is the troubling question: Who, 
finally, decides meaning? Given Eco, the possibility exists that, upon sorting the object 
into a schema, the observer’s knowledge about the world changes and grows by 
expanding into new, previously unconceived of territories.183 The possibility also exists, 
however, that the signification of the object—the code by which it arrives at meaning—
changes for the religious practitioner by interacting with you. Codes, in other words, are 
not stable, and as they change so to do the objects of which they make sense. Through 
Winkler, of course, another set of questions arise. Was the possibility for a violation of 
                                                
183 Do you recall the first time someone told you about quantum entanglement?  
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the code “written” into the object or did the percept’s culture or promulgator confer 
ambiguity upon it? Was the encountered percept intentionally meant to violate the code 
or was rupture a mere happenstance? With these questions, it now becomes necessary to 
describe Eco’s shift away from the code and toward the encyclopedia of culture, and, as I 
articulate what Eco meant by “cultural encyclopedia,” I will begin to answer one final 
question: How does my coexistent incompatibility differ from Eco’s violation of the rules 
of the code?  
 In Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, Eco begins his chapter on the 
encyclopedia184 by posing the question: Is a definition an interpretation?185 This question, 
for Eco, is at the heart of the distinction between the dictionary and the encyclopedia. If a 
sign is something that not only stands for something else but also demands interpretation 
(a sign is never a given), then the sign also implies inference or, better, Peircean 
abduction.186 Given a case, percept, or sign, in other words, I must find its correlating 
rule. So much of Eco’s The Name of the Rose is an exploration of this very idea.187 The 
                                                
184 Cf. Paolo Desogus, “The Encyclopedia in Umberto Eco’s Semiotics,” Semiotica 192 (2012): 
501–21; Patrizia Violi, “Individual and Communal Encyclopedias,” in Umberto Eco’s Alternative: The 
Politics of Culture and the Ambiguities of Interpretation, ed. Norma Bouchard and Veronica Pravadelli 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 25–38; Patrizia Violi, “‘The Subject is in the Adverbs,’ The Role of the 
Subject in Eco’s Semiotics,” in New Essays on Umberto Eco, ed. Peter Bondanella (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 113–126; and Umberto Eco, “Dictionary and Encyclopedia,” New Literary History 
15, no. 2 (2014): 255–71. 
185 Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), 46. 
186 Peirce’s abduction is an inferential process of fashioning a hypothesis to account for a state of 
affairs. See: Sandra E. Moriarty, “Abduction: A Theory of Visual Interpretation,” Communication Theory 
6.2 (May 1996): 167–187 and Cf. C.S. Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Justus Buchler, ed. (New 
York: Dover, 1955), 50–156; C.S. Peirce, Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Vincent Tomas, ed. (New 
York: The Liberal Arts, 1957), 126–143 and 235–255; Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok, eds., The Sign 
of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 204.  
187 Cf. Eco, The Name of the Rose; M. Thomas Inge, ed., Naming the Rose: Essays on Eco’s The 
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dictionary, which aims at correspondence, direct reference, and difference,188 ultimately 
fails because it seeks to reduce inference by articulating a finite set of universals.189 This 
proves to be an impossible task. If ram means male sheep, then one is not only in the 
uncomfortable position of providing a definition for sheep but also clearly identifying a 
strategy for arriving at a finite set of what Eco calls “primitive” terms. Those terms, like 
Platonic ideas, that establish a ground for meaning. This leads to the inevitable paradox 
that “either the primitives cannot be interpreted, and one cannot explain the meaning of a 
term, or they can and must be interpreted, and one cannot limit their number.”190  
 Another way of articulating the difference between the dictionary and the 
encyclopedia is found in From the Tree to the Labyrinth. Where the dictionary accounts 
for analytic properties, those that are necessary and sufficient to distinguish one concept 
from another, the encyclopedia includes knowledge of the world.191 As an example, the 
dictionary, under the heading “dog” would include “animal,” “mammal,” and “canine,” 
but it would not “assign to the dog the properties of barking or being domesticated.”192 
Accounting for knowledge of the world then is one of the distinguishing markers of an 
encyclopedia, and one of the primary reasons why it, as a cultural universe, is a useful 
                                                                                                                                            
Name of the Rose (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1988); Theresa Coletti, Naming the Rose: 
Eco, Medieval Signs, and Modern Theory (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Adele J. Haft, The 
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188 Eco, From the Tree, 8.  
189 Eco, Semiotics, 49–68. 
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metaphor for a religious aesthetics rooted in materiality. It is, in other words, a place in 
which Plate’s objects can be stored, ordered, and recalled.  
Rather than correspondence, reference, and difference then, an encyclopedia 
“assumes that the representation of the content takes place only by means of interpretants, 
in a process of unlimited semiosis.”193 The content or entry into the encyclopedia is a 
cultural unit or “anything that is culturally defined and distinguished as an entity” and 
about which more will be said below.194 But suffice it to say here that the cultural unit 
<<dog>> is comprised of an entry, in my culture, that includes <<K-9>>, <<Snoopy>>, 
and even <<Snoop Dog>>, the American rapper.195 And what of the interpretant and 
unlimited semiosis, both ideas taken from Peirce?  
If a sign, according to Peirce, “is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity,” then an interpretant is that which mediates the 
“standing for” relationship.196 It is “another sign translating and explaining the first one, 
and so on ad infinitum.”197 While this processes or movement of unlimited semiosis 
jumps outward from interpretant to interpretant, it is important to recall that this leap does 
                                                
193 Eco, Semiotics, 68. 
194 Eco, A Theory, 67. 
195 Throughout A Theory of Semiotics, Eco uses distinguishing marks to clarify that which he is 
currently discussing. //xxxx// is the object corresponding to the verbal expression /xxxx/, and both refer to 
the content unit <<xxxx>>. In other words, //object//, /word/, <<content>>. Cf. A Theory of Semiotics, xi. 
196 Eco, A Theory, 15 and cf. T. L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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197 Eco, A Theory, 15. 
 
 
86 
not tell us something else about the sign (which is the criticism that Eco leveled against 
Derrida),198 but rather something more. To start with <<dog>> and arrive at an American 
rap artist, in other words, does not imply that I am signifying something else (even 
though <<Snoop Dog>> has its own set of interpretants). This movement, rather, tells me 
something more about <<dog>> by articulating difference and expanding both its 
contents and capabilities or, perhaps, the starting content’s cultural purchase or world 
knowledge. To clarify, the interpretant is not the interpreter of a sign. It is that which 
guarantees the “validity of the sign, even in the absence of the interpreter.”199  
Getting back to the encyclopedia then, each entry is a cultural unit that is 
circumscribed by interpretants, a series of clarifications that is continually in flux. 
Through unlimited semiosis, I can begin with one cultural unit and, given a string of 
interpretants, arrive at any other cultural unit. This is not an infinite play or regression, 
however, but a clarifying process that tells me something more about the cultural unit 
from which I started. The encyclopedia that Eco describes is the universe of human 
culture and structured like a labyrinth,200 which is “a network of interpretants” that is 
“virtually infinite.”201 And this is key, “it does not register only ‘truths’ but, rather, what 
has been said about the truth or what has been believed to be true as well as what has 
been believed to be false or imaginary or legendary, provided that a given culture had 
                                                
198 Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 
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199 Eco, A Theory, 68.  
200 Eco, From the Tree, 53. 
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elaborated some discourse about some subject matter.”202 Within the encyclopedia then is 
both <<unicorn>> and <<gravity>>, the former of which exists and is true not as a brute 
fact arising from experience but as a content unit within Western culture. A cultural 
encyclopedia, in this way, can never be exhausted. In fact, “it is the sum total of 
everything ever said by humankind.”203 
The encyclopedia then is the semiotic world by which any given culture organizes 
its precepts (fictional ones included). It is flexible, fluid, and nimble. It exists as a vast, 
ever changing network.204 But it also, locally,205 has the potential to assume a given 
tradition, or a “that’s just the way it’s always been” attitude. When a local encyclopedia 
seeks global applicability, an ideological bias is produced.206 Though, of course, global 
biases can and do exist. It is whenever an encyclopedia is taken as natural—no longer 
dexterous—that an aesthetics of ambiguity rears its head. “Sometimes,” Eco writes, “a 
poetic text aims at destroying exactly our most unchallengeable assumptions.”207 If 
information theory led to a definition of ambiguity as a violation of the rules of the code, 
then the encyclopedia leads to a definition of ambiguity as challenging a culture’s 
                                                
202 Eco, Semiotics, 84 and From the Tree, 26. 
203 Eco, From the Tree, 49. 
204 Ibid., 37. 
205 Ibid., 52. 
206 For more on the many levels of Eco’s encyclopedia, as well as the role of the subject within 
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88 
assumptions.208 As an example, at least in America, one need only think of “The Laramie 
Project,”209 “Brokeback Mountain,”210 or “Angels in America”211 in reference to the 
cultural units <<love>>, <<marriage>>, or <<deviant>>.212  
You will notice, no doubt, that just I committed the cardinal sin of academia. I 
cited Wikipedia. Why? Because it is the closest material artifact that we have to Eco’s 
global encyclopedia. It is a network of cultural units and interpretants (hyperlinks) that is 
in constant flux and, at any given time, represents a sum of our cultural, as opposed to 
specialized, knowledge. It is that to which we defer and, in many ways, abdicate our 
cultural knowing.213 Do I, in other words, have to know what “The Demi-Virgin” is or 
can I leave it to Wikipedia to store the cultural knowledge that awaits my recall?214 With 
a mission to gather all recorded knowledge then,215 Wikipedia is a cultural encyclopedia 
                                                
208 Eco, From the Tree, 62.  
209 Wikipedia contributors, “The Laramie Project,” Wikipedia, 
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210 Wikipedia contributors, “Brokeback Mountain,” Wikipedia, 
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that is dynamic and unstable. It serves as a reminder that “reality cannot be pinned down 
with finality.”216 This is true, too, for Eco’s encyclopedia, which is both a collection of 
cultural experiences and a schema for ordering that which is continually in a fluid process 
of movement, reordering, and emergence. It can only be stable upon synchronic 
reflection. It is an ever-changing representation of a reality that is, even now, recreating 
itself every moment—established and policed by a swarming team of contributors.    
If I can imagine Eco’s encyclopedia as a kind of digitized, crowd-sourced 
network existing in the cloud,217 then each entry into that wiki is what Eco means by a 
cultural unit. The hyperlinks existing within that entry together with its disambiguation 
can be likened to the interpretants circumscribing that cultural unit. I can begin at 
Maimonides and, seventeen tabs later, arrive at “The Philosophy of Time.” The 
idiosyncratic nature of this example, however, is that the tabs between the one and the 
other might exist as interpretants only for me. But if they exist for me, then they must 
also exist as cultural potentialities at which anyone, given the infinity of Babel, could 
arrive.218 The encyclopedia as network or labyrinth, in this way, is moved through or 
navigated via conjecture, a series of idiosyncratic hypotheses and inferences. And with 
any new set of connections a polydimensional network of possibility is created that “does 
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Library_of_Babel (Accessed June 3, 2017). 
 
 
90 
not leave unaffected the collective encyclopedia.”219 The individual, in other words, 
affects the global.     
Moving forward then, I see two depictions of ambiguity thus far in Eco. One is as 
a violation of the rules of the code. The other is as a challenge to the assumptions of a 
given culture. Both cases imply, however, a dis-order or rupture. Ambiguity is an 
encounter with that which, though relying on a preexistent order (code or encyclopedia), 
allows me either to see something new in the preexistent order, an opening, or to create 
something altogether unforeseen from the matter of that which came before. As I 
transition to the semiotics of ambiguity as articulated by Eco, I want to suggest that 
ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility is slightly different from either violation or 
challenge.  
The former is an ambiguity that highlights the superposition, if I can unabashedly 
borrow that word from the sciences, of an encounter with an aesthetic object. It is less a 
violation or challenge and more of an awareness of the potentialities of cognition and 
interpretation. And, as such, it has the potential to expose the rules by which any culture 
collapses, from a plurality, into a univocality. Ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility 
also re-articulates Plate’s skinscape as not only that which is liminal, but also as a space 
of sought after uncertainty. It is, in other words, that place in which I refrain from 
judgment. It is the space of the blinking cursor on Wikipedia’s search bar that beckons to 
an infinity of a posteriori possibility, in between choice and encounter, order and 
disorder. It is a hesitation in the face of potentiality.     
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Semiotics and Ambiguity 
Eco’s semiotics stems from his work in the theories of information and 
communication. His seminal work in this phase of his academic career is A Theory of 
Semiotics.220 A dense and altogether difficult text, A Theory is nearly impossible to 
summarize, and, fortunately, that is not my present task. My purpose in this section is to 
build upon an ambiguity informed by information theory and the encyclopedia by further 
elucidating it through Eco’s semiotics. While it is outside the scope of this section to 
attempt a general summary of semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce’s influence on Eco 
cannot be overstated. I will not, however, discuss Peirce until the next chapter. It is 
important to clarify, as well, that Eco’s semiotics have little in common with Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics221 and those who follow in that school. 
Eco’s semiotic is thoroughly Peircean and, much like his theory of ambiguity, utilizes a 
different bibliography. What follows then is a short summary of Eco’s methodology, 
sign-function, and sign-production, before circling back around to rephrase Eco’s 
semiotics so that they more fully articulate his position. The goal is, of course, to help me 
elucidate an ambiguity of coexistent incompatibility that is informed by both violation 
and challenge. 
“The aim of [A Theory],” Eco ambitiously writes, “is to explore the theoretical 
possibility and the social function of a unified approach to every phenomenon of 
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signification and/or communication.”222 Broken into three parts: the first deals with 
signification and communication or how semiotics is a useful methodology for theories of 
communication. The second espouses Eco’s theory of codes. And the third clarifies Eco’s 
theory of sign production. Neither having the time nor space to analyze all three sections 
in detail, I will instead seek to express Eco’s main themes in each part. If there is an 
overarching contribution of A Theory to the study of semiotics, then it is Eco’s insistence 
that a sign is not a thing—it is, rather, a process.223 When I engage semiotics I am not 
engaging signs, but rather sign-functions. This results in a distinction between 
communication and signification, between “things said” and “things meant.”224 That 
which is a thing said falls under Eco’s theory of sign production. That which is a thing 
meant falls under Eco’s theory of codes. 
 The first section sets out to define what Eco means by sign-function, as opposed 
to the static notion of a “sign.” A sign-function is realized when expression and content 
enter into a mutual correlation.225 This is in contrast to a sign—everything which can be 
taken as significantly substituting for something else226—which is “always an element of 
an expression plane conventionally correlated to one (or several) elements of a content 
plane.”227 Given these distinctions, Eco claims that a semiotics of signification entails a 
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theory of codes, while a semiotics of communication entails a theory of sign-production. 
In other words, signification necessarily relates to the cultural code and the way in which 
I decode any given message, while communication discusses the various ways in which 
any society or person constructs or creates its signs. For Eco then, semiotics views all 
cultural processes as processes of communication or sign-production.  
To clarify further, if a communicative process is the passage of a signal from a 
source to a destination, then a signification system is an autonomous semiotic construct 
that has an abstract mode of existence independent of any possible communicative act it 
makes possible. “Every act of communication to or between human beings,” Eco writes, 
“presupposes a signification system as its necessary condition.”228 In other words, and in 
line with the previous sections, to seek to communicate is to assume that there is a 
probabilistic code or encyclopedia by which any message can be decoded or understood. 
 In his second section, Eco defines what he means by “code.” If a sign-function is 
realized whenever an expression and a content are in mutual correlation, then it is a code 
(usually, if not always cultural) that establishes the relationship.229 This is an important 
point for Eco, because he wants to make it abundantly clear that an expression does not 
have a referent.230 It has, rather, a content, which exists in the code of culture 
(encyclopedia) and is realized in what he calls “cultural units.”231 It is these cultural units, 
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he claims, that are “circumscribed” by what Peirce calls the “interpretant”232. . . and 
“provide the conditions for a complex interplay of sign-functions.”233  
Though I have already introduced cultural units via <<dog>>, it is necessary to 
reiterate or more fully articulate the cultural unit here. If //automobile//234 is the car or 
object that corresponds to the verbal expression /automobile/, then both refer to the 
cultural unit <<automobile>>. While this example is straightforward, it is important to 
remember that the content of <<automobile>> contains within it all that could go into an 
exhaustive (perhaps infinite) entry into a cultural encyclopedia. It would include not only 
//automobiles// but also their interpretants or those entries in the encyclopedia that are 
connected to the entry on //automobiles//, even if only tangentially (think of the previous 
section’s discussion on Wikipedia).235 While the example of the //automobile// is in no 
way flashy, imagine the West’s cultural unit or encyclopedic entry on //Jesus// and all the 
other entries that it might connect to. What is important to remember is that neither 
//Jesus// nor /Jesus/ refers to the concrete historical figure of the first-century 
Mediterranean world, but rather the content comprising its entry in the encyclopedia. 
//Jesus//, in other words, refers not to that which is “actual” but to <<Jesus>>, its cultural 
content, which is circumscribed by a swirling network of interpretants or other, similar 
entries (cultural units) in the cultural encyclopedia.    
                                                
232 Ibid., 68–69. 
233 Ibid., 56. 
234 Throughout A Theory of Semiotics, Eco uses distinguishing marks to clarify that which he is 
currently discussing. //xxxx// is the object corresponding to the verbal expression /xxxx/, and both refer to 
the content unit <<xxxx>>. In other words, //object//, /word/, <<content>>. Cf. A Theory of Semiotics, xi. 
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In his third and final section, “A Theory of Sign Production,” Eco suggests that 
utterances aim to communicate and are, in this way, acts of labor. To produce a signal 
one must first isolate and choose an expression-unit and then connect that unit, coherently 
(in so far as it aligns with any given culture’s coding or encyclopedia), to an expression-
string.236 While Eco’s theory is far more complex than I have the time to discuss, what is 
important here is that his theory of codes (things meant) is in service to his theory of sign 
production (things said), which is—together—in service to his understanding of 
semiotics as a socio-cultural process. Cultural codes tell me what expressions and 
contents (cultural units) I can and cannot match up for the purposes of sign production or 
concrete communication. Though, as I have already shown, the idea of a cultural code is 
far more fluid and flexible when conceived of as a cultural encyclopedia. 
There are three ways, Eco argues, in which a sign can be produced: one, by 
shaping the expression-continuum; two, by correlating that shaped continuum with its 
possible content; and three, by connecting these newly produced signs to factual events, 
things, or states of the world.237 While Eco, in great detail, shows how these three modes 
of sign production actually function, I will limit myself to a few words about sign-
production as it relates to the aesthetic text, after which I will stitch all three sections 
together and connect them to the larger argument of this chapter.   
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The aesthetic text is a manipulation of the expression-plane with the intended 
result being a reassessment of the content-plane.238 I speak, in other words, to call into 
question the encyclopedia. This “aesthetic sign-function,” Eco writes, “is based . . . [on] a 
process of code changing.”239 In his mind, one can study aesthetic texts to study all the 
aspects of sign-functions: “It can perform any or all productive functions . . . and it can 
require any kind of productive labor.”240 What makes an aesthetic text an aesthetic text? 
The fact that it is ambiguous and self-focusing. By ambiguity, Eco here means “a mode 
of violating the rules of the code,” which is rooted in information theory, or forcing the 
“hearer to reconsider the entire organization of the content,” which is rooted in the 
encyclopedia.241 Ambiguity, as I have already suggested, is both a violation of and 
challenge to the codes and encyclopedias of a culture. In A Theory, however, Eco 
articulates this by suggesting that what is violated or challenged is the expression-content 
correlation.242 
 Putting all three sections together then, I can say that a theory of sign production 
is communicative. It is that message which moves from a sender through a channel to a 
receiver. It is not yet a signification (a thing meant), as that begins only once a message 
has been received and begun to be interpreted. In this way, an aesthetics of ambiguity as 
coexistent incompatibility is interested in things meant or the process of interpretation 
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after encountering a percept. It is only, it seems to me, concerned with things said when, 
along with Winkler, it begins to ask questions about where ambiguity occurs—in the 
production or perception of a given precept.  
 If Eco were to respond to Winkler, then he might do so via his theory of 
communication and the labor required to produce a message. Communication systems 
(things said) have rules for combining and manipulating those messages that travel from 
sender or source to receiver or destination. This is what Eco calls a “syntactic system,”243 
which provides a structure “to communicative acts that limit the range of possible 
interpretations an addressee can give to a message.”244 To create a message then is to 
participate in four types of sign producing labor: recognition, ostension, replica, and 
invention. I am here, however, only concerned with the latter.245 Invention relates to a 
producer of a sign-function choosing “a new way of organizing existing expression units” 
and then seeking to make her new way of correlation acceptable.246 When it comes to 
ambiguity then, the labor of invention proposes novel ways of cultural organization. In 
Winkler’s language, this means that Echian ambiguity when considered as an act of 
communication is that which is strategically produced, which potentially enables the 
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receiver to “view the world in a way different from the standard ways of viewing.”247 
This is akin to Victor Shklovsky’s defamiliarization248 and is a deliberate violation and 
challenge to bring attention both to the nature of the code and encyclopedia.249 
This leads me to the final piece of this chapter’s puzzle regarding Eco’s 
ambiguity. As an introduction to the aesthetic experience, it produces further knowledge 
because it “compels one to reconsider the usual codes and their possibilities.”250 This 
“further knowledge” is ascertained by what Eco calls “aesthetic abduction,” proposing 
tentative codes—what I previously referred to as conjecture—to make the author’s 
message understandable but which the reader will not know directly.251 In other words, I 
have codes out of which I operate. I take these codes for granted. From these codes, 
messages are produced, received, embodied, and reified, only to be once again produced. 
This is the process of culture as Eco envisions it, a process, however, that can be arrested, 
interrogated, and restructured through ambiguity. And it is through the latter process that 
any given cultural code or encyclopedia can be rearranged or interrogated, and then said 
to have produced a knowledge that was previously unthinkable. 
If I can make one further distinction or clarifying remark regarding ambiguity’s 
potential for the creation of further knowledge, then it comes in the guise of ideology. 
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The messages that any sign producer constructs propagates what Eco calls “coded 
ideologies,” which are the labors of “selecting and preferring one worldview over 
another.”252 Ideological labor is a difficult work that “has to be actively performed on a 
potentially problematic reality.”253 If I am dissatisfied with the current state of the 
political order, then I could labor to confer an alternate view of the world upon that which 
I see, which would allow me to generate my privileged interpretation over against others. 
But, according to Eco, an ideological interpretation is always a partial interpretation of 
the world.254 It is a message that starts with a factual description “and then tries to justify 
it theoretically, gradually being accepted by society through a process of overcoding.”255 
Perhaps I can say it this way: Ideologies force a particular reading (univocality) 
while ambiguity allows for possible readings (plurivocality). This is, of course, what 
interests me the most in the notion of an aesthetics of ambiguity, which, given a “text” or 
percept, creates a liminal space of possibility—readings and interpretations that not only 
violate, challenge, and create further knowledge, but also account for, by arresting 
judgment, coexistent incompatibility—the infinite probability of an uncollapsed 
superposition. 
Conclusion 
Information theory defined ambiguity as a violation of the rules of the code. The 
encyclopedia highlighted ambiguity’s ability to challenge our cultural assumptions. And 
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the semiotics of Umberto Eco revealed the potential of ambiguity to create further 
knowledge. These distinctions allow me to delineate further what I mean by coexistent 
incompatibility and how it is both informed by but different from Eco’s ambiguity. For 
me, ambiguity is a space wherein an aesthete refrains from judgment so that she can more 
fully acknowledge the plurivocality or potentiality of a given percept. It is an encounter 
with that which forces upon an aesthete the factuality of many, equiprobable realities. 
Ambiguity does not, however, provide a way forward. It is neither map nor guide. It is a 
hesitancy, a refusal to judge or, better yet, a position from which one can foresee the 
infinite possibilities of a possible future.256  
Whereas S. Brent Plate speaks of a skinscape, a mediating position halfway 
between the semiosphere and the material world, perhaps I am articulating a nodal point 
in a network. From there, I can foresee the many, possible paths of traversal without yet 
committing to one over against another. All are coexistent but, once chosen, 
incompatible. A material religious aesthetic informed by an ambiguity seen as coexistent 
incompatibility would begin to articulate the possibility, given a set of cultural 
probabilities, that any percept potentially holds. A religious aesthetics informed by 
ambiguity would not view religious objects, rituals, or embodiments as univocalities. To 
do so, like von Balthasar, would be a labor of ideology. Ambiguity, here, is concerned 
with the ways in which religious aesthetics not only views or engages its subject matter 
as instances of violation, challenge, or further knowledge, but also as a coexistent 
incompatibility that has the potential either to create or highlight religious commitments 
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and narratives as they mutually exist as polyvocal percepts. A religious aesthetic rooted 
in ambiguity would not only examine this phenomenon but also those narratives that 
allow any observer to choose one vocality over another. 
 In the epigraph of this chapter, I referenced Alan Moore’s Jerusalem.257 Written 
over the course of a decade, Moore’s novel is well over 1200 pages in length. Daunting to 
most, if not all, readers, his book was published to critical acclaim, being compared to 
both James Joyce and Cormac McCarthy.258 Chronicling the life of Northampton’s 
Boroughs, Jerusalem is jam-packed with many a tale sprawling from the middle ages of 
England to the not so distant future. Its protagonists are varied and, depending upon the 
chapter, tell the story of a Victorian housewife or a prostitute in the 2000s. Early on, 
Moore writes of Ernest Vernall,259 an artist in 1865 commissioned with touching up the 
frescoes in St. Paul’s Cathedral. It is no ordinary day for Ern, however, as it is the day he 
is destined—like his father before him—to lose his sanity.260 “The fresco,” Moore writes, 
“that Ern planned to clean up and retouch . . . was one that he was not familiar with from 
sermons . . . [he] decided to begin his restorations with a halo-sporting figure in the 
picture’s upper left, angel or saint he couldn’t tell.”261  
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 Beginning with the figure’s clothes, Ern soon realizes with horror that the 
frescoed figure breaks “from the confines of its two-dimensional domain” and turns its 
massive face towards him.262 “Jaw hung wide,” Ern cannot scream, but only listen as the 
figure opens its maw and begins to speak an unknown language, but one that Ern can 
mysteriously comprehend.263 And what does this figure, this aesthetic event now 
identified as an angel, communicate to Ern?  
It seemed anxious to convey instruction of profound importance on a staggering 
range of topics, many of them seeming to be matters of mathematics and 
geometry for which Ern, though illiterate, had always had a flair. The knowledge, 
anyway, decanted into him so that he had no choice as to whether he took it in or 
not . . . the lecture was expansive, introducing Ern to points of view he’d never 
really thought about before. He was invited to consider time with every moment 
of its passing in the terms of plane geometry, and had it pointed out that human 
beings’ grasp of space was incomplete.264 
 
When all was said and done, however, he came down from the rafters a broken, giggling, 
and sobbing man. “It was not as though there was no recognition there in his expression,” 
Moore writes, “but more as if he had been away so long that he had come to think his 
former occupation and companions all a dream.”265 
 Interpreted through a lens of ambiguity, I can say that Ern, the artist, was 
confronted by an artwork so overwhelmingly powerful that he had no concept space into 
which he could receive it. But, as outside of everyday experience as the event was, Ern 
could neither dismiss it nor pretend that it never happened. He was confronted with all 
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the forms of ambiguity that I have discussed in this chapter. An angel stepping out of a 
painting, clearly, is a violation of the rules of the code—in this case, the code of Western 
empiricism. It is also a challenge to the cultural encyclopedia in that, prior to this 
encounter, Ern could not have conceived of a corresponding interpretant for the entry on 
“Frescoes.” Likewise, the confrontation with the angel created an opening so large in 
Ern’s encyclopedia that further knowledge—new knowledge, in fact—was created or, in 
this case, decanted into him. But I wonder if all these interpretations cannot be attributed 
to the real and paradoxical encounter with a coexistent incompatibility. Frescoes do not 
talk. And, yet, this fresco talks. Given a choice then, a nodal point in a vast network in 
which all potentials are present because time has collapsed, Ern chose a path of non-
integration. That which happened could not happen so, grasping onto his old categories, 
he chose a link in the network that led to insanity or madness. But, returning to that node, 
one wonders if perhaps there were no other, potential paths that he could have traversed.  
As I previously wrote, ambiguity is concerned with the ways in which religious 
aesthetics not only views or engages its subject matter as instances of violation, 
challenge, or further knowledge, but also as a coexistent incompatibility that has the 
potential either to create or highlight religious commitments and narratives as they 
mutually exist as polyvocal percepts. A religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity would not 
only examine this phenomenon but also those narratives that allow any observer to 
choose one vocality over another. If that is given, then the task when analyzing Ern’s 
encounter not only becomes probing the plurivocality of ambiguity, but also the 
underlying narratives that led Ern to choose one path over against another, equiprobable 
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path. It is also to claim Ern’s position atop the scaffolding, circumscribed by a crumbling 
dome, as an ambiguous space in which the infinity of possibility had not yet collapsed, 
for that is the full awareness of ambiguity. 
As I move forward now to discuss Peirce’s influence over Eco and “On the 
Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language,”266 I continue to 
explore the question of what an ambiguity understood as coexistent incompatibility does 
for a religious aesthetic informed by materiality. In doing so, I move closer to a fuller 
explanation of an ambiguity that emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and 
the narrativization of reality. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LIMITS, SURPLUS, AND CONTRADICTION 
 
“What a remarkably magical spot!” said Mr Honeyfoot, approvingly. “Your 
dream—so full of odd symbols and portents—is yet another proof of it!” 
“But what does it mean?” asked Mr Segundus. 
“Oh!” said Mr Honeyfoot, and stopt to think a while. “Well, the lady wore blue, 
you say? Blue signifies—let me see—immortality, chastity and fidelity; it stands for 
Jupiter and can be represented by tin. Hmmph! Now where does that get us?”  
“Nowhere, I think,” sighed Mr Segundus. 
—Susanna Clarke, Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell   
 
Introduction 
 
Echoing Mr Segundus and Mr Honeyfoot, I too ask: What does it mean? What do 
the infinite interpretants that lead to yet another node in the network illuminate? Truth? 
Being? Or less dramatically, things as they really are? If I have been arguing anything 
through ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility, then it is that there is no one reality. 
There is, rather, a multiplicity of possibilities that overlie one another and, at any given 
moment, an individual or a community makes that which is real by employing an ever 
fluid, ever dynamic encyclopedia. Another individual or community, however, could 
choose differently and, as a result, instantiate a reality that exists simultaneously as an 
entangled universe. What I have articulated then is two states, coexistent and entangled, 
but mutually incompatible. A recognition of this coexistent incompatibility is the state of 
ambiguity, which is also and often instigated by an encounter with that which is 
ambiguous in an Echian sense: a text that violates the rules of the code or an encounter 
that challenges cultural assumptions or an event in which further knowledge is produced. 
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In any case, the ambiguous encounter reveals the state of ambiguity as a coexistent 
incompatibility.  
What I wonder and am, in fact, probing throughout this book is if it is possible to 
employ a non-judgmental aesthetics, defer the collapsing of any superposition, and 
remain in a state of ambiguity as long as possible. Why would I desire that? Because it 
seems to me that the longer I remain in a coexistent incompatibility, the longer I have to 
interrogate the codes, encyclopedias, and semiospheres that confine my ability to judge. 
And, as such, I am arguing that religious aesthetics is a space in which this non-
judgmental analysis can take place. I am not only describing S. Brent Plate’s skinscape, 
but I am arguing for a religious aesthetics that intentionally seeks to remain liminal—
between the encyclopedia and the object, semiotics and materiality.  
I must stress, however, that this is not a muted form of objectivity. I am not, by 
articulating the in-between spaces of coexistent incompatibility, suggesting that one can 
escape her encyclopedia. I am merely suggesting that by seeking to remain within the 
skinscape one can better reveal the systems and processes by which she judges and, in 
doing so, confront the ways in which the other orders and embodies her encyclopedia as 
an equally valid instantiation of reality. Ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility is not a 
way out of subjectivity, but rather an admission that individual and collective 
representations of reality are the sum of all that is—and furthermore, that those 
representations are not outside the scope of interrogation.   
While this summary of my project might appear to be a full acceptance of a 
caricaturized poststructuralism, it is, in fact, no such thing. This chapter can be broken 
 
 
107 
into two parts. The first is not only a description of Eco’s reliance on Peirce, but also the 
ways in which Eco reconciled an ever-fluid encyclopedia with Peirce’s Firstness, 
Dynamic Object, and lines of resistance. The second part of this chapter is a reflection on 
Eco’s seminal essay, “On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic 
Language.”267 This final section ties together the preceding chapters, sets up Part II of 
this work, and argues that the state of and encounter with ambiguity are aspects inherent 
to semiotic systems but also capable, à la Winkler, of being intentionally and strategically 
manufactured. If this chapter sets out to argue anything, then it is that, even given 
coexistent incompatibility, an interpretation assumes a that-which-is-to-be-interpreted. 
This is a shift, in other words, from “To what do we refer when we talk, and with what 
degree of reliability?” to “What makes us talk?”268 I am arguing, in other words, that 
there is something that induces us to produce signs.269 In the end then, there is a thing and 
I cannot know it outside the potentialities of my encyclopedia, which exist coextensively 
with other constructions of reality. I cannot know it, but it is there, pushing back, and 
instigating my interpretations of it. 
Peirce, Eco, and the Sense of Sense 
I have already discussed the ever-fluid encyclopedia and the way in which it 
delimits cultural knowing, while also making it possible to produce further knowledge. I 
am now interested in shifting back to the aesthetics of sense perception and discussing 
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that which holds the encyclopedia accountable. If that is the wrong word, then perhaps all 
I mean is the something that catalyzes the creation of a cultural semiosphere. In this way, 
I side with Eco when he defines Being as “Something.”270 When I read a text and then 
interpret it, to put it differently, it is the text that causes or cultivates my interpretation of 
it. The text induces me to produce an interpretation. I am beholden or accountable to the 
text in so far as I want to interpret it and not something else. If I take that which induces 
me and drift widely afield, then I have not interpreted it but have, rather, used it. While 
Eco has discussed the difference between interpretation and use at length,271 what I am 
doing here is clarifying the way in which Eco’s hermeneutics were informed by Peircean 
categories and how both are necessary to understand an aesthetics of ambiguity defined 
as coexistent incompatibility and applied to religious aesthetics. 
To summarize by way of an example, the text of Moby Dick has instigated 
countless interpretations. It is that something, in this case, that I could analogously call 
Being. I must, if I desire to remain faithful to that which presents itself to me, be 
accountable to it. If I do not, then I am none the worse—but I have not interpreted, I have 
used.272 While I could argue at length the reasons why the White Whale represents a pink 
                                                
270 Ibid. 
271 Cf. Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1991); Umberto Eco, Jonathan Culler, Richard Rorty, and Christine Brooke-Rose, Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Charlotte Ross and 
Sibley Rochelle, eds., Illuminating Eco: On the Boundaries of Interpretation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2004). 
272 Regarding sense perception, this seems true, too. One can make whatever she desires of a given 
percept, but that poesis will only have purchase within the encyclopedia insofar as her community ratifies 
that which she has judged. If the community does not ratify her meaning or understanding, then it has little 
chance of attaching itself as an interpretant to a cultural unit. If it does, however, then it has the added 
possibility (via ambiguity) of producing further knowledge. To put it differently, the community often 
decides what does or does not count as a permissible object/content linkage. For a critique of this position 
 
 
109 
pansy in the garden of Melville, I would be using the text and not interpreting it—that is, 
taking it as it presents itself to me. While the whale can signify many things, in other 
words, it is still a whale that instigates my signification of it.   
Why digress down this little path? Because it illuminates the reasons why Eco so 
heavily relies on Peirce in both his hermeneutics and aesthetics. What follows then is a 
summary of Peircean ideas before I explicate the ways in which Eco employed them in 
his essay, “On Being.”273 For it is there, I think, that Eco most fully articulates his 
position on aesthetics as sense perception and the ways in which it connects to an 
aesthetics of ambiguity. 
Peirce’s genealogy is fully rooted in the categories of Immanuel Kant. After 
reading, Critique of Pure Reason, Peirce wrote that there is “a lacunae in Kant’s 
reasoning.”274 It is this lacunae that Peirce sought to fill for the rest of his life. T.L. Short, 
one of Peirce’s most well-known commentators, argues that Peirce filled this gap in 
Kant’s work by addressing two problems: “to construct a naturalistic but nonreductive 
account of the human mind, and to explain and defend the claim that the sciences are 
objective in their mode of inquiry and in fact yield knowledge of an independently 
existing reality.”275 In this way, to single out Peirce’s theory of signs is a bit unfair. To 
                                                                                                                                            
as it relates to Echian studies, see, Clare Birchall, “Economic Interpretation,” in Charlotte Ross and Sibley 
Rochelle, eds., Illuminating Eco: On the Boundaries of Interpretation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 
71–88.    
273 Umberto Eco, “On Being,” in Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition, 
trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Harcourt, 2000), 1–56. 
274 James Hoopes, ed., Peirce on Signs (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991), 1. 
275 T.L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ix. 
 
 
110 
best understand what Peirce is doing in semiotics, one must first understand Peirce’s 
much larger, fuller background. I do not, unfortunately, have the time to place Peirce in 
both his genealogical and historical context. I do, however, have the time to touch on his 
major contributions to semiotics, how those contributions were in part due to his 
continued wrestling with Kant, and how Eco has utilized Peirce throughout his career.  
To begin, Peirce considered himself to be a realist who leaned towards the 
empiricism of a nominalist.276 He would, in this way, say things that did not always add 
up. This was not due to any lapse in his critical thinking, but rather to his desire to 
reconcile these two disparate camps.277 In this way, he came to Kant and found him 
wanting. “It is perfectly true,” Peirce writes, “that we can never attain knowledge of 
things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is all the universe is 
for us.”278 To fill Kant’s gap then, Peirce would eventually reduce Kant’s categories to 
three—Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness—and make claims such as “thought is 
internalized discourse” and “thought is inherently general.”279  
If Kant is one thinker that Peirce was fruitfully engaging, then he was also 
engaging and discounting Cartesianism and foundational epistemology.280 For Peirce 
(and this is why he is considered to be the founder of pragmatism), philosophy must 
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begin wherever it happens to find itself, not at some previously-picked beginning 
point.281 “It is partly for this very reason,” Robert Burch writes, “that Peirce steadily 
rejected Kant’s claim about the a priori status of space and time . . . he regarded the 
structure of physical space and time as an empirical inquiry.”282 As Short writes, “Peirce 
consistently rejected Kant’s claim that there is an unknowable.”283 
I can say, so far, that Eco picked up on Peirce’s claims that, yes, all things are 
knowable, but that they are knowable only in their human aspect. This is, of course, the 
encyclopedia or semiosphere and the way in which it connects to materiality. Even if I 
am confronted by a thing, I can only know it insofar as its cultural unit allows me. While 
the encyclopedia’s entry can expand by a challenged assumption that produces further 
knowledge—I am not indefinitely bound by the encyclopedia—the outcome is still what 
Peirce and Eco would consider to be a percept’s human aspect. The encyclopedia is not a 
prison then, but it does facilitate the interpretation of that which confronts me. To fully 
explore this, I now turn to Peirce’s signs and the way in which he defined Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness.   
Peirce names a sign “anything which is so determined by something else, called 
its object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its interpretant, 
that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former.”284 There are three parts to 
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any sign: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. If the sign is the signifier and the object is 
the signified, then the interpretant is “best thought of as the understanding that we have of 
the sign/object relation.”285 This cannot be overstressed. The sign is triadic, relational, 
and significant (signifies) only in so far as it is interpreted. “This makes,” Albert Atkins 
writes, “the interpretant central to the content of the sign, in that, the meaning of a sign is 
manifest in the interpretation that it generates in sign users.”286   
Peirce claims that all thought is in signs and, therefore, that the interpretant 
always comes before and after any given sign.287 This conclusion has led many 
commentators to engage what they call Peirce’s “unlimited semiosis.” While it has 
become a theory that continues to be discussed in philosophical discourse, Peirce, for his 
part, later abandoned it. He did this by introducing the concepts Firstness, Secondness, 
and Thirdness into his theory of signs. In other words, to point to the interpretant as that 
which mediates the sign/object relationship is to imply potentially that there is no ground 
that holds signification accountable. Without Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there 
is no way, in Eco’s scheme at least, to delineate between use and interpretation.   
If a sign is a triadic relationship comprised of sign, object, and interpretant, then 
there are three kinds of signs:288 icon, index, and symbol. The icon is a sign of 
resemblance. The index is a sign of causation (like a weathervane being moved by the 
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wind). The symbol is a sign of convention.289 Notice here that the sign is three as are the 
types of signs as are the three categories. Strange as it may seem, Peirce himself admits to 
finding threes in all things. In his essay, “One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of 
Thought and of Nature,”290 Peirce reveals how his triadic sign, his sign distinction, and 
his fundamental categories are all interwoven. For my purposes, however, it is important 
to understand the role that his categories played in his semiotics and the ways in which 
the index helped Peirce to move away from his earlier idea of unlimited semiosis.  
Briefly, Firstness is “the conception of being or existing independent of anything 
else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, 
something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are 
brought into relation.”291 Following Peirce’s phenomenological categories, I could say, “I 
feel. I feel something. I feel a table.” To feel is first. To recognize it as something is 
second. And to name it as table is third. By recognizing Secondness or indexicality, “an 
immediate connection of [any] particular thought to its particular object, via which 
general concepts can be predicated of particulars” is established. There is resistance, in 
other words, in the object that imposes, which I must then make sense of and identify. All 
thought might be in signs, but signs are, for Peirce, material actualities that point any 
interpreter back to an object in the world, which in turn provides an imposing resistance. 
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I cannot know a thing in its Firstness, however. I can only know a thing in its 
Thirdness or its human aspect, insofar as Thirdness is synonymous with the semiosphere. 
Or, in other words, the category in which semiotics begins. As I have elsewhere argued, 
the transition from Firstness to Thirdness happens at the speed of cognition, which results 
in Firstness being that which I accept, am accountable to, but can never fully articulate.292 
As I now transition back to Eco, what must be stressed is that Peirce’s semiotics, taken 
together with his categories, are hugely influential in Echian hermeneutics.  
By analogy, Firstness is the text as it confronts the reader’s encyclopedia, 
which—via relation—is a Secondness. That which comes out of the encounter between 
text and encyclopedia is a Thirdness or interpretation, but also a cultural unit that has the 
potential to expand the encyclopedia, individual or communal. At the speed of cognition, 
however, all that one can know from a text is her interpretation of it. Even if all she can 
know of a text is at the level of Thirdness, she is still accountable—insofar as she wants 
to interpret—to the text as Firstness. This results in viewing Firstness as that which 
delimits or confines an interpretation. It also, when considered as an aspect of the 
aesthetics of sense perception, limits any definition or construction of reality. While there 
can be a plurivocality of coexistent incompatibility, all potential realities are—or should 
be, according to Eco via Peirce—accountable to Firstness, even though Firstness can 
never be known in itself.293  
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Transitioning to Eco then, how does he finally integrate Peirce’s semiotics and 
categories into his schema, and how does that connect to a theory of ambiguity? To 
answer these questions, it is now time to turn my attention to Eco’s Kant and the 
Platypus and particularly his essay “On Being.” By way of an introduction, however, let 
me begin with Eco’s own and state that Kant and the Platypus is his response to the 
academy’s critique of A Theory of Semiotics. In A Theory, Eco begins by articulating the 
difference between Peirce’s Dynamical Object and Immediate Object. The former, in 
general terms, is the object as it really is.294 The latter is “what we, at any time, suppose 
the object to be.”295 In Kant then, Eco explains that the bulk of his effort at the beginning 
of A Theory was to examine the Dynamical Object as an aim or an end of semiosis.296 
After following the chain of interpretants, in other words, one could arrive at the 
Dynamical Object or the object as it is. Or as Eco would say, the object as it is 
understood to be as a cultural unit. In Kant, Eco tells us, his emphasis has shifted, and it 
is no small shift.  
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The Dynamical Object is no longer an aim or end of semiosis, but rather its 
starting point or initial impulse. It is, Eco argues, the Something that “urges us to 
speak.”297 And this is where Kant begins, as an effort to 
temper an eminently ‘cultural’ view of semiosic processes with the fact that, 
whatever the weight of our cultural systems, there is something in the continuum 
of experience that sets a limit on our interpretations, and so . . . I would say that 
the dispute between internal realism and external realism would tend to compose 
itself in a notion of contractual realism.298  
 
And what is contractual realism? It is the ongoing, cultural negotiation between 
cognitive schemata and signification and reference299—between, in other words, the 
encyclopedia and material worlds.300 Contractual realism, to say it differently, is the very 
thing that Plate is after in employing his notion of the skinscape, a place in which one can 
analyze—non-judgmentally—the way in which the semiosphere and the material world 
engage, articulate, and change one another. It is, to use my language, the place in which 
semiotics and materiality are entangled and, as such, reveal coexistent incompatibility. It 
is important to keep contractual realism in mind, as I now move forward to express the 
importance of Eco’s “On Being” for the aesthetics of ambiguity. For, and this cannot be 
overstated, it is there that I find a ground to Eco’s “eminently cultural view.”301        
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If Being is Something, then Eco wonders why no semantic study has satisfactorily 
grappled with “to be.” Setting out to correct that, he argues that there are three kinds of 
Being: an existing entity, Being, and the verb, “to be.”302 Furthermore, Eco writes, Being 
includes the past, future, and that which is possible. “What is,” in other words, “is in all 
the conjugations and tenses of the verb to be.”303 This semantic approach to Being results 
in a series of ambiguities in language that philosophy cannot clarify and so, Eco muses, 
“may it not be that this perplexity expresses a fundamental condition?”304 Being cannot 
escape, in other words, aporia. 
Transitioning away from the semantics of Being to the semiotics of Something, 
Eco moves ever closer to that which interests me—Being and the artist. Before that, 
however, he takes his analysis of Being, semantics, and perplexity and asks the question 
from a different angle: “What is that something that induces us to produce signs?”305 In 
doing so, he shifts the focus away from speech about Being and towards that which 
compels us to speak about it. Briefly connecting this to Plate and religious aesthetics as 
materially focused, I can only ask, too, should not all theories of materiality first ask this 
question: What is that which the aesthetics of sense perception senses? The reasons for 
doing so will becomes clear below.  
In Eco’s world, Being is Something, and it is the task of semiotics to remain 
somewhat faithful to that something in its articulations of it. How is that possible? If a 
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Dynamical Object drives us to produce a representamen,306 which produces an 
Immediate Object to a mind, “which in turn is translatable into a potentially infinite series 
of interpretants,” then sometimes, through the habits formed in the interpretive process, I 
arrive back at the Dynamical Object and am able to make something of it.307 I come full 
circle, in other words, from Dynamical Object to Dynamical Object, and returning do not 
find the Dynamical Object the same. It requires, in fact, another representamen to name 
it. In this way, “the Dynamical Object always remains a Thing-in-Itself, always present 
and impossible to capture.”308 Yet, and this is what is so important in Eco’s essay “On 
Being,” the Dynamical Object is that which “drives us to produce semiosis. We produce 
signs because there is something that demands to be said.”309 
It is important to stress that the Dynamical Object in its Firstness is not known. It 
is, rather, the awareness of something. It is the “as yet blind decision whereby I identify 
something amid the magma of experience that I have to reckon with.”310 The Dynamical 
Object then is the “still raw material of an intuition not yet illuminated by the categorical 
. . . First there is something, even if it is only my reawakened attention; but not even that, 
it is my attention as it sleeps, lies in wait, or dozes.”311 One must be careful, however, for 
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the idea that I can understand that which stands outside of a categorical schema is 
precarious. While I can acknowledge a Firstness, and even remain faithful to it, I cannot 
think of it without first having organized it within a system or “the uncoordinated series 
of entities.”312 So yes, Firstness and Dynamical Objects, but tempered by Eco’s insistence 
that “the moment it appears before us, being arouses interpretation; the moment we can 
speak of it, it is already interpreted. There is no help for it.”313 
While it should be clear how all of this connects to an aesthetics of sense 
perception and Plate’s materiality, what I would like to highlight now is the way in which 
Peirce’s Firstness and Dynamical Object are integral not only to Eco’s hermeneutics but 
also his notion of ambiguity. Let me say first, however, that a religious aesthetic focused 
on materiality or a non-transcendental approach to perception must recognize the 
Dynamical Object as a thing that is not stable. It might start and end its analysis with the 
drum’s role in any given ritual setting, as Plate does, but as it returns from the 
semiosphere to the drum, the drum’s representamen has changed. It is no longer that 
which it was intuited to be. It morphed due to the chain of interpretants that any 
interpretation made of it.  
To interpret the drum in any context, however, is to be beholden, responsible, or 
accountable to the Firstness of the drum—drum as drum, only known and mediated 
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through Thirdness.314 To interpret the drum is to arrive back at the drum as Dynamical 
Object. To use the drum is to find oneself elsewhere, contemplating the sonic waves of a 
mosquito’s wings. “It’s difficult to tell the difference,” Plate writes, “between one’s 
search for the cultural-religious significance of drums and one’s search for religions, and 
the role of drums within those . . . One cannot simply study drums without knowing 
something about religions, and . . . vice versa.”315 
And so, it seems, Plate articulates this, too. The semiosphere and the object are 
entangled to an impossible degree, and to analyze the one is to analyze the other. And 
what Peirce through Eco stresses is that if I set out to explore the role of drums as a 
material artifact in various religions, then it is my responsibility to conclude with drums 
as a renewed Dynamical Object—not something else, endlessly deferred. And what I add 
to this, of which I will explore more below, is that insofar as the Dynamical Object can 
only be known through Thirdness, two or more realities coexist incompatibly.  
But what role does Firstness or the Dynamical Object play in an aesthetics of art 
or an aesthetics of ambiguity? Or, as Eco asks, “What does a Poet reveal to us?”316 She 
takes on the ambiguity of language, the fundamental perplexity, and from it seeks to 
“extract a surplus of interpretation . . . rather than a surplus of being.”317 She seeks to 
reveal or redirect my attention to a Peircean Firstness as if it were not mediated by 
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Thirdness. A poet desires to crawl backwards “to persuade me to reckon with being,” 
even if, ultimately, being as Firstness cannot be known.318 This, ultimately, leads to a 
surplus of interpretation, which, utilizing Winkler’s contemporary ambiguity theory, 
would point towards a poetic ambiguity that is both produced and strategic.  
According to Eco, the notions of Firstness and the Dynamical Object result in an 
oscillation between two aesthetics. The first is that the work of the artist manifests itself 
in the non-concealment of being.319 When I paint a picture of a pipe, I am peeling back 
the layers of semiosis and conveying the being of the entity as a stability of 
appearance.320 I am, in other words, seeking to reveal a Firstness as a Firstness (even 
though this is ultimately impossible). The second, however, is altogether different. “Here 
the work is not the mediator through which [Being] reveals itself,” Eco writes, “it is . . . 
how art makes a tabula rasa of the inauthentic ways in which we encounter the entities, 
and it invites and provokes us to reinterpret the Something in which we are.”321 If the 
former allows for Being to reveal itself, then the latter unmasks the way in which I 
construct Being, through the semiosphere, in the entities that I encounter. This provides 
me with a clean slate, so to speak, so that I can rethink the ways in which an entity 
signifies and the way in which I approach it. These are irreconcilable aesthetics. “The 
first,” Eco writes, “affords a glimpse of an orphic realism (something outside us that tells 
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us how things really are); the second celebrates the triumph of questioning and 
hermeneutics.”322   
It is the second aesthetic that corresponds to an aesthetics of ambiguity. Why? 
Because it asks us to consider things from a different point of view, “by inviting us to 
submit to the encounter with the concrete and to the impact with an individual in which 
the fragile framework of our universals crumbles.”323 The poet—an aesthete of 
ambiguity—continually invites me into the task of recognizing the constructions I make 
of the world and the way in which I embody them “as if” they were reality. Given this 
unmasking, new potentialities arise for creating the world anew from the matter at 
hand—a world not ex nihilo but palimpsestuous.  
While this second aesthetic, that of ambiguity, is enticing in its potentiality, it also 
raises the question: what is the boundary between an ambiguity that is an opening of the 
codes that swirl around us and the alternative facts of political delirium?324 According to 
Eco, the best answer to this question325 is what he calls “lines of resistance,” which is that 
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which is already given.326 This “already given” is neither completed nor finished, but it is 
a pure Limit or a pure No. Imagine pouring water over the surface of a coarse piece of 
wood. The water falls into the cracks and must, without exception, flow through the crags 
that are already given. “Wood,” the water might say, “change the trajectory of the crack 
that I am currently flowing through.” To which the wood can only say, “No.” To Eco, 
this is the line of resistance to which even an aesthetics of ambiguity must account for or 
be responsible to. And, as I now move to consider the ways in which aesthetic messages 
are produced before concluding Part I of this work, I will end with the words of Eco, who 
here writes of what poets do when confronted with a line of resistance:  
Of course, in the light of these resistances, the language of the Poets seems to 
occupy a free zone. Liars by vocation, they are not those who say what being is 
but seem to be those who instead often permit themselves (and us) to deny its 
resistances—because for them tortoises can fly, and there can even be creatures 
that elude death. But their discourse . . . brings us face to face with the 
immoderate nature of our desire: by letting us glimpse what could be beyond the 
limit, on the one hand they console us for our finiteness and on the other they 
remind us how often we are a ‘useless passion.’ Even when they refuse to accept 
the resistances in being, in denying them they remind us of them. Even when they 
suffer on discovering them, they let us think that perhaps the resistances could 
still be got around. What the Poets are really saying to us is that we need to 
encounter being with gaiety (and hopefully with science too), to question it, test 
its resistances, grasp its openings and its hints, which are never too explicit. The 
rest is conjecture.327  
 
 
 
THE COMPOSER 
III 
“My grandmother used to tell me the story.” 
                                                
326 Eco, Kant, 54. 
327 Ibid., 56. 
 
 
124 
“Rubinstein’s daughter?”  
“Yes, he was my great-grandfather.” 
“And what did she say?”  
Silent for a time, ordering her thoughts, Maria traced her empty ring finger. 
“Well, you have to remember, she was only eight at the time. Much of what she said 
was wrapped in the haze of youth. But she would often describe her dress, red satin, 
and the necklace that my great-grandmother let her wear that evening. It was ‘a 
simple thing,’ she would say, ‘but wonderful. Six pearls in golden filigree.’ 
Apparently, it was her introduction to society.” 
“And so your great-grandfather took her to Martynov’s infamous burning?” 
“Yes. But he had no way of knowing that was what would happen. By all 
accounts, it should have been nothing more than an elegant evening at the Bolshoi. At 
least, that’s what Lidiya said.” 
“Your grandmother?” 
“Yes.” Maria sipped her coffee. “From her perspective, that night was 
miraculous. The world was abuzz, she would say, with the beauty of Tsarina 
Alexandra, and the mystical battle between Rasputin and Nilus. She would often 
speak of Nilus’ conspiracy, but I doubt Lidiya, at eight, could have known such 
things. Telling me the story, I think, there was much she embellished or added 
afterwards. In fact—” 
“Can I get you anything else?” our waitress, a heavy-set woman, interrupted. 
The clinks and low murmur of the diner flooded into our booth. 
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I looked to Maria.  
“No,” she said. “I’m fine.”  
The waitress nodded, moving on to other patrons.  
“But what of the actual burning? What did she tell you? How did she describe 
it?” 
“‘The music,’ she would say, ‘was astounding.’ It was like nothing she had 
experienced before. Ghastly, stirring, transcendent. Have you ever heard Górecki’s 
Symphony of Sorrowful Songs?”   
I shook my head. “I don’t really go for such things.”   
“Do yourself a favor then,” Maria’s eyes were distant. “It’s what I imagine my 
grandmother encountered that night.” 
“And then?” 
“Martynov turned to his audience. The applause was deafening. Lidiya 
climbed onto her seat, the chandeliers above glowing their iridescent light. ‘Where 
others,’ she remembers Martynov shouting, ‘create to oppress. I invent to destroy.’ Of 
course, at the time, she had no way of knowing what that meant. But then, to the 
horror of all in attendance, he struck a match, held his composition aloft, and burnt it 
to ash. ‘Never again,’ he screamed, gripped by madness, ‘will you hear my song. A 
swerve in chaos, this moment cannot last.’ The Tsar’s soldiers, never far according to 
my grandmother, stormed the stage. The theater was locked in confusion.”  
Maria paused, looking down at her hands.  
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“The last words my grandmother heard Martynov scream that night cut the 
world in two. ‘We are all responsible for what happens next,’ he said, and then was 
wrestled to the ground by the imperial guard. Musicians leapt off the stage. People 
ran for the exits. Taken home and forbidden to speak of the night’s event, Lidiya was 
ushered out by her father. It wasn’t until later, much later, that she first spoke of it to 
me.” 
“In New York?” 
“Yes. My family emigrated not long after.”  
The conversation lulled. I drank my coffee.  
“And why,” I finally asked, “did your grandmother think he did it?” 
“She had lots of theories. But most were conspiratorial. I even, once upon a 
time, researched it myself.” 
“That’s right. You graduated from Juilliard.” 
She nodded. “I come from a family of musicians.” 
“Okay. So what do you think? Why did Martynov burn the only composition 
of what many have claimed to be the most influential piece of modern music?” 
“The most profound desire of humankind,” Maria said, “stems from that 
which we cannot have. I think Martynov wanted to create the illusion of a beauty that 
has neither a beginning nor an end.” 
“Is that an illusion?” 
Maria sighed. “I don’t know.” 
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The Aesthetic Production of Ambiguity 
 
Ambiguity for Eco is more than just a violation, challenge, or the production of 
further knowledge. It is also a poetic drive to create a surplus of interpretation. This 
surplus, however, is not an infinite drift or meaningless play—though play it is. It is, 
rather, a probing of the Dynamical Object or Firstness. It is both a recognition that there 
are boundaries, but a dreamlike recognition in which the horizon of Being is arrived at, 
interrogated, and moved beyond. Ambiguity, in this way, is that which allows me to 
reconcile with death even as it pretends to abolish it. And while overcoming lines of 
resistance, ambiguity reminds me that lines of resistance are impossible to overcome. 
What Peirce’s Dynamical Object and Firstness have done for an aesthetics of ambiguity 
then is to provide it with a way to articulate ambiguity’s commitment to that which is. 
While it probes and plays with resistance, it simultaneously articulates the plurivocal 
interpretations of Being while creating the unforeseen potentialities and possibilities of 
the already given.  
To say it differently, ambiguity points to Firstness and claims that even though I 
am not trapped by it, I recognize it as the No that it is. And, as such, I can subjunctively 
see past it, reconstruct it, and articulate it differently. I am not free to make of it what I 
will, for I am responsible to and accountable for the hardness of resistance. But insofar as 
I sketch out this resistance in its Thirdness, I can create a reality in such a way that my 
finiteness is celebrated. And, when done, I see that it was not Reality to which I was 
answerable, but rather a reality shaped from the living matter that surrounds me.  
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A materially oriented religious aesthetic that takes ambiguity seriously would not 
only side with Plate in his desire to eschew Beauty, Truth, and God, but also it would 
approach the material realm as qualified by Peirce and Eco. The objects that I touch, 
taste, see, smell, and hear are Dynamical Objects known through representamens, 
Immediate Objects, and interpretants. What my senses engage is a line of resistance, an 
already given, that—through ambiguity—has the potential to violate, challenge, and 
produce further knowledge. In its capacity to draw my attention to death (the ultimate 
line of resistance), it still questions and probes. And perhaps most importantly, it reminds 
me that I am accountable to a reality, even if that reality is a co-constructed project 
maintained and policed by the community in which I find myself. And yet, ambiguity, 
even then, has the potential to open, interrogate, and expand that very same community. 
To use my language, the aesthetics of ambiguity reveals the coexistent incompatibility 
inherent in all lines of resistance approached through Thirdness. And it is the poet, the 
aesthete of ambiguity, who draws my attention to these paradoxes with an aim of 
rethinking the world that I move through as an embodied already given. 
The final question that this chapter will take up then is how does an aesthete of 
ambiguity—a poet—accomplish all of this? How does one simultaneously create 
openings while remaining accountable to an already given? Or rather, how does 
ambiguity create an encounter that leads to the recognition of a coexistent 
incompatibility? To answer these questions, I must now turn to Eco’s essay, “On the 
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Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language.”328 But, in short, 
the answer is through contradiction.  
Beginning with Roman Jakobson’s assertion that the aesthetic use of language is 
both ambiguous and self-focusing, Eco writes that by ambiguity a message is “rendered 
creative in relation to the acknowledged possibilities of the code.”329 Given my previous 
two chapters, and situating Eco in his larger corpus, I think one can easily see both 
information theory and the idea of the encyclopedia lying behind this statement. While 
“possibilities of the code” is informed by Eco’s adventure in the world of information 
theory, “in relation to the acknowledged” is (or will be) a reference to the accumulated 
cultural knowledge gathered together in the encyclopedia in the form of cultural units. 
Ambiguity is here that which stretches cultural knowledge beyond recognition and, 
hence, leads one or many to confront the encyclopedia as it currently stands.  
This leads Eco to suggest that ambiguity does not only function at the level of 
content (the cultural unit), but also at the level of expression or form. As he writes it, 
“any changes occurring at the two levels [content and form] are functionally related to 
each other.”330 While this statement has been argued in the past, Eco laments, it has never 
been successfully proven due to any already-given expression’s entanglement with 
language. What is needed, he suggests, is a working model that stands outside the rules of 
any given code—a thought experiment with a made-up language. In this way, “the 
                                                
328 Umberto Eco, “On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language,” 
in The Role of the Reader (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1979: 90–104. 
329 Ibid., 90. 
330 Ibid., 91. 
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working model [will be] equipped to demonstrate a language’s own capacity for 
generating self-contradiction,” which is, to Eco, the foundation of aesthetic ambiguity.331  
Eco proposes to do this for his readers. His wonderfully playful idea is to recreate 
the language spoken in the Garden of Eden, and the way in which contradictions arose by 
God’s prohibitory expression, which equally resulted in a contradiction in content. What 
Eco’s essay will show then, for my purposes, is the way in which aesthetic messages are 
generated through contradiction and, as such, result in a rethought embodiment of the 
cultural code. It will show, in short, how ambiguity works and, placing it in Winkler’s 
frame, is both produced and strategic.  
“On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages” is the perfect ending for 
“Part I” of this project as it also ties together Plate’s turn towards materiality and Peirce’s 
Dynamical Object as ground. As Eco states, the insistence that expression or form 
potentially results in a change on the content-plane is a reminder that self-focusing 
aesthetic messages refer to the message itself as a physical entity.332 And what does it 
mean to be “self-focusing?” To convey information about one’s own physical make-up. 
A message, in other words, changes content but also form insofar as it questions or 
probes its own materiality or already given-ness. In doing so, a kind of two-way street is 
created in which the form (as material) shapes the content (as idea), even as the content 
(cultural unit) shapes the form (expression). In this ever and ongoing aesthetic process of 
ambiguity, potentialities emerge that were previously outside the scope of the already 
                                                
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid., 90. 
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given encyclopedia and material artifact. What Plate’s stress on the skinscape does is, of 
course, focus my attention on this process as a kind of liminal space between any final 
judgment. What my coexistent incompatibility does is to take the skinscape and push it 
further. It highlights the plurivocality of this process by deferring aesthetic judgment in 
such a way that, standing in the intersection of aesthetic experience, many possibilities 
are seen, acknowledged, and exposed as judgments of choice. But for that to be fully 
articulated you will have to wait until Part II of this book, wherein I turn my attention to 
the narrativization of theory. 
In summary then, it is in Eden that I find all of Eco’s theories converging and 
articulating the goal of this project—to espouse an aesthetics of ambiguity that connects 
to and expands upon Plate’s religious aesthetic. Before diving into Eden, however, let me 
quote Eco at length: 
[My] model must prove that any contradictions generated by the aesthetic use of 
language at the level of its form of expression equally involve contradictions in 
the form of its content; ultimately, they entail a complete reorganizing of our 
conceptual vision of the universe.333  
 
In the beginning, Adam and Eve devised a set of semantic units that gave 
preferential status to their emotional responses to flora and fauna.334 These units, Eco the 
mythologist writes, can be organized under six headings: yes vs. no, edible vs. inedible, 
good vs. bad, beautiful vs. ugly, red vs. blue, and serpent vs. apple. As cultural units do, 
these headings set up a series of connotative chains: 
 
                                                
333 Ibid., 91. 
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Red = Edible = Good = Beautiful 
Blue = Inedible = Bad = Ugly 
 
Eco claims that Adam and Eve devised a rudimentary language to give expression 
to these concepts, which was based on two sounds, A and B. These sounds could be 
arranged in a variety of sequences, but had to follow the combinatory rule X, nY, X, 
which is a fancy way of saying that every sequence must start with either A or B, have 
any number of the opposite sound, and then end with the sound with which it started. 
This resulted in, of course, a wonderfully colorful language in which words like “Edible” 
were spelled “ABA” and “Blue,” “BAAAAAB.” There was even a “Yes” (AA) that 
referred to God and a “No” (BB) that referred to Satan. Most importantly, Eco writes, “if 
two sequences are joined to each other, their cultural units are thus brought into 
reciprocal predication: BAAAB, ABBBBBA, for example, means ‘the apple is red,’ but 
also ‘red apple.’”335 Given this system, the connotative chains resulted in these 
significations:  
ABA = ABBA = ABBBA = ABBBBBA = BAAAB = AA 
Eat       Good       Beautiful   Red                 Apple        Yes 
 
BAB = BAAB = BAAAAB = BAAAAAB = ABBA = BB 
No Eat  Bad        Ugly             Blue                 Serpent   No 
 
In this edenic schema then, words equaled things and things equaled words, and any 
judgment passed on the universe was “automatically bound to be a semiotic 
judgment.”336  
                                                
335 Ibid., 93. 
336 Ibid., 94. 
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And so, given my purposes, the question arises: How does ambiguity manifest 
within this simple structure? Well, in this case, it just so happens that it is God who 
shoots herself in the foot. As Adam and Eve are languidly, no doubt, reclining near some 
idyllic pool chatting with Milton—lush vines and sweet nectar surrounding them—God 
strolls up and pronounces the first factual judgment. As Eco writes it: “You two probably 
imagine that the apple belongs to the class of good, edible things, because it happens to 
be red. Well, I’ve got news for you. The apple is not to be considered edible because it is 
bad.”337 Even though this does not square with Adam and Eve’s connotative chains, they 
have to listen because, to them, God is the ultimate AA. “God spoke and his words 
were,” Eco writes, “/BAAAB. BAB—BAAAB. BAAB/ (apple inedible, apple bad).”338  
In this way, God creates a cultural tradition, wherein culture is born out of an 
institutional taboo. The contradiction is that a denoting term establishes a contrast with 
cultural connotations. A new term emerges, “the redblue,” which is equivalent to 
“goodbad.” This term is ambiguous in both form and content and is therefore self-
focusing. The term “redblue” also has, in Adam and Eve’s edenic language, a formal 
indication of its inedibility. This matters because it signifies a contradiction at the level of 
expression, which impacts the materiality or embodiment of their cultural 
encyclopedia.339 What God did was outside the scope of language as Adam and Eve had 
previously conceived of it. How? By employing the aesthetic use of language—a 
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contradiction that resulted in a complete reorganization of the conceptual vision of any 
given universe.340 The aesthetic use of language is not a loss, however, for its 
resegmenting of content results in fresh cultural categories or units that potentially lead to 
new perceptive realities. As in this case, where the connotative chains, because of God’s 
prohibition, shifted to:  
Red = Edible = Good = Beautiful = Yes 
Blue = Inedible = Bad = Ugly = No = Serpent and Apple 
  
From which, Eco writes, “it is only a short step to 
 
Serpent = Apple.”341  
  
This contradiction that leads to a crisis of linguistic and perceptual ambiguity for Adam 
and Eve, soon leads Adam to begin exploring the boundaries of language. He writes 
poetry, spawns further contradictions, and is soon capable of saying things like: “inedible 
is bad, which is apple ugly and blue” or 
   BAB 
           BAAB 
        BAAAB 
       BAAAAB 
BAAAAAB.342 
 
Eve gets in on the fun and finds it interesting that “Serpent” (ABBBA) has the 
same ending as the words that “stand for beautiful, good, and red.”343 Playing the game of 
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343 Ibid., 100. 
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poetic language, she soon arrives at the construction: “Good, beautiful and red—is the 
Serpent.”344 But how can the Good and the Beautiful also be the “No?” “Just how can the 
Serpent,” Eco asks, “be the formal equivalent of things which the language system 
excludes as his predicates?”345 This soon devolves into a series of ambiguities and 
deceptions, which ends with both Adam and Eve becoming aware of the arbitrariness of 
signs and that order is nonexistent. Adam can then begin, investigating the form of 
content, asking the question: “Who ever said that Blue was Inedible?”346  
It is here then that I arrive at the fullest description of Eco’s ambiguity. “From 
conventionalized meanings,” he writes, “Adam takes a short step back to the world of 
experience and stages another encounter with its physical referents. He picks a blueberry 
for himself and eats it; the berry tastes good.”347 And so a contradiction that led to the 
destabilization of the encyclopedia resulted in an altered perception of the material 
world. What was once a given (Red = Good and Blue = Bad), was inverted and 
transformed. Adam resegmented content and, in the process, discovered fresh cultural 
categories (new perceptive realities), which obliged him to provide new names.348 In the 
end, Eco writes, “Adam taught mankind that, in order to restructure codes, one needs to 
rewrite messages.”349 
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Conclusion  
Adding to Eco’s notion of ambiguity then, I can say that ambiguity violates, 
challenges, and produces further knowledge. It is accountable to a reality, but not 
irreducibly so, as it also has the potential for opening significations of the material world. 
And finally, ambiguity is strategically produced and employed through creative 
contradictions in the already given cultural encyclopedia. The way Eco describes it, I can 
even say that ambiguous contradictions in the code not only transform and expand it, but 
also change the material world, not just my perceptions of it. How is that possible? 
Because, utilizing Peirce, I can only know the world through Thirdness, which is matter 
engaged at the level of the semiosphere. Reciprocally then, contradictions in the code 
change the material world via Thirdness, as Firstness is ultimately closed off to me.  
This espousal of Eco’s ambiguity connects to Plate’s skinscape (as previously 
mentioned) and articulates the turn towards materiality in religious aesthetics. A material 
object in a sacred space is infinitely entangled with the connotative chains of any 
culture’s encyclopedia. The one not only informs the other, but provides the possibility 
for violation, challenge, further knowledge, accountability, and contradiction. Likewise, 
Eco’s theory of ambiguity syncs with Winkler’s contemporary model for theories of 
ambiguity in that it fits well within the category of strategic production, because, among 
many things, ambiguity is a contradiction at the level of expression. 
Only a few questions remain: How is my description of ambiguity as a coexistent 
incompatibility furthered by Eco’s theory? How does it connect to Plate, Winkler, and 
religious aesthetics? And, finally, what does any of this have to do with narrativizing 
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theories? Let me state that the task of Part II of this work is given over to answering these 
questions. But, in short, coexistent incompatibility allows for the possibility of two or 
more Thirdnesses in both cultural encyclopedias and, more importantly, material worlds. 
In fact, to stress the nature of a coexistent incompatibility, I will stop just short of saying 
that it also allows for two or more Firstnesses.  
A contradiction that opens the code and my engagement with the material world 
also potentially reveals the plurivocality of the already given. Ambiguity, as I define it, 
reveals mutually existing, overlapping, and entangled universes. I must stress, however, 
that this is not a theory of multiple worlds. I am not talking about parallel universes or 
branching timelines. I am, rather, articulating the flux, process, and evolution of reality as 
it exists in motion.350 Given that, I am saying that any aesthetic judgment of reality is a 
synchronic snapshot of that which is presented to me, which exists alongside and 
overlaps with an infinity of simultaneous snapshots. If ambiguity as encounter moves me 
into ambiguity as state (Plate’s skinscape), then it is there that the possibility exists to 
interrogate, transform, or renew my aesthetic judgments, insofar as they are judgments of 
narratival or world construction. I cannot maintain the (non-judgmental) skinscape of 
coexistent incompatibility indefinitely, however, and so must, at some point, “collapse” 
the state, choose, and travel a path. I traverse, analogously, one networked connection 
among many, though all are equally viable. Hopping from node to node, when I 
encounter ambiguity, I can stop, critique my position, and possibly alter my direction. In 
doing so, I have not only rearranged the network, but also the node in which I exist. 
                                                
350 Cf. Lee Smolin, Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe (New 
York: Mariner Books, 2014). 
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To conclude this chapter, let me end with an example that narratively espouses 
coexistent incompatibility as both an encounter and state, and the power of ambiguity to 
unveil potentialities.351 China Miéville’s The City & The City is a dark, gritty detective 
novel in which the protagonist, Tyador Borlú, must solve the murder of a young woman 
dumped near a shelled-out project. Read on the surface, this seems the common fair of 
dime-store literature. But beneath that compressed summary is a world dripping with 
ambiguity, paradox, and coexistent incompatibility.  
Imagine the Yugoslav Wars in the 90s and, rather than war, the solution to the 
problem was to create a tiered state in which the occupants of Sarajevo all lived in the 
same physical space but embodied different cultural encyclopedias wherein it was a 
crime to see, acknowledge, or admit the existence of the other. Miéville accomplishes 
something like this with his cities Beszel and Ul Qoma, two cities that overlap or 
“crosshatch”—that are, in fact, the same material city. While the citizens of each are 
entangled regarding culture, language, architecture, and more, the residents have 
undergone a rigorous cultural training in “unseeing.” I could, as a citizen of Beszel, be in 
the same physical coffee shop as a resident of Ul Qoma, but neither see nor hear her. I 
would construct and experience the space differently given my encyclopedia and, so too, 
would she, even though it is exactly the same material. We would be living in the same 
space and, through unseeing, construct it differently. Sharing the physical space of the 
world then, Miéville seems to suggest, we could only overcome our cultural, ethnic, and 
religious differences through a mass denial built upon a quantum state.  
                                                
351 China Miéville, The City & The City (New York: Del Rey, 2010). 
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While this Heisenbergian architecture works for most, it does not for all. There 
are those that—through ambiguity as violation, challenge, or contradiction—begin to 
undo their unseeing. And when a resident of Beszel looks across the street and sees it 
manifest as a thoroughfare of Ul Qoma rather than one of Beszel’s, she is quickly 
scooped up by the liminal organization known as “Breach” and is never heard from again 
in either city. Why? Because once the immutable law of unseeing has been broken, once 
the coexistent incompatibility has been revealed, there is no going back. The 
encyclopedia and the physical space that it both constructs and informs has been 
irrevocably changed. The further knowledge that has been produced because of Breach 
(both a crime committed and the organization responsible for policing it) cannot return to 
a pre-ambiguous state. Once committed, Breach is infinite. 
Given a momentary glimpse into the liminality of Breach, however, the reader 
begins to see the competing narratives at play in Beszel and Ul Qoma. In that world, a 
citizen can pick one narrative over the other, but she cannot choose both. To do so is 
anathema to the cultural encyclopedias of either city. She must choose or be forced into it 
from childhood. To break the strict boundaries of Miéville’s city or to produce further 
knowledge, a resident from either side of reality must have an encounter with ambiguity, 
an encounter that has the potential to shape the material world itself.  
Miéville’s thought-provoking novel is also an illustrative way to end Part I of this 
work, wherein I have set out to accomplish three tasks. One, I have articulated ambiguity, 
its current theories, and the way in which Eco fits into ambiguity’s contemporary 
movements. Two, I have placed Eco and his ambiguity in conversation with Plate’s 
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religious material aesthetic. And three, I have injected my own understanding of 
ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility into this conversation.  
In the end, I can say that ambiguity is a strategic production that violates, 
challenges, and produces further knowledge. It is accountable to a reality, though it also 
has the potential to shape the material world itself. It is a contradiction in the code or 
encyclopedia that stretches either beyond recognition and results in an interpretive 
surplus. And it is both an encounter and a state that pushes Plate’s skinscape into a kind 
of phase space or Breach, to use Miéville’s term, wherein I can see many of the 
competing and provisional narratives that inform any one physical space. It is then, in the 
state of ambiguity (a non-judgmental and liminal aesthetic), that I can interrogate, 
expand, or choose differently. The first part of this work has prepared me to engage the 
competing narratives of ambiguous spaces and the way in which narratives and theories 
are not only mutually informing but co-constitutive world builders. Part I of this work, in 
other words, has set out the parameters in which I will articulate in Part II how a religious 
aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the 
narrativization of reality. 
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PART I: CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter One, I carefully crafted a heuristic outline for a theory of ambiguity. I 
argued that there are three types, broadly speaking, of ambiguity: literary, philosophical, 
and scientific. Utilizing Winkler, I also sketched out contemporary trends in theories of 
ambiguity before focusing my attention on religious aesthetics and its turn towards 
materiality. Relying on Plate, I first defined religion and then articulated a religious 
aesthetic rooted in ambiguity. In summary, I defined ambiguity as a coexistent 
incompatibility, which highlights the proliferation of meaning by holding multiple 
interpretations in tension, and religious aesthetics as the provisional exploration into the 
commitments and narratives that humans subjunctively embody.  
In Chapter Two, I set out to place Eco’s ambiguity in conversation with current 
theories, Plate’s material religious aesthetic, and my own understanding of ambiguity as a 
coexistent incompatibility. I did this by examining and contextualizing Eco’s theories of 
aesthetics, semiotics, cultural units, and encyclopedias. I argued that much of Eco’s 
theory of ambiguity is rooted in his work on information theory and, as a result, specifies 
an ambiguity that violates cultural codes, challenges cultural encyclopedias, and produces 
further knowledge. This helped me to espouse fully my theory of coexistent 
incompatibility while also developing Plate’s notion of the skinscape. I suggested that 
ambiguity is a space wherein an aesthete refrains from judgment so that she can more 
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fully acknowledge the plurivocality or potentiality of a given percept. It is an encounter 
with an already given that forces upon an aesthete the factuality of many, equiprobable 
realities. Ambiguity does not, however, provide a way forward. It is neither map nor 
guide. It is a hesitancy, a refusal to judge or, better yet, a position from which one can 
foresee the infinite possibilities of a possible future. Connecting this to Plate, I posited 
that a material religious aesthetic has the potential either to create or highlight religious 
commitments and narratives as they mutually exist as polyvocal percepts. A religious 
aesthetic rooted in ambiguity, in other words, would not only examine phenomena but 
also the narratives that allow any observer to choose one vocality over another. 
In Chapter Three, I brought in Peirce and both his Firstness and Dynamical 
Object. I showed how Eco’s ambiguity, which greatly informs and contextualizes mine, 
is grounded in a reality that is flexible, fluid, and networked. I then dove into Eco’s 
seminal essay on the creation of aesthetic messages. This showed, via Winkler’s 
paradigm, how Eco’s ambiguity is both strategic and productive. It also highlighted the 
role of contradiction in theories of ambiguity. I claimed that ambiguity violates, 
challenges, and produces further knowledge. It is accountable to a reality, but not 
irreducibly so. And that it is strategically produced and employed through creative 
contradictions in the already given cultural encyclopedia. This resulted in an expansion of 
Plate’s material religious aesthetic or skinscape. A material object in a sacred space, I 
suggested, is infinitely entangled with the connotative chains of any culture’s 
encyclopedia. Ambiguity is both an encounter and a state (much like Plate’s skinscape) 
that reveals mutually existing, overlapping, and entangled universes. It is within 
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ambiguity that the possibility exists to interrogate, transform, or renew my aesthetic 
judgments, insofar as they are judgments of narratival or world construction.  
Finally, moving into Part II, I shall show how my understanding of ambiguity 
arises in Eco’s novels—or, more specifically, the narrativization of his theories. In this 
way, you can think of his novels as the matter and his theories as the encyclopedia or 
semiosphere. It is my argument that his theories and narratives shuttle back and forth in a 
way similar to the entanglement of the semiotic and material worlds. In doing so, I argue 
that ambiguity exposes the way in which we create knowledge and construct worlds, in 
so far as the event of ambiguity leads to a state of ambiguity (skinscape) in which I can 
analyze potentialities—or, to put it differently, how a religious aesthetic rooted in 
ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of 
reality. 
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PART II: THE AMBIGUOUS NARRATIVES OF REALITY 
 
Part I of this work sought to define ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility. Part 
II analyzes Umberto Eco’s theories and novels through that lens. Taken together, both 
parts argue the thesis that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the 
provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. 
Chapter Four provides a test case for my theory of ambiguity by examining The 
Prague Cemetery. Following the life of Captain Simone Simonini, Eco’s protagonist, I 
show the ways in which narratives are both constructed and embodied, and the role of 
ambiguity in such narratives. I argue that The Prague Cemetery, read through ambiguity, 
is one instance wherein I can see the construction, destruction, and liminality of 
provisional knowledge. It not only depicts the narrativization of reality but also 
represents the map of fictions that are thrust onto the world of things and embodied as 
natural.  
Chapter Five further explores the entanglement of fiction and reality by 
examining Simonini in light of Eco’s Six Walks in the Fictional Woods and Inventing the 
Enemy. I discuss the possibilities of ordering one’s encyclopedia and the way in which 
choice and provisionality are revealed by ambiguity. I argue that all knowledge is 
organized, limited, and idiosyncratic, and, once confronted by ambiguity, provisional. I 
also take up narrativizing theories and show how they overlap with and further my 
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ongoing arguments about ambiguity. I suggest that narrativizing theories are a posteriori 
arrangements of the universal encyclopedia that, once embodied, shape an equiprobable 
reality.   
Chapter Six summarizes the previous five chapters, connects my argument to the 
ongoing work of S. Brent Plate, and concludes the main portion of my work by engaging 
ambiguity through wit, lightness, and narrativizing theories. I argue that humor is 
ambiguity in the face of certainty. If an aesthetics of ambiguity seeks to uncover the 
fictions that I map onto reality while also confronting me with the provisionality of my 
encyclopedia, then it also implies that its enemy is certainty—a knowledge that is 
convinced it has arrived at the proper ordering of the universal encyclopedia. It is the goal 
of Chapter Six not only to summarize my work in a concluding fashion, but also to 
express humor’s role in ambiguity.  
The overall aim of Part II is to continue the work laid out in Part I and to wrestle 
with the thesis that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the 
provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF AMBIGUITY IN RELIGIOUS AESTHETICS 
 
Perhaps there is a provisional solution to this epistemological mess, which is to be 
located in the phrase it is as if. This phrase is of course precisely the announcement of an 
analogy. And on reflection, it is admittedly a halting problem, but jumping out of it, there 
is something quite suggestive and powerful in this formulation, something very 
specifically human. Possibly this formulation itself is the deep diagnostic of all human 
cognition—the tell, as they say, meaning the thing that tells, the giveaway. In the infinite 
black space of ignorance, it is as if stands as the basic operation of cognition, the mark 
perhaps of consciousness itself. Human language: it is as if it made sense. 
—Aurora, Kim Stanley Robinson 
 
Introduction 
 
“It is as if,” Kim Stanley Robinson writes, “It is as if stands as the basic operation 
of cognition.”352 The speaker, however, is SHIP, a quantum computer tasked with 
teaching itself human narrativity. And what does SHIP discover? That the self—human 
or artificial—“emerges out of the combination of all the inputs and processing and 
outputs that we353 experience,” which is ultimately nothing more or less than the 
narratives we string together.354 Narrative, in other words, is the “pretense of self” that 
can only be expressed in narrative, “a self that is these sentences. We tell [a] story, and 
                                                
352 Kim Stanley Robinson, Aurora (New York: Orbit, 2016), 126. 
353 “We,” SHIP says earlier, “are aware that in talking about the ship we could with some 
justification use the pronoun I. And yet it seems wrong. An unwarranted presumption, this so-called subject 
position. A subject is really just a pretense of aggregated subroutines. Subroutines pretend the I. Possibly, 
however, given the multiplicity of sensors, inputs, data, aggregations, and synthesizings of narrative 
sentences, we can plausibly, and in some senses even accurately, speak of a ‘we.’ As we have been. It’s a 
group effort on the part of a number of disparate systems,” 204.  
354 Ibid., 217. 
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thereby come to what consciousness we have. Scribble ergo sum.”355 And yet, the self 
cannot only be the emplotment of experience. For it, SHIP argues, is a much larger 
complex of sense perceptions, actions, and habits, to name a few. The self, to put it 
differently, is also a collection of embodied experiences that cannot be accounted for in 
the narratives of consciousness. There is always an excess that escapes my attempt to 
construct myself, to shape and order it into a palatable narrative. “Consciousness is so 
poorly understood,” SHIP laments:  
that it can’t even be defined. Self is an elusive thing, sought eagerly, grasped hard, 
perhaps in some kind of fear, some kind of desperate clutch after some first dim 
awareness, awareness even of sensory impressions, so that one might have 
something to hold to. To make time stop. To hold off death.356  
 
It is as if.  
Following from Part I, Part II of this work explores the role of ambiguity in 
religious aesthetics. And though perhaps convoluted across such an expanse of words, I 
am arguing that ambiguity, as a coexistent incompatibility, is an acknowledgement of the 
It is as if of Robinson’s SHIP. Ambiguity, among many things, is an awareness that the 
encyclopedias that allow for understanding and the embodied world given as reality is 
cognized into a narrative that is and can only be as if. A more technical way to phrase my 
proposition is that both aesthetics and, subsequently, epistemology are provisional. That 
which I intuit, cognize, and know as true today, may not be tomorrow. “Having 
established the referent of meaning is,” one Echian commentator writes:  
                                                
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid. 
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because it is endowed with the ability to refer, it remains, nevertheless, 
incomplete and challengeable as predicate of such a referent. Thus, at the same 
time we must say that the referent of meaning is not because it is never a true self, 
it lacks its own independent individuality. We can never hold it firm . . . it is very 
slippery and constantly changed and postponed by the semiosic process into what 
is a never changing succession of interpretants.357 
 
Ambiguity then, as I have articulated it, is that which reveals, highlights, or brings 
my attention to the provisionality or the as-if-ness of the narrative that I take for granted. 
It is also that space in which I can analyze my own provisional assumptions and begin to 
account for the potentiality of other ways of seeing and doing. Underlying this argument, 
as I have already said, is the assumption that the task of religious aesthetics is to examine 
the narratives that humans live as if they were reality. Or, stealing the language of 
Robinson’s SHIP, religious aesthetics explores the narratives that people wield so that 
they might have something to hold onto, to make time stop, or to hold off death. 
Religious aesthetics, following Plate, seeks also to account for the excess of everyday 
experience. It is rooted, in other words, in the “awareness even of sensory 
impressions.”358  
So much for Part I. But what of Chapter Four? If I argued that ambiguity is a way 
into the provisional narratives of reality, then this chapter, and much of what follows, 
provides a test case for that argument. Umberto Eco’s penultimate novel, The Prague 
Cemetery,359 is the laboratory in which I distill my chemical concoction, which is 
                                                
357 Raffaele De Benedictis, “Il Cimitero Di Praga: The Epistemic Implication between Lies and 
Reality,” Forum Italicum 45, no. 2 (September 2011): 440. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Umberto Eco, The Prague Cemetery, trans. Richard Dixon (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011). 
Cf. Rocco Capozzi, “Revisiting History: Conspiracies and Fabrication of Texts in ‘Foucault’s Pendulum’ 
and ‘The Prague Cemetery,’” Italica 90, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 638, “[Eco’s novels] are not easy reading 
 
 
149 
ambiguity as I defined it in Part I. Following the life of Captain Simone Simonini, Eco’s 
protagonist, I show the ways in which narratives are both constructed and embodied, and 
the role of ambiguity in such narratives. In the following chapter, stepping back from The 
Prague Cemetery, I examine how Eco’s own theory of ambiguity was narrativized. 
Culminating in the final chapter of this book, I argue that the theory to novel to theory 
journey of The Prague Cemetery is similar to the ways in which aesthetics functions 
when understood through my definition of ambiguity. The interplay between an already 
given encyclopedia, lived experience, and constructed, as if narratives all point towards 
the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality.360 While ambiguity 
reveals this and allows for potentialities in the skinscape, it is the task of religious 
aesthetics to examine the narratival paths I traverse. This chapter argues, in conclusion, 
that The Prague Cemetery, read through ambiguity, is one instance wherein I can see the 
construction, destruction, and liminality of provisional knowledge, because it not only 
depicts the narrativization of reality but also represents, “the proof that fiction and reality 
can function together and that any fiction, once recorded, is able to create its own 
reality.”361 
                                                                                                                                            
and, because they are instruments for discussing ideas and for understanding and expanding knowledge, 
they are intended to function as cognitive tools that activate associations of words, image, ideas, fictional 
characters, historical events, cultural phenomena and innumerable texts.” 
360 Cf. Nishevita J. Murthy, Historicizing Fiction/Fictionalizing History: Representation in Select 
Novels of Umberto Eco and Orhan Pamuk (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), xiii: 
“Through their creative use of literary techniques, [Eco’s] novels succeed in highlighting the way reality 
can be glimpsed through, and as, representational perspectives.” 
361 Anca Andriescu Garcia, “Inventing the Enemy. When Propaganda Becomes History,” 
Philologica 5, no. 1 (January 2013): 65; and Capozzi, “Revisiting History,” 625. 
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The Prague Cemetery: An Ambiguous Summary362 
Moving through the streets of Paris like a panoramic cinematographer, I am 
introduced to the narrator of this tale. Neither Eco nor Simonini, I can only guess that it is 
the model author, that textual strategy that “coincides with the intention of the text,”363 
which so quickly establishes The Prague Cemetery’s aesthetic credentials.364 “If you 
were a passerby in March of 1897,” the text suggests, “then this is what you would see: a 
man, sitting as his desk, scribbling down personal notes.”365 I am, as a participant in this 
scene then, peering over the writer’s shoulder along with the unnamed narrator, who, it 
would seem, turns to me and winks, for: “the Narrator himself does not yet know who the 
mysterious writer is, proposing to find this out (together with the Reader) while both of 
us look on inquisitively and follow what he is noting down on those sheets of paper.”366 
The next words in the text are the title of Chapter Two, “WHO AM I?”367 And what a 
                                                
362 From which you should take away four things. One, Simonini is an asshole. Two, The Prague 
Cemetery’s framing narrative is that the protagonist, Simonini, is performing a psychoanalysis upon 
himself. Three, the underlying story of The Prague Cemetery is the collecting and editing together of The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion from disparate sources. And four, the ambiguous moment—that liminal 
space between the encyclopedia and the material world—is always self-reflective (cf. Martin J. Plax, “On 
Extremism in Our Time,” Society 50, no. 2 (April 2013): 202–3). 
363 Cf. Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1991), 59; Umberto Eco, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); 
Umberto Eco, Jonathan Culler, Richard Rorty, and Christine Brooke-Rose, Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Joseph 
Francese, “Eco’s Poetics of ‘The Model Reader,’” Forum Italicum 37, no. 1 (March 2003): 161–83. 
364 The text is self-focusing, but also focuses my attention and urges me to an interpretation of it. 
Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 261–76. 
365 My paraphrase of Eco, The Prague Cemetery, 1.  
366 Ibid., 4. 
367 Ibid., 5. 
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question to ask. Am I the empirical reader deciphering, through Peircean abduction,368 
that which is to come or the Model Reader, that textual strategy forever sparring with the 
Model Author who both reveals and, at times, obscures the text’s intentions? Who am I, 
indeed?  
To stop, to pause, to reflect—but only upon the second and third reading369—I 
can already see that this text is self-focusing and ambiguous. It is not what it appears to 
be. Someone, the narrator perhaps, is having her way with me, for The Prague Cemetery 
is embedded in a play of narratival frames. On one level, there is me, the reader, sitting 
outside on a sunny day in Colorado, smoking my pipe while the sounds of construction 
whir around me. On another, there is me, the reader, peering over the shoulder of an 
unnamed writer in 1897 eagerly awaiting his next pen stroke. And on another? The 
Model Reader constructing, interpreting, and abducing the text that sits before me. And, 
yes, I am even the writer of these words that you can only know as the Model Author, the 
intention of the text that you can (should?) only engage as another Model Reader. And to 
point to the text that you are now reading in this way, have I not also established its 
aesthetic intention? Is that possible—admirable even—in academic texts?   
I am off balance, rendered vertiginous by the frames that confront me. But this is 
The Prague Cemetery, and, I think, the very thing the text intends.  
                                                
368 Umberto Eco, “Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Abduction,” in 
The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, eds. Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 198–220. 
369 Cf. Eco’s notion of the naïve and critical readers in The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the 
Semiotics of Texts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 205 and The Limits of Interpretation 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 55; Capozzi, “Revisiting History,” 622. 
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“I feel a certain embarrassment as I settle down here to write,” the man pens, “as 
if I were baring my soul, at the command of—no, by God, let us say on the advice of—a 
German Jew.”370 To know him, he suggests, is not to ask who he is or how he loves or 
what he does. But rather, whom he hates. For he later tells me, “Odi ergo sum. I hate 
therefore I am.”371 And hate he does. Jews, Jesuits, Germans, and women are all set in the 
crosshairs of this man’s scope, whom I come to learn is Captain Simone Simonini. He is 
to me, a modern and western academic, abhorrent. A man who writes:  
the Jew, as well as being as vain as a Spaniard, ignorant as a Croat, greedy as a 
Levantine, ungrateful as a Maltese, insolent as a Gypsy, dirty as an Englishman, 
unctuous as a Kalmyk, imperious as a Prussian and as slanderous as anyone from 
Asti, is adulterous through uncontrollable lust—the result of circumcision, which 
makes them more erectile, with a monstrous disproportion between their dwarfish 
build and the thickness of their semi-mutilated protuberance.372  
 
Yes, I think, much like the L’Osservatore Romano,373 I should put this down, for it can 
only corrupt me. But then I recall ambiguity as surprise—the very ambiguity that I wrote 
about in Part I!—and that while “it’s certainly shocking to read the anti-Semitic 
                                                
370 Ibid., 5. 
371 Ibid., 17; Capozzi, “Revisiting History,” 626. Also, compare to the first cogito of this chapter, 
Robinson’s: “Scribble ergo sum,” 217.  
372 Ibid., 6. 
373 Mary Donnarumma Sharnick, “Devious History,” America Magazine, March 5, 2012, accessed 
July 11, 2017, https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/culture/devious-history; Joshua Lustig, “Skulking in 
the Sewers,” Open Letters Monthly—an Arts and Literature Review, November 1, 2011, accessed July 11, 
2017, https://www.openlettersmonthly.com/skulking-in-the-sewers/; Matthew Surridge, “Between Forgery 
and Fiction,” Splice Today, February 21, 2012, accessed July 11, 2017, 
http://splicetoday.net/writing/between-forgery-and-fiction; Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, “The Deadliest 
Hoax: Umberto Eco’s Novel Explores the Twisted History of ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.,’” The 
New York Times Books Review, November 20, 2011, accessed July 11, 2017, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/books/review/the-prague-cemetery-by-umberto-eco-book-
review.html? mcubz=2; and Maria Spruyt, “Umberto Eco’s The Prague Cemetery: A Game of Double Co-
Incidence,” Literator 36, no. 1 (June 2015): 4. 
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passages” in The Prague Cemetery “many parts of the book . . . are culled from historical 
sources. Simonini’s hate is the real hate of eras past, and indeed of the present.” I am 
shocked, in other words, “not by the sordidness of Eco’s imagination, but by the 
sordidness of reality.”374 Okay then, I will keep reading. I will willingly place myself in 
the presence of such hate, racism, and ethnocentric triumphalism.  
And what do I find? 
Simonini looks up from his notes. “Why me, of course, the very essence of 
ambiguity.”375 
“Yes,” I nod. “But I have to summarize The Prague Cemetery in order to establish 
a base with my reader. I can’t assume that she’s read your estimable work or, if she has, 
that she remembers it.” 
He stares, blinking, while the narrator adjusts his weight. The temperature inside 
of a building in 1897 is stifling. A droplet of sweat rolls down my nose. “Refer to 
location 506 to 519,” the captain says. “It is there that I meet a man—well, a Jew—
named Froïde. He is the reason I am now writing.”  
“I’m sorry, captain, but when you say ‘location’ are you referring to the Kindle?” 
“He is,” the narrator says in his strange accent,376 “but for traditional readers, turn 
to page 37 and read through 46.”  
                                                
374 Surridge, http://splicetoday.net/writing/between-forgery-and-fiction. 
375 Cf. Spruyt, “to examine the issue of the human condition . . . may be a shattering experience for 
the individual, as well as a nation . . . an exploration into the dilemma of the human condition and 
especially humans’ capacity to perform both good and evil deeds, is what the author’s intention was,” 6–7. 
376 There are three font types in The Prague Cemetery, each betraying a different voice in the text. 
There is the narrator, Captain Simone Simonini, and the Abbé Dalla Piccola, the last of which I have yet to 
introduce.   
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“Yes, well, what you’ll find is that this Froïde—” 
“Again, I apologize for interrupting, captain. But you do mean Freud, yes?”  
“That is what I said, is it not? Froïde?” 
“Yes. But . . . is Froïde the Sigmund of psychoanalytic fame? Can I say that you 
are writing this diary of yours as a kind of ‘talking cure?’”377  
“You can say whatever you’d like, but what I’d say is that I refuse to divulge 
myself to such a perfidious race. So rather than allowing some ‘doctor’ to visually grope 
me while I lounge on his couch—with the hope of caressing my pudendum, no doubt—I 
simply write all of my thoughts and memories with the aim of unlocking some hidden 
secret deep within my subconscious. I am, you see, my own psychoanalyst.”378  
“Ah, yes. Ingenious.”  
Simonini then turns from me and continues to write.  
I discovered much in those few days. The captain was a forger, a spy, and a 
murderer. He was despicable in every way imaginable. But he was never only him. Often 
times, after writing furiously for an hour or three, he would leave the room only to return 
dressed up as a Jesuit priest! In those moments, he would refuse to answer to captain. He 
would say that his name was Abbé Dalla Piccola, then sit and read what the captain had 
written. Usually, but not always, he would then jot down his notes or commentary before 
disappearing.  
                                                
377 Ibid., 44. 
378 Ibid., 45. 
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I need not tell you how discomfiting this experience was. If it were not for the 
narrator who sorted, compiled, and edited Simonini’s (or were they Piccola’s?) notes, 
then I fear that I would have never pieced together what really happened. The long and 
short of it is that Simonini had killed the Abbé (among many others) and taken on his 
personality as a convenient disguise in his work as a spy. Through many twists and turns, 
I came to see that Simonini’s life work was to destroy the children of Zion. But why? For 
two reasons, I think. He was once, as a boy of fourteen, spurned by a young and attractive 
Jewish woman.379 Not only did this contribute to his hate of all Jews, but also women. 
Second, and I think more importantly, he was irrevocably taught such hate—dare I say 
the encyclopedia of hate—by first his grandfather and then his father. But I find that I am 
getting slightly ahead of myself. For no summary of Simonini’s notes is complete without 
a mention of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.380   
“My book,” Simonini shouts. “What have you, an American, to say of such a 
thing?”  
“Only that . . . the work is, well, the central story of The Prague Cemetery. And 
that your ‘book,’ as you put it, is a collage of other texts spliced together for the purpose 
of discrediting the Jewish race. Do I have that right?” 
                                                
379 Ibid., 59 and 436. 
380 Victor E. Marsden, Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion (Bensenville, Il: Lushena, 2014); 
Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); and Will Eisner and Umberto Eco, The Plot: The 
Secret Story of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006). 
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Simonini stared at me for a long time, considering only he knows what. But 
finally, he spoke: “Your Eco has discredited me. He talks of Joly,381 Sue,382 and 
Dumas,383 not to mention Barruel384 and Goedsche.385 But what of my genius? The plot, 
that grand conspiracy, was mine.386 I constructed it, so that it would ‘accompany the final 
solution.’”387 And before I could respond, he continued: “And, yes, I purposely chose that 
last phrase.”388 
“You’re odious.” 
 “I’m no different than you, with your careful words and pretense at inclusion. Or 
do you think that I’ve missed it? Shall you reveal it to your reader, or shall I?” 
I blinked. 
“Fine. I will,” Simonini laughed. “You always refer to your reader as a woman. 
Why? To cover up the fact that the majority of your bibliography is filled with men, 
                                                
381 Cf. Umberto Eco, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), 135 and 138; Umberto Eco, Turning Back the Clock: Hot Wars and Media Populism, trans. 
Alastair McEwen (New York: Harcourt, 2007), 314–9;Garcia, 63–4; and de Benedictis, 430; and Goldstein, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/books/ review/the-prague-cemetery-by-umberto-eco-book-
review.html? mcubz=2. 
382 Eugène Sue, The Wandering Jew (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013) and The Mysteries of 
the People (New York: Penguin, 2015).  
383 Alexandre Dumas, Joseph Balsamo (Rockville, MD: Wildside, 2007).  
384 Cf. Eco, Six Walks, 134.  
385 Ibid., 135. 
386 Eco, The Prague Cemetery, 431. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Spruyt, 3. 
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mostly white and western.389 Isn’t that right? You hope to divert the reader’s attention 
with a cheap trick, but in doing so, you reveal your own biases.” 
I looked to the narrator for support, but he turned away. I was caught out, 
embarrassed. But it was true. Following the paths of Eco’s literary forest, I found myself 
surrounded by men. I tried to cover it up, but does that omission—that sin of inclusion—
make me a monster? “I think you’re wrong to compare your collage of hate to my 
particular inadequacies as an author. Whereas your work participated in the construction 
of the Nazi imaginary, and continues to influence conspiracy politics, mine seeks to 
open—” 
“Yes,” he interrupted. “I know all about your ambiguity and its ‘potentialities.’ It 
smacks of the liberal elite and, bugger me, those that would say they know better. And do 
you, author? Do you know better?” Simonini turned from me then. Saying nothing, he 
began to write his psychoanalysis with the hope of unearthing his “traumatizing 
element.”390 But I turned, too, away from 1897. I moved backwards, in fact, and followed 
Simonini into his childhood. For it is there, I think, that I will best discover the nature of 
ambiguity and those it-is-as-if narratives that exist in the liminality of the skinscape.  
 
 
                                                
389 Kristine Phillips, “Why These Professors Are Warning against Promoting the Work of Straight, 
White Men,” The Washington Post, July 16, 2017: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/speaking-of-science/ wp/ 2017/07/16/feminist-scientists-
say-citing-research-by-straight-white-men-promotes-a-system-of-oppression/; cf. Carrie Mott and Daniel 
Cockayne, “Citation matters: mobilizing the politics of citation toward a practice of ‘conscientious 
engagement,’” Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography (June 2017): 1–20, accessed 
July 18, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2017.1339022. 
390 Eco, The Prague Cemetery, 45. 
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THE COMPOSER 
IV 
March 12, 1892  
The Tonic? I cannot know. I have no way of answering that question. I am haunted by 
the past, by the starting point. I want to move forward. But . . . secondhand. That is 
all. I cannot escape Korsakov. Ha! The name that ruins. I am weighed down by time, 
by all that is—will ever be. 
I tried again today. A beginning. That is what I sought. But it was the wrong 
thing. I do not desire beginnings, but that which births from process. In media res . . . 
is that possible? No. For I am no Greek. I must speak to the people of Bylina, not 
Odýsseia. But Kalinnikov has stolen my efforts. 
I start anew. I must speak to the people, to the masses. Of that which 
transcends Orthodoxy but is not transcendent. Of that which is more than 
Chernyshevskii but rooted in that which he defended. Is there such a thing as a 
beginning without origin? Am I not a parody of that which has come before? 
I encountered a strange concept recently. “Plagiarius.” I think, perhaps, it will 
be all consuming in the future. It looms on the horizon. What I say to the masses must 
be new, but there is nothing new. A tonic that is both past and future, but speaks to 
the present. A beauty that is other, but does not speak of “G—.” Am I wronged by a 
desire for the impossible that is possible?           
April 28, 1892  
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My dear, Kseniya. You were born yesterday. And though you will not read 
this for some time, if ever, it is my hope to impart to you the wisdom of an older 
generation. Time is fleeting. It beats ceaselessly upon the mind and body alike. What 
was once today will no longer be tomorrow. And yet, life is such a glorious affair. Do 
be struck by it. Curiosity and wit are the handmaidens of truth. And though this will 
not make sense until you are my age, beauty is hidden in all things.  
But that is not the reason for which I write. As you lay in the warmth of your 
bassinet, there are those that, whispering in the Tsar’s ear, would claim that you 
represent a problem. I am horrified by such machinations.  
You see, I am a composer and teacher of music. I am neither the best nor the 
worst, though I have tried to hold my gift responsibly. I invent to destroy. A thing that 
makes little sense. ‘Destroy what?” you will no doubt ask yourself. And, yes, that is 
the question. But there are those who create to oppress. Who twist the world into such 
a shape that there is little room for escape. Who grasp at power and weave tales of 
conspiracy and domination. 
And do you know of the chasm that separates invention from creation? The 
one, inventio, is the generation of discovery. It takes that which precedes it and 
imagines new possibilities. It is a sculpture of found objects. It is not a once-for-all 
creation, but triggers further invention. The other, however, is creatio ex nihilo. But, 
my darling, there really is nothing new under the sun. An invention pretends at 
neither foundation nor arche. It is merely an arrangement of elements in a specific 
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time and place. If creation involves one—the genius laboring in solitude—then 
invention is the continuous process of many that resists completion. 
So you see, Kseniya, invention is everything. The one is. But from the other—
emergence. Ah, but this is too much. I have rambled as you coo in the fullness of 
contentment . . . 
People will say many things to you about your heritage and your grandfather, 
and I only thought it fair to share my opinion on the matter. I compose, yes, it is true. 
I invent fictions that order time and relate experience. But for what reason do I invite 
others into this task? 
I only seek to illuminate a goodness that I fear no  
The rest is too heavily scratched out to translate. Sorry, Ed. I hope that 
suffices. Onto the next . . .  
May 30, 1892 
Allegro. Tomorrow night will tell all. Fast, too fast, time is hurling towards its 
end. And what can I do? Burn. That is all. I must burn that which I invented. The 
thing will not change, cannot change the Tsar’s mind. But perhaps the action, so 
futile, will suggest other possibilities. And yet, I am wracked with guilt. If I kill the 
thing, can the spirit endure? No. I know the answer even before I act. But burn it 
must. 
I visited Sofia’s grave today. It was no heavy burden. I laid chamomile upon 
her brow. I can only hope that it brings her rest.  
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Standing, I saw the strangest thing. A man, small in stature, leaping over 
gravestones. I do not burn with a heavy soul, I thought. 
Perhaps there is still possibility in this sculpture.   
There was a time when I believed in self-evidence. But no longer. I burn with 
lightness. 
 
In My Grandfather’s Day 
It is nearly impossible to summarize a book and, likewise, to analyze critically 
one of Eco’s works is a voluminous task. In an effort to limit the scope of what I can 
accomplish, I propose to perform a close reading of only one chapter. This chapter is, I 
think, the most important for the way in which it shamelessly constructs Simonini’s 
psyche.391 First his mother (women), then his grandfather (Jews), and finally his father 
(Jesuits) all shape the protagonist in ways that reverberate throughout The Prague 
Cemetery. It is as if one is reading the opening lines of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: 
“From my grandfather Verus: goodness of character and freedom from anger.”392 But 
rather than curating virtue, Simonini is collecting visions of hate, racism, and bigotry. 
And while Simonini is performing psychoanalysis on himself, I am doing no such 
thing.393 I am, rather, reading the chapter, “In My Grandfather’s Day,”394 through the 
                                                
391 Spruyt, 4. 
392 Christopher Gill, trans., Marcus Aurelius: Meditations, Books 1-6 (Clarendon Later Ancient 
Philosophers), 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. 
393 For a good psychoanalytic reading, see Spruyt.  
394 Umberto Eco, “In My Grandfather’s Day,” in The Prague Cemetery, trans. Richard Dixon 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 47–82. 
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theorizing lens that I set out in Part I of this work. The reason for choosing this chapter 
over others is simple: in it, I find a confluence of those as-if-it-is narratives that are 
central to my understanding of both ambiguity and religious aesthetics. “In My 
Grandfather’s Day,” in the end, is a test case for what has come before it. And if it seems 
strange to you that my playground is of a literary nature, then I will leave this 
introduction with a small reminder: both Winkler, and Eco before her, find literature to be 
the place for examining the functions of ambiguity.395 
From My Mother: Woman as Cultural Unit 
If the reader moves too quickly, then she will miss it. “My childhood,” the chapter 
begins. “Turin . . . A hillside on the other bank of the Po, me on a balcony with my 
mother. Then she was gone, and my father was crying . . . My grandfather said it was 
God’s will.”396 This is all that the text says of Simonini’s mother, who is nothing more 
than a specter to the protagonist, a figure of loss. And yet her absence reverberates 
throughout Simonini’s earliest memories. “Childhood,” he writes:  
for me was my grandfather, more than my father and mother. I hated my mother 
who had gone without telling me, I hated my father who had done nothing to stop 
her, I hated God because he had willed such a thing to happen, and I hated my 
grandfather because he thought it normal for God to will such things.397  
 
And so, it appears, that Simonini’s cogito has its roots in the disappearance of his mother.  
Simonini is left, young and blank except for the hate that roils within him. This is 
an important note, because it allows for that which comes next—the construction of 
                                                
395 Susanne Winkler, Ambiguity: Language and Communication (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 
2015), 18 and Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 261. 
396 Eco, The Prague Cemetery, 47. 
397 Ibid. 
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Simonini’s encyclopedia in seclusion.398 He is, in other words, an empty vessel waiting to 
be filled by the cultural encyclopedia as it exists in his grandfather and father’s mind. 
And that is what this chapter is about, what it sets out to show. How does one construct or 
encounter an encyclopedia, twist it into a narrative, and then embody it?399 This will, of 
course, lead me to ask the following question in the next chapter: How does one construct 
a theory that becomes a narrative or narrativize a theory that, on either end of the 
spectrum, constructs a reality. In both cases, it is ambiguity that reveals the construction 
as one possibility among many.  
Getting back to Simonini, however, I can see that as a boy, he was left secluded 
and impressionable because of the loss of his mother. While this might have created the 
cultural unit of <<Mother>>400 or <<Woman>> in his encyclopedia, it was most certainly 
not the only encounter that contributed to that entry. What I am proposing, in other 
words, is the examination of those encounters in the world that contributed to the 
construction of Simonini’s encyclopedia before looking at one possible instance of 
ambiguity in Simonini’s youth. In this case, considering the cultural unit <<Woman>>, 
there are two more to consider. 
Since Simonini did not attend public school, he was educated by Jesuits brought 
into his home at the behest of his grandfather. One such priest, Father Bergamaschi, 
                                                
398 Ibid., 64: “When I reached eighteen, my grandfather, who wanted me to be a lawyer . . . 
resigned himself to letting me out of the house and sending me to university. This was my first chance to 
mix with boys my own age, but it was too late, and I felt uneasy around them.” 
399 This can, of course, work the other way around. One can have an encounter with the material 
world and from that construct an encyclopedia.  
400 As a reminder, the <<X>> construction refers to the content of a given cultural unit and neither 
the spoken word nor thing in itself.  
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taught him the evils of communism. Babette of Interlaken, he told Simonini, was known 
as the “Great Virgin of Swiss Communism.”401 She was beyond salvation as a debauched 
and thieving murderer. “Babette, her blond hair blowing in the wind,” the priest said, 
“like the Whore of Babylon, concealed beneath her mantle of charms the fact that she 
was the herald of secret societies, the demon who orchestrated all the tricks and intrigues 
of those mysterious confraternities.”402 With enchantment and thaumaturgy, Babette 
could overwhelm men and governments alike. It was assumed, given her knack for 
controlling the powerful, that she was possessed by Satan.  
And how does Simonini respond? What does he store away inside his 
encyclopedia? He was shocked and horrified, but could not stop himself from dreaming 
of Babette. “I wanted to block out the pictures of that blond demon . . . surely naked, that 
demonic, fragrant hobgoblin, her breasts heaving rapturously with godless, sinful 
pride.”403 Yet, Simonini admits, he wants to model her, imitate her, and be like her. He, 
too, desires to be “a secret and all-powerful agent who forged passports and led victims 
of the other sex to perdition.”404 That which terrifies him, in other words, he yearns to 
become so that he can destroy it as it exists as an other.405 
 
                                                
401 Ibid., 63.  
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Fig 4.1. The picture below is taken from The Prague Cemetery, 64. The caption reads: “I was 
startled, I tried not to listen, but at night I dreamt of Babette of Interlaken.”  
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 fig. 4.1 
 
The cultural unit <<Woman>> then is filled, so far, with absence, lust, and debauchery 
but also an enticing mystery. <<Woman>> is something other to be hated and feared, 
consigned to nightmares of passion.  
The final encounter with women in Simonini’s youth that contributed to the 
construction of his encyclopedia of hate came when he was shown, by a companion, a 
nineteenth-century Playboy. “I shuddered as I turned the pages and found engravings,” he 
writes, “that sent streams of sweat trickling from my hair down to my cheeks and 
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neck.”406 He cannot recall how that “turbulent” night ended, but he does pull from the 
recesses of his mind an old scrap of wisdom stored in the encyclopedia of his childhood. 
“All this feminine charm,” he chants to himself, “is nothing but phlegm, blood, humors, 
bile . . . how can we ever want to embrace a sack of excrement?”407  
Added to Simonini’s <<Woman>> then is her physiological embodiedness held 
against her. <<Woman>> is nothing more nor less than fluids and waste. It is shocking, 
no doubt, for many readers of the twenty-first century to encounter Simonini’s words. As 
shocking, in fact, for him to conceive of a woman in other terms. If I approach Simonini 
through ambiguity, however—rather than only revulsion and fear—then I can see 
ambiguity working on two levels. Ambiguity, might I remind you, is an awareness that 
the encyclopedia, which allows for understanding and the embodied world given as 
reality, is cognized into a narrative that is and can only be as if.  
The first level of ambiguity for Simonini is the ambiguity that he encounters as a 
protagonist. His mother gone, he is raised in a world of men. Discovering women 
throughout his adolescence can only result in ambiguous entanglements—moments when 
the material world added to, stretched, or altered his encyclopedic entry on <<Woman>>. 
The second level of Simonini’s ambiguity is that of the reader’s, in so far as Simonini 
represents ambiguity itself. To a reader who adheres to modern, Western-liberal values, 
Simonini likely repulses. She does not want Simonini to construct his encyclopedia—or 
have it constructed—in such a way that <<Woman>> is disparaged. For this reader, 
                                                
406 Ibid., 74.  
407 Ibid., 75. 
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ambiguity is the terrifying prospect of accepting Simonini’s encyclopedia into the 
Universal Encyclopedia of human construction. Simonini is ambiguous, in other words, 
because he confronts the reader’s assumptions and challenges her. Not to hate women, 
but to reconcile herself to the possibility that hate is a human—as opposed to 
monstrous—reality. The abhorrence of Simonini, in other words, is a line of resistance 
that the reader cannot escape. 
This realization or encounter with ambiguity results in the state of ambiguity 
wherein the reader can foresee, one, that encyclopedias are constructions and that, even if 
distasteful (destructive even), an encyclopedia is still an encyclopedia. Two, 
encyclopedias lead to narratives that are embodied in the world of things by the way in 
which the reader arranges her experiences through cultural units. These narratives 
proliferate into infinity and coexist as equiprobable. As repugnant as it is, Simonini’s 
narrative is as valid408—in so far as it is a narratival construction—as mine. The validity 
of any narrative, in other words, is neutral. Three, the arrangement of experiences can 
always be ordered differently. The way in which I sort, organize, and make palatable my 
narrative is a choice. I am not bound by the already present and ever-existing 
encyclopedia. An encounter with ambiguity affords me the opportunity to choose 
otherwise.  
This choice, revealed in the state of ambiguity, leads me to consider 
<<Accountability>> and <<Responsibility>>. But these are difficult encyclopedic entries 
laden with their own cultural interpretants. And yet, I can conceive of no other way to 
                                                
408 I discuss “validity” more fully below.  
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articulate choice. When in the non-judgmental space of ambiguity that has been 
instigated by an ambiguous encounter, I am thrust into a choice of equiprobability. From 
one node to another, the path which I traverse is an alternative that I am both accountable 
to and responsible for. In Simonini’s case, even given the circumstances of his youth, he 
is answerable for <<Woman>> and the way in which he embodies his arranged narrative. 
The interplay between an already given encyclopedia, a lived experience, and a 
constructed, as if narrative, which all point towards the provisionality of knowledge and 
the narrativization of reality, does not, in other words, result in the abdication of ethics. 
There are lines of resistance written into every hermeneutical cluster.409 While all 
narratival arrangements are equiprobable in the non-judgmental space of ambiguity, not 
all are equally valid once chosen and submitted to the community for ratification.410  
How can this be? How can I speak of encyclopedias alongside choice, 
accountability, and responsibility? For the answer to that question, you will have to wait a 
little longer. Before I discuss the moment that challenged the young Simonini to open up 
his encyclopedia, I will first look at the way in which his grandfather and father 
constructed the <<Jew>> and the <<Jesuit>>. 
From My Grandfather: Mordechai the Monster 
Sitting with his grandfather, Simonini learned that Abbé Barruel had sown the 
seeds of universal conspiracy. For the abbot, the Knight Templars and Freemasons were 
                                                
409 Cf. Benjamin John Peters, Sigurd’s Lament: An Alliterative Epic (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017), 
52–8. 
410 I say more about this below.  
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at fault. But it was clear to Simonini’s grandfather, Giovanni Battista Simonini,411 that 
Barruel had misrepresented the scope of the plot. He had forgotten the Jews and their 
desire to “destroy the name of Christ wherever possible.”412 It was the Jews, Giovanni 
argued, that stood behind all plots, pulling the strings of power.  
But how could Giovanni know this? He had heard it from the Jews themselves.413 
What follows is disturbing but, as Eco writes, “the only fictitious character in this story is 
the protagonist, Simone Simonini. His grandfather . . . is not invented.”414 The characters 
in The Prague Cemetery, in fact, “actually existed, and said and did what they are 
described as saying and doing in this novel.”415 The <<Jew>> then, as an entry into 
Simonini’s encyclopedia, was mercilessly and meticulously constructed by Giovanni’s 
own creation, the exiled Jew, Mordechai.  
“If you don’t behave yourself and go straight to sleep,” Giovanni would threaten 
Simonini, “the horrible Mordechai will come visit you tonight.”416 Young and scared, 
Simonini would imagine Mordechai, “dribbling lubriciously, muttering, ‘Fee-fi-fo-fum, I 
                                                
411 From here on out, I will refer to Simonini’s grandfather, Giovanni Battista Simonini, as 
Giovanni. 
412 Eco, The Prague Cemetery, 52. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid., 438. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid., 58. 
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smell the blood of a Christian boy.’”417 And what was this story that so terrified a little 
boy from Turin and contributed to his cultural unit <<Jew>>?418  
fig. 4.2 
 
Let me suggest, first, that the text here, reprehensible no doubt, is asking 
something of its reader. It is asking her to enter into the mind of the other as constructed. 
I am not speaking here of Mordechai, but Simonini. He is hate, racism, and violence. He 
                                                
417 Ibid.  
418 Fig. 4.2. Ibid., 60. Caption reads: “ . . . almost hearing the terrible old man’s footsteps on the 
wooden staircase, coming to get me, to drag me off to his infernal den, to feed me unleavened bread made 
with the blood of infant martyrs.” 
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is all that I hope I am not. But the text asks me to enter into him for a time and participate 
in the construction of intolerance. Is this acceptable? Even for a novel? For a genre that 
reveres decorum? If the task of religious aesthetics is to examine the narratival paths that 
humans traverse, then when should it turn back in the fear of legitimizing that which it 
only seeks to understand? 
When does ambiguity overstep?  
Mordechai was a Syrian Jew suspected of murdering an Arab boy. Found in a 
ditch, the body was “cut into a thousand pieces and pounded in a mortar.”419 It was likely, 
Giovanni thought, that Mordechai had falsely baptized the child for use in Passover, 
because Jews needed Christian blood to make their bread. But Mordechai could not find a 
Christian boy, so he settled for a baptized Arab. Baptism, you see, is efficacious 
regardless who performs it. So unwittingly, and even though Satan himself assuredly 
stood behind it, the Arab boy was saved and committed into heaven. 
Tortured by the police, Mordechai finally confessed. Five other Jews were 
rounded up and executed, but Mordechai was set free with “dislocated limbs.”420 After a 
series of unfortunate events, he arrived in Turin and met Giovanni. It was there that 
Simonini’s grandfather first learned of the Jews’ universal plot. For Mordechai:  
told him how their Talmud preached hatred of the Christian race, and how in 
order to corrupt the Christians, they, the Jews, had invented Freemasonry, of 
which he had become one of their nameless superiors, and that he commanded 
lodges from Naples to London, but he had to remain hidden, living in secret, 
segregated from the world, so as not to get knifed by the Jesuits, who were 
hunting for him everywhere . . . [but the Jews had] vowed to become rulers of the 
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world in less than a century, to abolish all other sects so that theirs would reign 
supreme, to build as many synagogues as there were Christian churches and to 
reduce everyone else to slavery.421 
 
Giovanni, utilizing synecdoche, ended in a flourish: “I had learned from all of them what, 
in fact, I had heard from one man alone.”422  
 Poured into Simonini’s cultural unit <<Jew>> was, first, that there was a 
universal plot to overtake and rule the systems of the world. This plot was instigated by 
the Jews and had been in motion for centuries. The Jew, according to Giovanni, would 
stop at nothing to achieve its goal. Added to this was the depiction of the Jew as a drinker 
of blood and someone who was both merciless and immoral. In fact, given Mordechai’s 
absolute dedication to his plot, Giovanni characterizes the Jew—again, via synecdoche—
as inhuman.  
Yes, Giovanni wrote the encyclopedic entry for <<Jew>>, which was stored away 
in Simonini’s cultural paradigm. But he also achieved something else. He constructed an 
enemy for Simonini. And though I principally discuss this in the next chapter, the 
construction of an enemy is central not only to Eco’s system of thought but also to the 
way in which I engage Eco’s theory to narrative to theory translation. Here, of course, is 
the narrative. A young man’s encyclopedia is written for him—not out of nothing, but 
through the texts of his community—in such a way that he then acts out or embodies it in 
the created reality that he has chosen. To him, this construction is absolute. For the 
encyclopedia as the cultural repertoire of a given society, as its historical memory, “is 
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based on the conviction that there can be no meaning, or language or culture outside and 
independently of the community in which the speakers are defined and exist.”423 To 
Simonini then, the <<Jew>> is and can only be the enemy.  
This is not only a construction of <<Jew>>, however, it is also a glimpse into the 
construction of Simonini’s identity. “Having an enemy,” Eco writes, “is important not 
only to define our identity but also to provide us with an obstacle against which to 
measure our system of values and, in seeking to overcome it, to demonstrate our own 
worth. So when there is no enemy, we have to invent one.”424 Any notion that the Jews, 
in any way, resemble the characters in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is patently 
false. It is pure creation. And yet, for Giovanni, and subsequently Simonini, it is wholly 
true. The <<Jew>> as a cultural unit is diabolical. This “fact” not only contributes to 
Simonini’s store of cultural knowledge but also allows him to measure his system of 
values. In seeing <<Jew>> through his grandfather’s lens, Simonini is able to establish a 
counterweight to his own identity. He can overcome the <<Jew>>, his enemy, and in 
doing so “demonstrate his own worth.”425 This is clear, as an example, when Simonini 
describes his first meetings with Froïde.426  
 
                                                
423 Marco Santambrogio and Patrizia Violi, “Introduction,” in Meaning and Mental 
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  fig. 4.3 
 
“He sat alone at a nearby table,” Simonini writes: 
  
and at first we limited ourselves to polite nods. I judged him to be gloomy by 
nature, ill at ease, timidly eager for someone to confide in, to unburden his 
anxieties . . . but I had always remained aloof . . . I nevertheless knew that all 
Jews who live and make money in Paris have German names, and, my suspicions 
having been raised by his hooked nose . . . ‘I prefer to keep my distance—Jew and 
German are a mix I don’t much like.’427 
 
And again:  
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There are Paris intellectuals who, before expressing their distaste for Jews, 
concede that some of their best friends are Jews. Hypocrisy. I have no Jewish 
friends (God forbid). All my life I’ve avoided Jews. Perhaps I have instinctively 
avoided them, because the Jew (like the German) can be identified by his smell . . 
. This and other signs help them to recognize each other, as pederasts do. My 
grandfather used to say that their smell is due to the excessive use of garlic and 
onion . . . But it must also be the race itself—their infected blood, their feeble 
loins. They are all communists.428  
 
Yet the reader knows, or will know by the next chapter, that Simonini’s dislike of Jews 
has nothing to do with instinct, unless she is willing to say that one’s encyclopedia has an 
instinctual effect upon the embodying individual. Either way, the point here is that 
whatever Simonini might think about Froïde, the reader can assume the opposite is true 
for the protagonist. “He has a hooked nose,” the reader might interpret, “but not like me. I 
have no such contorted appendage.” The Jew, or <<Jew>>, is nothing more than a 
cultural unit by which Simonini can construct his own, superior identity.  
The <<Jew>> is constructed out of the bibliography of Giovanni for a young 
Simonini, who will, no doubt, add his own texts to the entry.429 Is he forgiven for this? Is 
it his fault? Is he accountable and responsible for the cultural units that comprise his 
reality? To ask it differently, when does the non-judgmental space of ambiguity cross into 
the judgmental reality of communal life? In other words, how does one judge between 
competing narratives, especially when those narratives are already given? 
From My Father: The Jesuit as Pedophile 
Simonini’s father is absent. He is often gone, fighting with the Carbonari, those 
Italian nationalists who sought an independent, constitutionally ruled republic. Perhaps 
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this is because of his lost wife or because his father, Giovanni, was an ardent monarchist 
and, by all accounts, an oppressive and demanding personality who supported the Jesuits 
then under attack by republican gangs. Giovanni, in fact, sees the emerging Italian 
republic as “the advent of the Antichrist,” an event instigated by Jewish intrigue and the 
plots of Mordechai.430 Whatever the reason, when Simonini’s father is present, he is often 
distracted and lethargic.  
For my purposes, however, what is important is that Simonini’s encyclopedia is 
shaped in two significant ways by his father. The first is when Simonini discovers his 
father’s cache of popular culture concealed in Giovanni’s attic.431 Inside are the formative 
novels, newspapers, and feuilletons of Simonini’s youth. Chief among them is his father’s 
Le Constitutionnel, which serialized Eugène Sue’s The Wandering Jew. “It was here,” 
Simonini writes, “that I learned how the infamous Society of Jesus had managed to plot 
the most abominable crimes to seize an inheritance, trampling on the rights of poor, good 
people.”432  
If Simonini learns of the Jesuit’s “plot” in the attic of his grandfather—Eco’s 
protagonists are always stumbling upon important cultural artifacts in the attics of his 
novels—then his encyclopedic entry on <<Jesuits>> and <<Priests>> are solidified by 
those rare moments of interaction between him and his father. “I hated the [Jesuit] 
teacher of the moment, not just because his way of teaching was by rapping my knuckles, 
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but also because my father . . . had instilled in me a hatred of priests.”433 And what was 
this hatred comprised of?  
It is Jesuitism that undermines, torments, afflicts, vilifies, persecutes, destroys 
men of free spirit; it is Jesuitism that drives good and valiant men out of public 
positions and replaces them with others who are base and contemptible; it is 
Jesuitism that slackens, obstructs, torments, harasses, confuses, weakens, corrupts 
public and private education in a thousand ways . . . [after an incredibly long list 
of that which Jesuitism is responsible for]434 . . . No sect in the world is so gutless 
. . . so hard and ruthless when its own interests are at stake, as the Company of 
Jesus . . . the Jesuits of Italy kill the soul with their tongues, like reptiles, or with 
their pens.435 
 
And here, something incredibly formative happens to Simonini, two things that are also 
added to his encyclopedia. One, “pens” have the power to shape reality. And two, “I have 
always been amused,” Simonini’s father tells him, “Gioberti took some of these ideas 
secondhand from The Wandering Jew.”436 Gioberti is the writer of a text wherein 
Simonini’s father first encountered the “true nature” of the Jesuits, ideas repurposed from 
a novel. Why is this important? Because it is here that Simonini learns to take what is 
already known in a culture’s encyclopedia and twist it ever so slightly in order to 
manipulate and contort a given cultural unit. Between the pen and the recycling of 
cultural knowledge, Simonini is able to construct the lies of The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion. He later admits as much:  
if I wanted to sell the story of conspiracy, I didn’t have to offer the buyer anything 
original, but simply something he already knew or could have found out more 
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easily in other ways. People believe only what they already know, and this is the 
beauty of the Universal Form of Conspiracy.437  
 
And, I might add, the importance of ambiguity, of that which expands the already 
known.438 
 
  
 fig. 4.4 
 
                                                
437 Ibid., 79. 
438 Fig. 4.4. Ibid., 15. Caption reads: “Jesuits are Masons dressed up as women.” 
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The <<Jesuits>> then are violent liars and manipulators “dressed up as women.” 
They are hypocrites who use their positions of religious authority to wield and exploit 
power to their own ends. They are even, Simonini suggests, pedophiles who seek out 
tutoring positions so that they can touch little boys.439 They are all this and more, for they 
too are entangled in the universal plot to conquer the world. 
What do all of these cultural units in Simonini’s encyclopedia add up to? “I have 
known many people who feared the conspiracy of some hidden enemy,” he writes:  
for my grandfather it was the Jews, for the Jesuits it was the Masons, for my 
Garibaldian father it was the Jesuits . . . Who knows how many other people in 
this world still think they are being threatened by some conspiracy? Here’s a form 
to be filled out at will, by each person with his own conspiracy . . . No one 
believes their misfortunes are attributable to any shortcomings of their own; that 
is why they must find a culprit. Dumas offers, to the frustration of everyone 
(individuals as well as countries), the explanation for their failure. It was someone 
else, on Thunder Mountain, who planned your ruin.440  
 
The cultural units of Simonini are tools by which he can turn the encyclopedia to his own 
ends, manipulate the populace, and wield his own form of power. <<Women>> are 
seductresses. <<Jews>> are sinister. <<Jesuits>> are hypocritical pedophiles. Simonini, 
however, is outside of it all, pulling the strings of history. But what he fails to realize is 
that his encyclopedia, too, was constructed, organized, and maneuvered in such a way 
that his narrative was already written. And it is this failure—of self-reflection?—that 
leads Simonini to overlook his encounter with ambiguity and his confrontation with 
choice. 
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Ambiguity and Thing 
At nearly fourteen,441 Simonini has his first encounter with ambiguity. And to 
remind you, ambiguity violates, challenges, and produces further knowledge. It is 
accountable to a reality, but not irreducibly so, as it also has the potential for opening 
significations of the material world. Ambiguity is strategically produced and employed 
through creative contradictions in the already given cultural encyclopedia, contradictions 
that not only transform and expand the code, but also change the material world—not just 
my perceptions of it. And, finally, ambiguity is that which reveals, highlights, or brings 
my attention to the provisionality or the as-if-ness of the narrative that I take for granted. 
It is also that space in which I can analyze my own provisional assumptions and begin to 
account for the potentiality of other ways of seeing and doing. 
Simonini’s code is comprised of those cultural units written for him by his 
grandfather and father—<<Woman>>, <<Jew>>, <<Jesuit>>—and then stitched together 
to form a narrative of embodiment. It is the task of religious aesthetics, as I have argued, 
to show or reveal this narratival construction, the way in which any set of cultural units 
are arranged into a string that constitutes a narrative that can then be embodied in the 
world of things. Sometimes these narratives correspond to materiality, often, however, 
they contradict it. This is not to say that the material world is right, only that it provides 
me with a line of resistance.  
I might think, given Dumbo, that elephants use their floppy ears to fly. But when 
provided with the line of resistance that is the material world, I must either check myself 
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into Bedlam or rearrange my cultural encyclopedia—even as I must also admit Dumbo as 
an interpretant into my construction of the cultural unit <<Elephant>>. When this 
confrontation with a line of resistance happens, when an already given encyclopedia is 
confronted with that which is ambiguous, then my already arranged, as if narrative has 
the potential to be unmasked as provisional. It is in that moment, in that space of 
ambiguity, that the possibility for choosing differently arises. I can traverse alternative 
paths. I can construct my encyclopedia otherwise. I can, through abduction, negotiate a 
new narrative that will, until I stumble upon another line of resistance, remain 
provisional.442 
Simonini’s encyclopedic narrative as arranged by his grandfather and father 
represent a reality. And though distasteful to many modern, Western academics, it is a 
reality that cannot be dismissed as either atypical or unworthy of consideration. It is, in 
other alarming words, one valid reality among many. By valid, however, I do not mean 
either “correct” or “true,” but rather consistent with an arranged set of cultural units. 
Valid, here, is not a value judgment. Imagine the key of “C” in music. If, given “C,” I 
want to play the twelve bar blues, then I must, according to tradition, play the 
corresponding IV and V chords, “F” and “G.” In the key of “C” then, “F” and “G” are 
absolute and valid for that which I set out to accomplish. I cannot play “A” or “B” and 
hope to arrive back at “C” without dissonance and confusion. Changing the key, 
however, allows me to maintain the arrangement of the twelve bar blues while utilizing a 
different set of absolute and valid chords. In “C” though, I am bound by the IV and the V. 
                                                
442 Chapters Five and Six will more fully espouse the notions of “abduction” and “negotiation” as 
essential to the ambiguous space.   
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To make that claim is not to make a value judgment. The key of “C” is what it is, even if 
music—through ambiguity?—affords a key change via a common chord.  
Simonini’s encyclopedic narrative is valid in the sense that the key of “C” is a 
valid key in which to play the twelve bar blues.443 That which comprises the key of “C” is 
absolute, but not for all of the potential occurrences of a given twelve bar blues 
arrangement. I can play, in other words, “Kind Hearted Woman,” in either “C” or “G” 
depending on my mood, context, or desire. So, yes, Simonini’s code is valid, if 
reprehensible, which leads me to the question: How do I judge between competing 
narratives? How do I decide to play in either “C” or “G?”  
Approaching fourteen, Simonini wanders the limits of Piedmont’s ghetto. It is 
there that he meets  
a girl with black hair who crosses piazza Carlina each morning carrying a basket 
covered with a cloth to a nearby shop. Fiery gaze, velvet eyes, dark complexion . . 
. Impossible that she’s a Jewess, that those men my grandfather has described, 
with rapacious features and venomous eyes, could produce a woman like her. And 
yet she can only have come from the ghetto.444 
 
This is the first time, Simonini admits, that he has looked upon a woman. His heart 
pounds. His palms sweat. He becomes enraptured by her sight. She is, for Simonini, the 
embodiment of ambiguity, cutting across his arranged, as if narrative. This encounter in 
the material world, this line of resistance, provides him a glimpse into an alternate reality. 
And for a moment, Simonini—Odi ergo sum—appears human. What can he do? Can he 
                                                
443 I do not think that one can defer to a concept of beauty here—that one rendition of the twelve-
bar blues is more beautiful than another. For what is beauty but a subject category that I wield to prop up 
my own encyclopedia? 
444 Ibid., 59. 
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rearrange his encyclopedia? Can he reject the wisdom of his grandfather? Can he traverse 
an alternate path and embody a different as if narrative?  
In that liminal space of ambiguity, Simonini realizes the equiprobability of his 
encyclopedia. He is afforded the possibility of playing in a different key. And what does 
he do? “One morning I dare to stop the girl and, eyes lowered, ask her if I can help carry 
her basket.”445 He challenges his narrative! He seeks out a change in key. But, according 
to Simonini:  
she replies haughtily, in dialect, that she can manage perfectly well by herself. But 
she doesn’t call me manssϋ, but gagnu, boy . . . I’ve been humiliated by a 
daughter of Zion. Is it perhaps because I’m fat? This, in fact, marks the beginning 
of my war against the daughters of Eve.446 
 
Simonini rejects ambiguity. He falls back into his key and decides—then and 
there—to embody fully the arranged, as if narrative that he has received. In that moment, 
however, he had a choice between the unforeseen potentiality of untraversed paths and 
the already known and given encyclopedia. What would have come of The Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion had Simonini chosen differently? If he had swallowed his pride and 
seen the “fiery gaze” of the other as a line of resistance? But he did not, and the horrific 
tale of violence, hate, and racism was as well as already written.  
If religious aesthetics, as I have conceived of it, allows us to peel back the layers 
of an embodied, as if narrative and its encounter with the world of things, then it is also 
an exercise in understanding. This understanding is not a stamp of approval, however. It 
is a negotiation in the ambiguous, cultural world of encyclopedias. Simonini’s choice is 
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abhorrent, but a choice nevertheless. And it is this choice, and my willingness to 
condemn it, that betray the judgmental side of ambiguity. I choose, because I must. But 
how is it that I can choose one narrative? What allows me to call one encyclopedic 
arrangement abhorrent over against another, equiprobable arrangement? Simply, my 
arranged, as if narrative and the community of interpreters that I find myself in. There is 
no standard of judgment, in other words, that stands outside of all encyclopedias.  
We are all responsible and accountable.  
And in so far as Simonini seeks to integrate his encyclopedia into the global 
repository of knowledge, I can—much like merging a pull request from GitHub447—
reject it. This is similar to the European Union saying to Turkey, “If you want to join the 
EU, then you must do x, y, and z. You must, in other words, adopt and then embody our 
encyclopedia.” The choice is Turkey’s alone, but one for which—in terms of the 
outcome—they are responsible for and accountable to. 
Simonini’s narrative is despicable to me, and many others, because I refuse to 
embody it. But as Will Eisner has shown in The Plot: The Secret Story of The Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion, many others have not.448 And, while that is more than just 
disheartening, what can I (or Eisner or Eco) do other than strategically create 
confrontations with ambiguity? 
 
                                                
447 “Merging a Pull Request from GitHub,” accessed on July 25, 2017, 
https://help.github.com/articles/ merging-a-pull-request/. 
448 Will Eisner and Umberto Eco, The Plot: The Secret Story of The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006). 
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Conclusion 
 
My ambiguous confrontation with Simonini’s ambiguity has not only employed 
the theory outlined in Part I of this work, but it has also answered the question: How does 
one construct or encounter an encyclopedia, twist it into a narrative, and then embody it? 
The answer to this question was given by a close analysis of the chapter “In My 
Grandfather’s Day” and the way in which Simonini constructed his cultural units, 
arranged them into a valid narrative, and then embodied that narrative in the world of 
things.  
 Through Simonini, I was also able to accomplish two things. One, that ambiguity 
reveals, highlights, and brings my attention to the provisionality or the as-if-ness of the 
narratives that I take for granted. It is also that space in which I can analyze my own 
provisional assumptions and begin to account for the potentiality of other ways of seeing 
and doing. And two, that the task of religious aesthetics is to peel back the layers of an 
already given cultural encyclopedia to reveal, analyze, and understand the as if narratives 
that humanity embodies. 
 In this way, I claimed that Simonini’s ambiguity functioned within the literary 
world of The Prague Cemetery when he encountered the fiery gaze of the other, but that 
he also represented ambiguity for a certain kind of reader—namely, me, a male, Western, 
and liberal academic. Simonini’s repugnance forced me to ask myself why I discounted 
him, which led to the question: how do I choose or judge between competing, though 
equiprobable narratives? If ambiguity instigates the possibility for constructing and 
embodying a different as if narrative, then the choice of which narrative ultimately lies 
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with the individual traversing ambiguous spaces. Not alone, however, when entering back 
into the communal world, I must seek to ratify my choice with the interpretive 
community within which I find myself. The larger the community (like the European 
Union), however, the more power it has to force an already given, co-constructed, as if 
reality.  
And finally, the choices I make as an individual or as a member of a ratifying 
community are choices that I am both accountable to and responsible for. There is no 
one, no community, or no thing that stands outside of cultural units, encyclopedias, and 
as if narratives to which the Universal Encyclopedia can defer.  
We are our own legislators and judges. That which we choose and then embody is 
on our heads alone. To seek something outside of the encyclopedia is to abdicate both 
choice and responsibility.449 It is to construct an as if narrative that discounts the line of 
resistance. It is to embody a reality in which elephants fly. And it is, finally, to forgo the 
open, plurivocality of ambiguity for the totalizing, univocality of dogma. It is a refusal to 
maintain provisionality.            
 In the following chapter, stepping back from The Prague Cemetery, I ask the 
question: How does one construct a theory that becomes a narrative or narrativize a 
theory that, on either end of the spectrum, constructs a reality that, through ambiguity, is 
seen as only one possibility among many. By examining how Eco’s own theory of 
ambiguity was narrativized—via Six Walks in the Fictional Woods and Inventing the 
Enemy—I continue to build upon the thesis that the interplay between an already given 
                                                
449 The question still might be raised, to what are we responsible? To which I can only answer—to 
choice.  
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encyclopedia, lived experience, and a constructed, as if narrative all point towards the 
provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. 
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EXCURSUS TWO: THE KINGDOM 
 
“I’m an agnostic writer who wants to know what exactly Christians believe today. If you 
want to share that with me, I’d be delighted; if not, I won’t bother you any longer.”450 
Introduction 
 
“Between the word of God and my understanding, it’s the word of God that counts, and it 
would be silly of me to retain only what jibes with my limited understanding. Never 
forget: it’s the Gospel that judges me, not the opposite.”451 
Creative nonfiction is a burgeoning field. It is not the place of this excursus to 
convince you of that. It is the place, however, to argue that creative nonfiction and 
ambiguity go hand-in-hand. To write true stories with literary and artistic style in such a 
way that the events are verifiable, even as the gaze of the writer is entangled with the 
narrative, is to write with an intrinsic understanding of ambiguity. That which happened 
is ordered and arranged in such a way that the telling cannot be separated from the event. 
To critique a thing as “not true” or to say that “it didn’t happen that way” is an 
inappropriate approach to this ambiguous genre. If you disagree, then disagree in writing. 
Tell me a story, a true story, from your perspective.  
                                                
450 Emmanuel Carrère, The Kingdom, trans. John Lambert (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2017), 8. 
451 Ibid., 33–4. 
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 It is my argument—lock and load your criticisms—that creative nonfiction is a 
genre of ambiguity, and that this is reflected in Emmanuel Carrère’s work, The Kingdom. 
If there is an underlying assumption to this excursus, then it is that academic 
interdisciplinarity can learn much from Carrère and should, in fact, adopt his style as a 
means for expressing its liminal insights.  
A Disappointing Faith 
 
“I’m tempted to be ironic about the person I was, but I want to remember the confusion 
and terror I felt at the thought that the faith that had changed my life and to which I held 
above all else was endangered.”452 
While there are many creative nonfiction stories to choose from, Emmanuel 
Carrère’s The Kingdom is a fitting companion for a book on religious aesthetics. A novel 
in four parts, The Kingdom recounts the story of Emmanuel Carrère’s own brush with 
faith and subsequent spiral into doubt before historiographically tackling Paul, Luke, and 
the writing of the Gospels. Though perhaps discomfiting to some, The Kingdom is a work 
of creative nonfiction that, among many other things, problematizes the porous borders 
between fiction and history.  
While one can recognize the intense research and analysis that went into writing 
it, one cannot help but read The Kingdom, and subsequently the Gospel of Luke, through 
the thoughtful eyes of Carrère. The Kingdom, in other words, is a work of both history 
and poesis that seeks to display the first-century Mediterranean world in all of its 
complexity while also projecting Carrère’s emotion and context onto the record that it is 
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trying to elucidate. And it is the essence of the projection that captures ambiguity. For in 
Carrère’s deft hands, faith is not only defamiliarized, but so too the Gospels, their 
meaning, and the very idea of Christ.  
Attending Easter Sunday at an Abbey during his intensely Christian period, 
Carrère writes:  
The chapel is gray and ugly, lit by a dull light. The thick stone walls drip with 
humidity. The community now has no more than ten or so nuns, all old and 
wobbly on their feet . . . their voices falter and crack as they sing, and the bleating 
of the young priest who looks like the village idiot and who’s come to bring them 
Communion isn’t any better . . . no one really seems to be listening . . . Mass with 
the nuns isn’t exactly cheerful. In fact, it’s enough to fill you with sadness, and it 
would have sent me packing in the past—supposing I’d ever gone in there in the 
first place . . . But I say to myself: This is it, this is the kingdom. Everything that 
is weak, despised, and wanting: that is the dwelling place of Christ . . . But what if 
I were chased out? Or, worse still, if I were happy to leave? If one day I 
considered this time . . . an embarrassing episode.453  
 
It is the tension between time and memory that makes this pericope so ambiguous. I 
know that Carrère is agnostic and that he is honestly trying to recall this time in his life 
without irony. I can see both his commitment and his disappointment, his hope and his 
sadness. There is a desire to hold fast to faith, while also an admission that—even then—
he will not. And while Carrère is ambiguous in that he is problematizing, challenging, 
and violating all kinds of codes, he is also self-reflexive, and light. There is a weightiness 
to his writing that is neither heavy nor dense. The priest is a jester. The nuns are stoics. 
And the place of infinite hope is dark and dank. I cannot help but read this—seriously, 
soberly—but with the hint of a smile. I can visualize the chapel, its inhabitants, and I can 
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see, too, Carrère, desperately frustrated by his own lack of desire and self-conscience to 
the point of embarrassment.  
 Outside of Carrère’s ambiguity, that is what makes The Kingdom itself 
ambiguous. For I cannot forget this scene of disappointed and waning faith as I move into 
Carrère’s historically researched and retold Gospel of Luke. It is the scenes of sad and 
depressing Christianity two-thousand years later that, in fact, shape my reading of 
Carrère’s gospel. It is the intentional structuring of the work that is itself ambiguous, in 
that it continually questions, probes, and violates its own encyclopedia. It is ambiguous in 
that it ends with a question, which forces the reader to do the hard work of constructing 
meaning even if, as Carrère suggests in his epilogue, he had missed the point. That he 
was “completely off the mark.”454  
The Gospel According to Luke Carrère 
 
“Maybe that’s how it happened. Or . . . I think I have a better idea.”455 
 
Deep into his narrativizing of Luke’s journalistic account of the life of Paul, 
Carrère discusses the two-year stay of the latter in Caesarea. It is here that Carrère begins 
to weave a tale of Luke’s sleuth-like piecing together of Jesus’s life. Carrère knows he is 
creating, admits it but—as a writer of creative nonfiction—claims there is little else that 
he could do. “Everything I’ve told until now,” Carrère writes, “is known and more or less 
accepted.”456 True. He writes both eloquently and well about the beginnings of the Christ 
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movement. He does not mislead. But then? “For [those] two years . . . I’ve got nothing. 
Not a single source. I’m free—and forced—to invent.”457 Carrère’s project then becomes 
“to investigate what [Luke’s] investigation may have been like.”458 
Is this history then or a fresh ordering of data given a creative imagination? I 
think it is a little of both. History is always an ordering after the fact. It is that which I 
believe to be true about a given event, which could change in accordance with new 
information. History, in other words, is fluid. And it is this admission that allows Carrère 
to claim that he is forced to invent. He has compiled the data, but it is yet to be ordered.  
How shall it be arranged? Why, by Carrère’s own encyclopedia, of course. And is 
that any different from what I have done? No. For I, too, collected, arranged, and 
organized given an encyclopedia, narrativizing theory, and embodied experience. I, too, 
have my moments where I am forced to invent.  
And yet, invention is not a free for all. It is an accounting of that which presents 
itself to me. It is playing at Firstness through Thirdness, which is all I have anyway. It is 
an admission that narrativizing theories are revealed as provisional only when they have 
encountered the openness and potentiality of ambiguity.  
“No,” Carrère writes, “I don’t believe that Jesus was resurrected. I don’t believe 
that a man came back from the dead.”459 Even though he had earlier admitted that the 
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resurrection was the only truth upon which a life should be founded. “But the fact that 
people do believe it,” he continues: 
and that I believed it myself—intrigues, fascinates, troubles, and moves me—I 
don’t know which verb is the most appropriate. I’m writing this book to avoid 
thinking that now that I no longer believe, I know better than those who do, and 
better than my former self when I believed. I’m writing this book to avoid coming 
down too firmly in my favor.460  
 
Carrère once believed. He no longer does. And those that still do? They are 
ambiguous events in Carrère’s life. While he uses a string of different verbs, he could 
have said that they violate, challenge, and question his encyclopedia. That, through them, 
he is forced to consider their difference, commitment, and narrativizing theory as 
coexistent incompatibility. It is The Kingdom, he even suggests, that has the sole purpose 
of not only keeping him aware of ambiguity but also accountable to provisionality, a 
reminder that he could be wrong about the other.  
What an interesting approach to data collection. Carrère is not seeking to 
convince through argument, but rather to hold himself accountable. To unearth his biases 
and expose their provisionality. And, given his time and place, to posit The Kingdom as 
an ambiguous text for the majority of liberal Westerners who have forgotten that their 
own narrativizing theory is also a provisional construction. 
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Luke and the Creative Moment 
 
“Yes, I think that Luke mourned James and everything he stood for, although his master 
declared it obsolete. And perhaps, while mourning, he got an idea. In any event, I’m 
getting one.”461 
In his actual construction of Luke’s story, I learn much about the first-century 
Mediterranean world, the Gospel of Luke, and the role of ambiguity in creative 
nonfiction. I discover factual events. I stretch my intellect. But I also experience literature 
as an ambiguous event, which is always a metaphor for how I construct a reality from the 
lines of resistance that I receive from the world of things.  
There is the capital “F” fact that I can only know through Thirdness. There is the 
encyclopedia and the narrativizing theory that I embody. There is ambiguity, standing in 
the middle, challenging and violating both code and percept. And there is Carrère 
creating the world of two-thousand years ago, writing:  
When [Luke] heard Paul bad-mouthing James, the Luke that I imagine—because, 
of course, he’s a fictional character, all I’m saying is that this fiction is 
plausible—couldn’t stop himself from thinking that James was right in a way. Or 
from thinking that Paul was right when James bad-mouthed him. Does that make 
him a hypocrite? One of those divided men to whom the Lord does not give 
himself? A man whose yes tends toward no, and whose no tends toward yes? I 
don’t know. But I do think he’s a man for whom the truth always has one foot in 
the opposite camp.462 
 
The fiction is plausible. I agree. All fictions that stem from the world of experience are 
equiprobable. Carrère, in this way, is not writing about Luke, but <<Luke>>. And his 
relationship, his faith, was not with or in Jesus, but <<Jesus>>, that cultural unit that is 
                                                
461 Ibid., 278. 
462 Ibid., 281–2. 
 
 
195 
filled with so much good, beauty, evil, and ugliness. What he teases out of it, of course, is 
due to his narrativizing theory, his tension with hypocrisy, and his continuing 
acknowledgement of truth’s various sides.  
 Mapping his fiction onto reality, I then begin to read Carrère not as the author of 
The Kingdom, but as The Kingdom’s protagonist. The “I” behind the data, collecting, 
organizing, and narrativizing a story. I cannot help but ask: Is this really about Luke’s 
plausibility or the I’s? That question, however, is the one I continually find myself hiding 
within. How do I choose between this reality and that? How do I embody ambiguity and 
provisionality and equiprobable realities? How do I judge when skipping from one node 
to the next in the ever expanding, ever flexible, and ever fluid network?  
 “The historian’s job,” the I quotes, “is to give the society in which he lives the 
feeling that its values are relative.”463 The academic too, especially of the 
interdisciplinary variety, is to provide the culture within which she lives the feeling of 
provisionality. Our narratives are not concrete, given, or natural. “I, too, am free to invent 
provided I say that I’m inventing, and set out . . . the degrees of the certain, the probable, 
the possible, and—right before the completely excluded—the not entirely impossible: the 
realm in which a good part of this book is based.”464 
 Is there room for provisionality in the academic world of certainty? Can argument 
also function ambiguously?  
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 “The program Luke sets himself is that of a historian. He promises Theophilus a 
field investigation, a report that can be trusted. But then what does he write no sooner 
than he’s stated this intention, starting the very next line? Fiction. Pure fiction.”465 But 
these are my cultural categories rearing their head, not Luke’s, surely. But can that be 
escaped? Am I not trapped within the horizon of my encyclopedia? No. The answer is 
always no. Ambiguity allows for the paradox of fictions that shape the world and expand 
the encyclopedia. I am not trapped. But I am accountable to and responsible for the 
choices I make in the space of ambiguity. Is not that correct? 
 And here is the hard admission of any academic wrestling with the truth of the 
thing that she writes. I don’t know. I can think. I can suggest. I can posit. But can I know?  
“But this isn’t a fable by Aesop or La Fontaine,” Carrère comments on Luke’s 
parables:  
It’s the Gospel. It’s the final word on the kingdom: the dimension of life where 
God’s will manifests itself. It would be another thing if it were a question of 
saying: ‘That’s what life on earth is like: unjust, cruel, arbitrary, we all know that, 
but you’ll see, the kingdom is something else altogether . . .’ But that’s not it at 
all. Luke is saying nothing of the sort. Luke says, ‘That is the kingdom.’ And, like 
a Zen master after pronouncing a koan, he lets you figure it out for yourself.466 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a history student, I had to write a dissertation on a topic of my choice. As I 
knew almost nothing about history but a lot about science fiction, I chose a topic I 
was sure to know more about than that entire jury: uchronia. Uchronia deals with 
fictions along these lines: What if things had happened differently?467 
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The Kingdom stands as an ambiguous reminder of provisionality. “In a nutshell,” 
Carrère writes, “I’m all for reading the Bible as it suits me, as long as I bear in mind that 
I’m doing just that. And I’m all for projecting myself onto the figure of Luke, as long as 
I’m aware that I’m projecting.”468 All of us, no matter how cringe-worthy the idea—
project our emotion, context, and voice into our various projects. We all set out in our 
expertise to recount objectively the data, but, in the end, do little more than tell a story 
wherein the academic—much like Carrère in The Kingdom—embodies the “I” of the 
protagonist. And it is ambiguity that allows us to know that our projection is just that—a 
projection.  
Why is this such an important reminder? Because when approached this way, 
academia is seen for what it is, a wonderfully world-enriching, but ultimately provisional, 
accumulation of knowledge. And when viewed as provisional, one cannot help but 
wonder if perhaps we should not all end our books as Carrère has done, with three simple 
and humble words: “I don’t know.”469 
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CHAPTER FIVE: NARRATIVIZING THEORY IN THE PRAGUE CEMETERY 
 
Cervantes’ text and Menard’s are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely 
richer. (More ambiguous, his detractors will say, but ambiguity is richness) . . . Menard, a 
contemporary of William James, does not define history as an inquiry into reality but as 
its origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened; it is what we judge to have 
happened. 
—Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote470 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I employed my theory of ambiguity in the work of 
deciphering the encyclopedia of The Prague Cemetery’s protagonist, Simone 
Simonini.471 I argued that Simonini represents ambiguity on two levels: one, the 
ambiguity that he confronts outside of Turin’s ghetto, which resulted in the rejection of 
an alternative reality, and two, the ambiguity that I encounter as a modern, Western 
liberal upon facing Simonini’s odi ergo sum. This allowed me to articulate the role of 
aesthetic judgment or choice within my theory of ambiguity, which spawned a series of 
questions: Should I ratify Simonini’s local encyclopedia into the universal encyclopedia? 
If I do, then how does his cogito alter my reality? If I do not, then by what rules do I 
choose to reject it? Are the rules to which I defer constructed, assumed, or given as 
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natural? In the end, I claimed that choice is both essential to ambiguity and that which 
maintains a responsible accountability.  
The questions taken up in this chapter not only continue this line of inquiry but 
also explore the entanglement of fiction and reality. The purpose behind this approach is 
twofold: one, to engage further the possibilities of ordering one’s encyclopedia and the 
way in which choice and provisionality are revealed by ambiguity. And two, to show the 
ways in which academia, through its theorizations and ideological structures, participates 
in this ordering. The later argument is neither a critique of objectivity nor a naïve 
deconstruction of the human and natural sciences. It is, rather, to suggest that all 
knowledge is organized, limited, and idiosyncratic, and, once confronted by ambiguity, 
provisional.472 The theories that academics construct and then employ in the analysis of 
the material world are, in other words, tools for the narrativization of reality. And while it 
cannot be otherwise, both the tools and the narratives—as well as the material artifacts on 
which they are based—are temporary stopping points in an ever changing, ever fluid 
network. What I write today will not hold, for both the encyclopedia and the world are in 
flux.   
The questions that I ask in this chapter then are rooted in Eco’s analysis of 
Simone Simonini in the context of Eco’s lectures on the distinction between fiction and 
reality, and how one might misstep when applying the former to the latter.473 Filtered 
                                                
472 Cf. Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach, The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone 
(New York: Riverhead, 2017). 
473 Cf. Umberto Eco, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994). 
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through my theory of ambiguity then, the questions become: What is the difference 
between a narrative and a theory? Where do they overlap? And how does the simultaneity 
of a narrativized theory further develop my understanding of ambiguity?  
By way of a preliminary answer, let me refer you to the epigraph. Jorge Luis 
Borges writes that Pierre Menard composed “the Quixote itself,”474 and in doing so 
created something “infinitely richer.”475 Why was it richer? Because it was ambiguous. 
This richness is similar to Eco’s ambiguity-as-information-theory. Whereas Eco might 
say a given message is high in information (surprise), Borges might claim: “text x is high 
in richness, which is a measure of its ambiguity.” The key is not the connection between 
Menard’s excess and Eco’s understanding of information theory, but rather the way in 
which Borges’ short story introduces my concern for this chapter.  
After admitting ambiguity into his aesthetic, Borges writes: history is the origin of 
reality. It is what the community of interpreters—me, you, and everyone else who is 
responsible for the universal encyclopedia—judges to have happened.476 History, in other 
words, is an arranged or emplotted narrative that, first, forms a reality and then, second, 
gets ratified into Eco’s universal encyclopedia. Am I then accountable to history? No. 
But I am, following from the last chapter, accountable to and responsible for that which I 
judge—choose—history to be.477 
                                                
474 Ibid., 38. 
475 Ibid., 41. 
476 Ibid., 41–2. 
477 Cf. Clare Birchall, “Economic Interpretation,” in Illuminating Eco: On the Boundaries of 
Interpretation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 71–87. 
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To swap out history for narratives is to arrive at this chapter’s concern. Or 
perhaps another way to phrase it would be to say that while history is the a posteriori 
arrangement of the universal encyclopedia, narratives are much the same for individual 
and local encyclopedias. Historians argue over, arrange, and analyze the former, while 
religious aesthetes, as an example, might take up, comment upon, and engage the latter. 
To keep the two separate is, of course, silly. There is overlap, entanglement, and shared 
information running through the multi-directional wires of heuristically tiered cultural 
encyclopedias. But for my purposes, Borges’ commentary on Menard’s Quixote 
influences this chapter in two, important ways.    
One, it further reveals what Simonini was up to in The Prague Cemetery. His 
meticulous invention, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, was an arrangement of the 
universal encyclopedia—a history to shape histories. It was a judgment upon an invented 
happening in order to steer the future course of events. Simonini’s narrative was 
knowledge—arranged and ordered—that was, rather than provisional, certain. In this, 
unfortunately, it was largely successful.  
And two, Borges’ commentary reminds me that Eco’s protagonist did not 
materialize out of thin air. He is, though fictional, a creation spawning from a judgment 
upon what happened. In this way, Eco’s research into the historical construction of The 
Protocols mirrors both the arrangement of a given set of cultural units into a narrative 
and the object of study for religious aesthetics—those narratives that, once organized and 
embodied—shape an equiprobable reality. What I explore in this chapter then is “history 
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as the origin of reality” or the way in which Eco went about collecting scraps of historical 
data that then set off an aesthetic chain of events.  
Eco researched Simonini and the historical construction of The Protocols in, 
among many places, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods. From this, he articulated a theory 
of global conspiracy. Collecting it all together, he then wrote The Prague Cemetery, after 
which—shaped by the data, his arrangement of that data into a theory, and his 
narrativization of that theory—he espoused another, related idea, that of Inventing the 
Enemy.478 To be clear, I am not concerned with the timeline in which these events 
happened,479 but rather with the way data, theory, and narrative are all entangled. It is 
difficult, in other words, for even the most detailed scholar to say where the one begins 
and the other ends. To do so, in fact, is to betray an encyclopedic blindness. So much so, 
it is my contention, that what I take as “reality” is more often, if not always, a 
narrativized theory shaping my aesthetic judgments. This is not a reversion to concept 
making the world or semiotics over against embodiment, but rather an admission that the 
world of things (lines of resistance) and the world of ideas (encyclopedias comprised of 
cultural units) are so deeply entangled that they are nearly impossible to detangle.480 As 
Eco writes it, there is: 
                                                
478 Umberto Eco, Inventing the Enemy: And Other Occasional Writings, trans. Richard Dixon 
(New York: Mariner, 2011). 
479 Why? Because the timeline of publication is different from Italy to America. Not only that, but 
because narrativizing theory relies upon distended reception as espoused in my work, Sigurd’s Lament: An 
Alliterative Epic (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017): 42–60 and 199–214. 
480 Cf. Guy Raffa, “Eco’s Scientific Imagination,” in New Essays on Umberto Eco (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 34–49. 
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an astronomic infinity of books, each of which straddles different worlds, and 
stories that some have considered to be true will be seen as fictitious by others . . . 
So the frisson with which we perceive the ambiguous confines between fiction 
and reality is not only equal to the one that seizes us when faced with the books 
written by angels, but also to that which should seize us when faced with the 
series of books that represent, authoritatively, the real world.481 
 
I am, in other words, struck equally by the ambiguity of reality when confronted by 
fiction and history alike.482 The way in which I arrange reality and understand it through 
a cultural encyclopedia is neither natural nor a simple matter of facts—a conclusion that I 
can draw only through ambiguity and the liminality of the skinscape.  
To answer my questions before more fully exploring the answers then, the 
difference between theory and narrative is that the former, in an ongoing process, 
arranges the latter. Theory and narrative overlap in that the process of ordering and 
embodiment is never a two-way street with a separating median, but an entangled, 
overlying network that is dynamic, connected, and simultaneous. I intuit, order, and 
narrativize in a tangled jumble of simultaneity. And it is that very simultaneity that 
allows me not only to account for ambiguity in “real time” but also to recognize my 
judgments as provisional. Though simultaneity and the space of ambiguity that allows for 
reflection might, at first glance, be at odds—they are not. For, as I previously stated, the 
space of ambiguity, the pulling out of the tangled simultaneity to account for 
potentialities, is at the speed of cognition. Or, as Eco might say (referencing Peirce and 
Calvino), abduction or conjecture is a quick, nimble, and light negotiation.    
                                                
481 Umberto Eco, The Infinity of Lists: An Illustrated Essay, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: 
Rizzoli, 2009), 365. 
482 Cf. Rocco Capozzi, “Preface,” in Reading Eco: An Anthology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), xvii–xxv. 
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To conclude this lengthy introduction, in this chapter I first analyze Six Walks and 
the way in which Eco’s data translates into his theory. I then examine the ways in which 
The Prague Cemetery (Eco’s narrativization of his theory) entangles with Inventing the 
Enemy. It is my argument that this process mirrors the way in which religious aesthetics 
should seek to understand the role of embodied narratives in the lives of human 
practitioners. If Eco’s novel is the matter to his theory as encyclopedia, then it is my 
argument that his theories and narratives shuttle back and forth in a way similar to the 
entangled simultaneity of the semiotic and material worlds.483 I argue, finally, that 
ambiguity exposes the way in which knowledge and realities are constructed and 
arranged, in so far as the event of ambiguity leads to a state of ambiguity (better 
understood together as the process of ambiguity) in which I can analyze potentialities—
or, to put it differently, how a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the 
provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. 
Walking in the Woods with Eco 
I have written much about networks, nodes, and traversing glowing paths in a 
digital landscape. I have suggested that my contemporary encyclopedia is analogous to a 
hyperlinked Wikipedia—fluid, dynamic, and crowd sourced. I have referenced GitHub, 
artificial intelligence, and science fiction. And while these might be necessary metaphors 
for the situation in which I find myself, Eco’s network is a vastly different, and much 
older picture.484 Overgrown with forking paths and the terror of sublimity, the woods are 
                                                
483 Cf. Eco on the “aesthetic effect” in Experiences in Translation, trans. Alastair McEwen 
(Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 2008), 93. 
484 Cf. H. L. Hix, “Review: Six Walks in the Fictional Woods by Umberto Eco,” Harvard Review 
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a rhizome to Eco. And while informed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,485 Eco’s 
rhizome is better understood in reference to Joycean puns and Borgesian labyrinths.486 It 
is a place of mystery, wit, and abduction. It is a forest of myths and fables that exists in 
reality but is only realized when a reader enters into its dark, foreboding overgrowth. The 
woods, to Eco, represent the process of interpretation, which includes lines of resistance, 
abduction, choice, and textual responsibility, even as it remains open to infinite paths, 
perspectives, and possibilities.  
 But why ruminate on Echian woods? Because it is there, within the expansive and 
wild borders of generative invention, that I must go if I am to understand the ambiguity 
of Simone Simonini.  
 “Woods,” Eco writes, “are a metaphor for the narrative text, not only for the text 
of fairy tales but for any narrative text.”487 There are no straight paths, however, for 
within each wood are forking paths wherein “everyone can trace his or her own path, 
deciding to go to the left or to the right of a certain tree and making a choice at every tree 
                                                                                                                                            
7, no. Fall (1994): 229: “Descartes founded modern philosophy, but he also reinforced it with hylophobia. 
By assuming that the woods are a place of danger from which one should try to escape, Descartes derives 
an ethical imperative from the metaphor of travelers lost in a forest who know to stay on a single course 
because, even if it is not the shortest route, it will eventually get them out. Descartes is terrified by the 
prospect of being lost in the woods, but Umberto Eco revels in the idea . . .  [He] reverses Descartes’ 
metaphor. Eco proposes fiction as a cure to modern philosophy’s fear of the woods, so that this book is less 
a theory of fiction than an apology for it.” 
485 Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi, 2 ed. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
486 Cf. Umberto Eco and David Robey, The Aesthetics of Chaosmos: The Middle Ages of James 
Joyce, trans. Ellen Esrock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) and Cristina Farronato, Eco’s 
Chaosmos: From the Middle Ages to Postmodernity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 8–31. 
487 Eco, Six Walks, 5. 
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encountered. In a narrative text, the reader is forced to make choices all the time.”488 I 
enter the woods. I find myself confronted with a narrative. And I choose. “Indeed,” Eco 
continues, “this obligation to choose is found even at the level of the individual 
sentence.”489  
While I am perhaps getting ahead of myself, it is necessary to call attention to the 
role of choice in Eco’s hermeneutic, which, of course, is never just a theory of 
interpretation. For Eco’s hermeneutics influence his aesthetics, which in turn influences 
his epistemology. If I choose in the woods, then it is a safe bet that I also choose in 
reality—or in those moments where I am actively arranging my experiences.490 As I have 
said, I choose and, by doing so, make history, which is a reality. 
“To read fiction,” Eco writes:  
means to play a game by which we give sense to the immensity of things that 
happened, are happening, or will happen in the actual world. By reading narrative, 
we escape the anxiety that attacks us when we try to say something true about the 
world. This is the consoling function of narrative—the reason people tell stories, 
and have told stories from the beginning of time. And it has always been the 
paramount function of myth: to find a shape, a form, in the turmoil of human 
experience.491 
 
 There is an uncomfortable parallel here between Borges’ history and Eco’s 
fiction. In both cases, the questions are what has happened? How do I order it? And, once 
                                                
488 Ibid., 6. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Cf. Jerry A. Varsava, “Umberto Eco, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods,” International Fiction 
Review 22, no. 1 and 2 (June 1, 1995): 89, “In short, the first-level Model Reader will attend to what the 
Russian Formalists called the fabula and what we refer to as the  story or the natural chronology of events 
whereas the second-level Model Reader will focus on the sjuzhet, i.e., the plot or narrative chronology of 
the text, and enjoy time spent in the textual forest.”   
491 Ibid., 87. 
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ordered, what do I call it? Or, perhaps better, what is true about that which is said to have 
happened? With “truth,” however, I arrive back at the encyclopedia.492 For a truth or a 
history or a fiction is only true given a set of contextual rules that are often only 
discovered after “a happening” by utilizing conjecture. And this is the metaphysical 
situation of which fiction serves as a reminder. Truth is always situated in or 
contextualized by an arranged and organized encyclopedia.493   
Whereas the real world is full of forking paths, conjecture points, and cultural 
encyclopedias that require negotiation in order to arrive at a sense of truth, fictional 
worlds provide their readers “the comfortable sensation of living in worlds where the 
notion of truth is indisputable.”494 I know, in other words, that the companion of Sherlock 
Holmes is John Watson and that he was injured in Afghanistan while serving as Captain 
in the Fifth Northumberland Fusiliers. This is a fact that is and always will be true. It is 
the kind of fact that I can only encounter in fiction.495 
History is the origin of reality. Fiction provides its reader with indisputable truth. 
It is from these two conundrums that Eco considers not only the role of the “Total 
Encyclopedia” in representing reality but also that “the way we accept the representation 
of the actual world scarcely differs from the way we accept the representation of fictional 
                                                
492 Ibid., 89. 
493 Cf. Rafa, who, along with Mieke Bal, critiques this position as naïve, 166–7: “Eco fails to 
consider adequately the shared cultural grounds needed to establish limits to interpretation in the first 
place.” While I completely disagree, of course, Eco set out to more clearly address this issue in both Kant 
and the Platypus and From the Tree to the Labyrinth.  
494 Eco, Six Walks, 91. 
495 Cf. Umberto Eco, The Book of Legendary Lands, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Rizzoli 
Ex Libris, 2013), 440–1. 
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worlds.”496 In both cases, I employ a set of interpretive techniques that help me find my 
way in the Echian woods.  
But if truth can be taken for granted in fiction, in the world of things, “I must 
make some difficult decisions about my trust in the community . . . I must decide which 
portions of the Total Encyclopedia are to be trusted, while rejecting others as 
unreliable.”497 In the world of aesthetic perceptions, I have to choose, make judgments, 
and employ provisionality as an operative disposition. For without provisionality, I run 
the risk of continually circling back to a desired origin point and expiring from hunger. 
“What is the moral of this story?” Eco asks:  
It is that fictional texts come to the aid of our metaphysical narrow mindedness. 
We live in the great labyrinth of the actual world, which is bigger and more 
complex than the world of Little Red Riding Hood. It is a world whose paths we 
have not yet entirely mapped out and whose total structure we are unable to 
describe. In the hope that rules of the game exist, humanity throughout the 
centuries has speculated about whether this labyrinth has an author, or perhaps 
more than one. And it has thought of God, or the gods, as if they were empirical 
authors, narrators, or model authors . . . But some (including philosophers, of 
course, but also adherents of many religions) have searched for God as Model 
Author—that is, God as the Rule of the Game, as the Law that makes or someday 
will make the labyrinth of the world understandable . . . The problem with the 
actual world is that, since the dawn of time, humans have been wondering 
whether there is a message and, if so, whether this message makes sense. With 
fictional universes, we know without a doubt that they do have a message and that 
an authorial entity stands behind them as creator, as well as within them as a set 
of reading instructions. Thus, our quest for the model author is an Ersatz for that 
other quest, in the course of which the Image of the Father fades into the Fog of 
the Infinity, and we never stop wondering why there is something rather than 
nothing.498 
 
                                                
496 Ibid., 90. 
497 Ibid., 92–3. 
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The truth of fiction then creates a kind of metaphysical paradox wherein I demand 
a fictional truth from the actual world in the hopes that an author, too, stands behind the 
narrative of the world of things.499 But in the Echain woods—terrifying, foreboding, and 
unkempt—I must make my own way. For there is no author and I am responsible for my 
own narrative.500  
Returning to the woods of The Prague Cemetery, however, the question remains: 
where is Simonini amongst all these swaying trees, splitting paths, and rhizomatic roots? 
It is Eco’s protagonist that contorts the total or universal encyclopedia in such a way that 
it plays into the metaphysical desire of narrativizing humans. I want the actual world to 
be a fictional truth. And even if I do not believe in a divine initial point,501 I am prone to 
recognize, and perhaps even defer to, an author or authors who stand behind all things, 
constructing a universal plot. If nothing else, then I can at the very least abdicate any 
interpretive responsibilities that I might encounter in Eco’s sylvan hermeneutic.   
But if reality and fiction blend, and I cannot tell where the one begins and the 
other ends, and if I utilize the same tools to make sense of both, then how do I make a 
distinction between the two and remain accountable to the narratival choices that I make? 
Or, as Eco asks it, “If fictional worlds are so comfortable, why not try to read the actual 
                                                
499 Cf. Guy P. Raffa, “Walking and Swimming with Umberto Eco,” MLN Bulletin 113, no. 1 
(1998): 166. 
500 The “I” here is a bit hyperbolic, as authority, tradition, and community all go into the shaping 
of one’s encyclopedia. Cf. Eco, Six Walks, 130: “Our perceptual relationship with the world works because 
we trust prior stories. We could not fully perceive a tree if we did not know (because others have told us) 
that it is the product of a long growth process and that it does not grow overnight. This certainty is part of 
our ‘understanding’ that a tree is a tree, and not a flower. We accept a story that our ancestors have handed 
down to us as being true, even though today we call these ancestors scientists.” 
501 Cf. Peters, Sigurd’s Lament, 42–60 and 199–214. 
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world as if it were a work of fiction?”502 I have, along with Borges, already answered 
Eco’s question. I do read the world as if it were fiction. This cannot be helped. Eco 
agrees,503 but still articulates—through a detailed analysis of the compiling of The 
Protocols—the numerous ways in which fictionalizing reality can go horribly wrong.504 
And yet, the infinite trap and relativity of language betray me at every turn. To 
say that a particular narratival arrangement that sought ratification into the universal 
encyclopedia is “horribly wrong” is to betray my own ordering of the cosmos. I can 
neither help it nor consider Simonini’s work as reputable. It is between my arrangement 
and Simonini’s then that I encounter ambiguity and am forced to choose. To extend Eco’s 
analogy, Simonini is a tree in the narratival woods. To encounter him is to stumble upon 
a forking path. Do I set foot on his? Mine? A third? Some kind of blending of the two, or 
three, or four? Where does it end? Are there boundaries to this branching forest? And 
what if I stay put, paralyzed by the choice? Is that possible, too, or does it only mean that 
the Simonini’s of the world will choose for me? The circular choice, however, is the one 
to which Eco has already referred and to which Simonini manipulated. To travel the path 
that would suggest someone else—or authors—cleared this path, directed it, and set me 
upon it. To traverse that path of universal conspiracy, however, is both choice and 
abdication.  
                                                
502 Eco, Six Walks, 117. 
503 Ibid., 118. 
504 Ibid., 131–7. 
 
 
211 
After describing natural and artificial narratives then, those that describe events 
that actually occur and those that pretend to tell the truth about the actual universe,505 Eco 
writes:  
In fiction, precise references to the actual world are so closely linked that, after 
spending some time in the world of the novel and mixing fictional elements with 
references to reality, as one should, the reader no longer knows exactly where he 
or she stands. Such a state gives rise to some well-known phenomena. The most 
common is when the reader maps the fictional model onto reality—in other 
words, when the reader comes to believe in the actual existence of fictional 
characters and events . . . There are, then, many reasons a work of fiction may be 
mapped onto real life. But we must also consider another, far more important 
problem: our tendency to construct life as a novel.  
 
 fig. 5.1 
 
And while this, at first glance, seems to critique the mapping of fiction onto reality, Eco 
finally admits that it cannot be otherwise,506 and so his detailed analysis of The 
                                                
505 Ibid., 119. 
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Protocols507 lead him to ask: “How should we deal with intrusions of fiction into life, 
now that we have seen the historical impact that this phenomenon can have?”508 
 Before answering Eco’s question, I want to suggest that Eco’s work on The 
Protocols is an example of what I am calling for within religious aesthetics: to encounter 
someone who arranges her local encyclopedia differently and then to analyze the way in 
which she has organized her embodied narrative. This has two important outcomes. One, 
I move towards understanding that which is other. And two, I create opportunities for 
ambiguity, which allow for the fluidity and transformation of my own encyclopedia.  
This approach is all the more important when encountering someone utterly 
despicable, like Simonini. Why? Because not only does it allow me to seek understanding 
and create instances of ambiguity, but it also helps in establishing the borders or 
boundaries of the communal encyclopedia. It allows me, in other words, to not only 
ground choice but also to reveal the rules by which I make my own judgments. As Eco 
articulates it, narratival analysis enables me to understand the mechanisms by which 
fictions shape life, which constitutes a form of therapy against the sleep of reason that 
generates monsters.509 If I can understand how encyclopedias are arranged and embodied, 
                                                                                                                                            
506 Cf. Ibid., 130 and Eco’s own use of Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965); Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Jorge Lozano, El discurso histórico 
(Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987); and A. J. Greimas and Joseph Courtés, Semiotics and Language: An 
Analytical Dictionary, trans. Larry Christ and Daniel Patte (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979). 
507 Cf. Figure 1, taken from Eco, Six Walks, 138. 
508 Ibid., 139. 
509 Ibid., 138. 
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then I might be able to participate in the correction or revealing of the dominant, 
oppressive, or ill-conceived narratives that shape a shared reality. Ambiguity is always 
self-reflexive, however, and so every analysis is also a questioning of the self and the 
rules by which I judge, embody, and analyze. “Studying the fundamentalism of others,” 
Eco writes, “helps us understand our own fundamentalism better.”510   
In the process of ambiguity then—encountering it, the critique or revealing of a 
communal encyclopedia, and the possibilities for self-reflection—I am reminded that all 
knowledge and subsequent embodiment of that knowledge is a provisional negotiation 
between fictional arrangements. Nowhere is this better espoused than in Eco’s works on 
translation.511 It is there that he so often asks: what are the rules by which I communicate 
across languages or, by analogy, encyclopedic arrangements? If it is true that there are 
lines of resistance, a hard core of Being that suggests all humans crawl but not a one of 
them flies, then it is there that “languages should be confronted.”512 Whereas philosophy 
wrestles with the conundrum of ontology when and if it feels like it, translation must 
continually face it, which is why translation is a better place to discover the provisionality 
and negotiation inherent to the aesthetics of ambiguity.  
For translators, provisionality and negotiation are a given, a pragmatic reality. 
And so while translation re-proposes “to philosophy its everlasting question . . . whether 
                                                
510 Umberto Eco, Turning Back the Clock: Hot Wars and Media Populism, trans. Alastair 
McEwen (New York: Mariner, 2008), 244. 
511 Umberto Eco, Mouse or Rat?: Translation as Negotiation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
2004) and Experiences in Translation, trans. Alastair McEwen (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 
2008). 
512 Eco, Mouse or Rat, 181. 
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there is a way in which things go, independently of the way” languages make them go, 
translators avoid ontological problems by comparing languages and negotiating solutions 
that do not offend common sense. “Translators,” Eco writes, “simply behave like 
polyglots, because in some way they already know that in the target language a given 
thing is expressed so and so. They follow their instinct, as does every fluent bilingual 
person.”513  
I can think of no better way to articulate the navigation of trees—decision 
points—in the aesthetics of ambiguity. Upon encountering the ambiguous, I too can 
behave like a polyglot by comparing encyclopedias and negotiating an outcome. “We 
negotiate,” Eco writes, “because, if everyone stuck to his own interpretation of the facts, 
we would go on ad infinitum. We negotiate to bring our diverging interpretations to a 
point of convergence, if only a partial one, that enables us to deal with a Fact—a thing 
that is there and is difficult to get rid of.”514  
Two keys to aesthetic negotiation then are partiality, or what I have been calling 
provisionality, and the uppercase “Fact.” The former is an individual commitment 
(choice) that what is true today is not tomorrow—that aether can become the fabric of 
space-time. When I negotiate, I hold my own narratives loosely in order to arrive at a 
solution that does not “offend common sense.” And it is important to note that common 
sense does not refer to bourgeois assumptions about culture but to both the instinct of the 
polyglot and lines of resistance. The latter, lines of resistance or Fact, is a challenge to 
                                                
513 Ibid., 182.  
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those who might say there are no facts but only interpretations.515 If this were so, Eco 
suggests, then  
negotiation would be impossible, because there would be no criterion that would 
enable us to decide whether my interpretation is better than yours or not. We can 
compare and discuss interpretations precisely because we can weigh them against 
the facts they are intended to interpret.516 
 
It is Fact or lines of resistance that leads to an interpretation, which then enters, as 
a cultural unit, into an encyclopedia. When I encounter someone else’s interpreted Fact 
through ambiguity, negotiation begins. And by negotiating the convergence of cultural 
units, or ratifying them into a more general (individual, communal, universal, etc.) 
encyclopedia, I am reminded that all knowledge is provisional. If Fact begins this 
aesthetic process, then it also ends it, as—thinking back to previous chapters—unlimited 
semiosis always tells me something more and not something else. I have learned, in other 
words, something new about that which confronts me. And it is through a recognition of 
this process that I am able, at more general levels of the encyclopedia, to judge one 
against the other. It is there that I am able to reject Simonini and choose a different 
narratival arrangement. And it is there that I am accountable to that choice.  
This has been a long and winding chapter thus far, and perhaps I should 
summarize before moving on. Chapter Four employed my theory of ambiguity in The 
Prague Cemetery. This section set out to discover the ways in which theories turn into 
narratives. To accomplish this, I looked not so much at Eco’s detailed analysis of The 
                                                
515 Cf. Umberto Eco, “Absolute and Relative,” in Inventing the Enemy: And Other Occasional 
Writings, trans. Richard Dixon (New York: Mariner, 2012), 22–43.  
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Protocols, but rather the argument that Eco situated The Protocols in and were an 
example of—the way in which fiction maps onto reality and how one judges between two 
competing, narrativized realities.517 It was my argument that by examining the theory 
behind The Prague Cemetery, I might more fully understand the ways in which an 
encounter with ambiguity can possibly lead to a reorganization of my cultural 
encyclopedia. Underlying this argument was the assumption that the theories of 
academics also construct a narrativized reality, and that this process, exemplified by 
Eco’s Six Walks and The Prague Cemetery, is analogous to the more general aesthetic 
theory that I laid out in Part I. Finally, I also moved closer to a justification of my notion 
of aesthetic judgment as choice. I accomplished this through introducing negotiation, 
provisionality, and Fact into my theory of ambiguity.  
The final section of this chapter takes up the far side of narrativizing theory. The 
first section looked at the theory that went into creating The Prague Cemetery. The 
second section examines the theory that came out of it, Inventing the Enemy. If fiction 
and reality blend together in equiprobable realities but it is still possible to judge between 
competing narratives, then why does something like The Protocols still exist? Why is the 
spirit of Simonini, in other words, still afloat and influencing realities?  
 
 
 
                                                
517 Cf. Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok, eds., The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 205: One “can deal with “universes as if they were 
texts and with texts as if they were universes.” 
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THE COMPOSER  
V 
Abernathy, Edward. “Martynov’s Gift: A Light Too Bright To Bear.” The Telescope. 
August 3, 2017. Accessed on September 19, 2017. 
http://www.thetelescopenews.com/sections/arts-and-li 
fe/2017/09/19/578320984/martynovs-gift-a-light-too-bright-to-bear. 
 
The Voynich manuscript of The Atlantic fame is an artifact with no meaning. We 
have it. You can see it. Hold it. Turn it over in your hands, and question its existence. 
But the mystery of its import will forever remain unsolved.  
And its antipode?  
What if I told you that, once upon a time, there was musical composition for 
which we knew its meaning but no longer possessed its artifact? You could not play 
it. Hear it. Or experience it? But you could know it and that for which it stood.  
You would, no doubt, call me a liar, a conspiracy theorist. A man who plays 
with truth. Perhaps, yes. But in the Spring of 1892 as the sun set behind Moscow’s 
Bolshoi Theater, Zuravel Ostrava Martynov conceived of such a thing. By all 
accounts, he invented a musical composition that was extravagant in detail, beautiful 
in scope, and utterly haunting. That, in itself, is not the mystery—and continued 
influence—of the Martynov composition.  
Toiling away in the winter of 1892, Martynov composed sheet after sheet that, 
according to his journals, could be played in any order. His idea was to step onto the 
Bolshoi’s stage, throw his composition into the air, collect it, and then conduct it 
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given the order into which it had fallen. Martynov invented, in other words, a 
composition of entropy.   
But why?  
“So that,” he wrote, “the audience could complete the work. For I refuse to 
dominate man’s guttural drive towards the imaginative.” 
Many critics of classical music, however, refer to this as apocryphal, a story of 
doubtful authenticity.  
What is not apocryphal, however, what many eyewitnesses claim is that after 
Martynov’s orchestra played what is widely held to be the modern world’s most 
influential composition, he turned to his audience, struck a match, and burnt the only 
record of that which he had invented. 
And so while the memory and meaning lingered, the artifact could never again 
be experienced. It was a once-for-all-time performance, a thing tinged with loss—that 
which defied repetition.   
According to the journals of Martynov, those in attendance, and contemporary 
critics, Martynov’s burning was artistic anathema. He was said, upon igniting the 
flame, to have screamed, “I invent to destroy.” In many monographs, critics still try to 
explain the meaning of that statement and its relationship to Martynov’s performance. 
Most are in disagreement. Some say that Martynov was deranged. Others that he was 
fighting against the then burgeoning philosophy of Russian materialism. And still 
others claim that it was a political statement against those who were seeking to 
influence the Tsar against the Jewish population in Moscow. 
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But I cannot speak to any such theory.  
From my own research, Martynov was a kind and intelligent man. He was a 
composer ahead of his time, influential in his own community. Nikolayevich 
Romanov Diletsky, the world’s foremost scholar on Martynov, calls Martynov’s 
burning a gift. But to whom? His audience? The musical world? To philosophers 
everywhere looking for an easy dissertation on aesthetic theory?  
While I cannot answer those questions to the satisfaction of this reading 
community, what I can say is that Martynov was obsessed with time. To him, music 
was the ordering of experience’s cadence. But it was also an escape from humanity’s 
inevitable march towards death. Music taught that time and history could be arranged 
differently. That we could, in fact, see beyond the horizon. It was a reminder that 
starting points are false and should be endlessly interrogated. And that, if understood 
rightly, Being could be worn lightly, with gaiety even.  
So is Martynov’s burning, in fact, a gift? Perhaps. If it is, then it is a gift of 
choice. For only you can decide what it means.  
Martynov died in a Siberian labor camp in the Summer of 1892. He was survived by 
his daughter and granddaughter, who emigrated shortly thereafter to New York. It is 
said that his last words were “From ash to light, I leap.” I do not know what that 
means. But it saddens me to think that such a life was spent in the forges of 
misunderstanding. 
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The Enemy that Makes 
 
In one of his most pithy statements on the The Protocols and universal 
conspiracy, Eco writes that the intellectual anti-Semitism of today arose in the modern 
world.518 Abbé Barruel wrote in 1797 “to show that the French Revolution was a plot 
hatched by Templars and Masons, and later a certain Captain Simonini (an Italian) 
pointed out to him that those who pulled the strings were the perfidious Jews.”519 After 
that began the polemic about international Jewry, which led to The Protocols, anti-
Semitism in Russian Tsarists circles, and eventually Hitler. The fuller story, of course, is 
recounted in both Six Walks and The Prague Cemetery but what is important about this 
account is Eco’s distillation of his narrativizing theory, his self-reflexivity,520 and the way 
in which it moves from history, through narrative, and towards the argument that The 
Protocols are still in use today, developing a new, popular anti-Semitism. All I need do, 
according to Eco, is “visit certain racist Internet sites, or take a look at anti-Zionist 
propaganda in Arab countries, and you will see the same old recycling of The 
Protocols.”521 
 This rhetorically confuses Eco to no end. If writers like himself, Cohen, and 
Eisner have, time and again, debunked The Protocols by revealing their fictional sources, 
then why are people still using them to whip up anti-Semitic sentiments? “How can we 
                                                
518 Eco, Turning Back the Clock, 314. 
519 Ibid. 
520 The short article is titled, “Are the Italians Anti-Semites?” Eco, Turning Back the Clock, 313–
6.  
521 Ibid., 316. 
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explain,” Eco asks, “this resistance to the evidence, and the continuing perverse 
fascination of this book?”522 The answer to Eco’s question comes only a few paragraphs 
later: “It is not The Protocols that engender anti-Semitism; it is the profound need to 
identify an enemy that prompts people to believe in them.”523 
 It is the aim of this section to examine that final statement by engaging in a 
reading of Eco’s essay, “Inventing the Enemy.”524 My analysis does not exist in a 
vacuum, however, and is conducted in the hope of exploring the last vestige of 
narrativizing theories. What happens, in other words, once the data has been collected 
and reported, the theory has been narrativized, and the final story has been told? It is my 
argument that “Inventing the Enemy” is analogous to the ways in which narratival 
arrangements of cultural encyclopedias are embodied in the world of things. And by 
examining it, I better understand the full process of intuition, cognition, and embodiment, 
which is continuous, fluid, and dynamic. In an ever continuing process then, I encounter, 
I arrange, I negotiate, I narrativize, and I embody, even as any of those steps might usurp 
its place and begin the process anew from a new perspectival location. 
                                                
522 Ibid., 318. 
523 Ibid., 319. 
524 Umberto Eco, “Inventing the Enemy,” in Inventing the Enemy: And Other Occasional 
Writings, trans. Richard Dixon (New York: Mariner, 2012), 1–21. 
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fig. 5.2 
The above diagram, however, is only a heuristic, an illustration to help me think through 
the ways in which narrativizing theories—as pieces to the puzzle of the aesthetics of 
ambiguity—are non-linear processes rooted in the relationship between thing and 
interpreter or text and reader. In what follows, I examine the ways in which narratives 
embody before I turn my attention in the final chapter to narrativizing theories and their 
role in the aesthetics of ambiguity more properly. 
 Eco’s concern in “Inventing the Enemy” is not the process of identifying and 
naming an actual threat, but the “process of creating and demonizing the enemy.”525 In a 
convergence of both the semiotic and material worlds, the other is first identified and 
then connected to various cultural units: <<enemy>>, <<difference>>, or <<foreign>>. 
As I pointed out in Chapter Four, the poesis of enemy construction defines the identity of 
the ones who create or narrativize the enemy and also provides them an obstacle against 
which to measure their system of values. Since <<enemy>> is essential to this creation of 
                                                
525 Ibid., 2. 
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identity, if a culture finds itself without one, then it must invent an enemy in order to 
know itself and what it values—I can place all that I am not into the cultural unit of 
<<enemy>>.  
Ambiguity is intrinsically connected to this process in that enemies represent 
difference, which, in turn, epitomizes foreignness.526 Thinking back to Part I, I could say 
that the enemy, to a given cultural encyclopedia, is high in information or surprise and, 
hence, ambiguity. An enemy will often, if not always, call into question the encyclopedia 
of those confronting it. If difference can equate to surprise, then I can imagine the 
encounter between a resident and an alien. “You eat that?” the resident might say, in both 
shock and horror. But in doing so, the resident casts the alien into the units of 
<<foreign(er)>> and <<difference>>, which is only an interpretant away from 
<<enemy>>.  
While most of this seems harmless, though perhaps exhausting to the newly 
arrived refugee who has to continually answer questions regarding attire or food or 
speech, it turns towards Simonini when the other becomes an enemy not because she 
threatens, but because someone has an interest in portraying her as a true threat even 
when she is not. In this way, Eco writes that “difference itself becomes a symbol of what 
we find threatening.”527 This difference can be depicted in a variety of ways, but Eco 
focuses on only a few. It is found in the foreign immigrant who speaks and acts badly.528 
                                                
526 Ibid., 3. 
527 Ibid.  
528 Ibid., 4. 
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It is symbolized in the enemy who must be ugly, as beauty is identified with the good 
(kalokagathia).529 It is rooted in heresy when one desires to find an enemy within, and 
even, if not most often, in the lower classes.530  
Tying his theory of the enemy together, Eco then explores it as a “recurring 
model” throughout history, particularly focusing on “witchcraft.” All too often, he 
argues, a picture is built up of the enemy so that the victim herself admits to doing what 
she has not done or, at the very least, recognizes herself in the picture.531 And while this 
might result in a modern liberal feeling triumphant at avoiding such “conservative” 
poesis, the process cannot be escaped. “The figure of the enemy,” Eco writes, “cannot be 
abolished from the process of civilization.”532 While someone like me533 does everything 
in his power not to project the cultural unit of <<enemy>> onto the other, “the image of 
the enemy is simply shifted from a human object to a natural or social force that in some 
way threatens us and has to be defeated, whether it be capitalistic exploitation, 
environmental pollution, or third-world hunger.”534  
Virtuous, perhaps, but it is the same process of enemy construction shifted from 
the individual or community to either a more general, vague population—“flyover 
country” or “basket of deplorables”—or systems of oppression and injustice. But, as Eco 
                                                
529 Ibid., 5. 
530 Ibid., 5.  
531 Ibid., 17. 
532 Ibid. 
533 I am white, male, and heterosexual, as well as a Western, liberal democrat.  
534 Ibid., 17–8. 
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posits, even a hatred of injustice “makes the brow grow stern.”535 Or, in other words, 
injustice is perhaps better written as <<injustice>>, which suggests that it is neither fixed 
nor autonomous but rather a fluid category that—much like the objectification of the 
enemy—can result in the ideological misappropriation of power.  
And so, it would seem, I am doomed. I cannot help but create enemies, whether 
they be individuals, ethnicities, generalized populations, or systemic evils. That which is 
deemed threatening, via a careful though sometimes unreflective manipulation of the 
cultural encyclopedia, is necessary for me to solidify my identity. “Know thyself” then is 
better written as “know thine enemy.” But since the construction of enemies is 
inescapable, the question arises: “Is our moral sense therefore impotent?”536 Or, to ask it 
differently, how am I am able to judge the conservative construction of the enemy when I 
am guilty of the same process? The answer, which will not surprise you, is found in 
ambiguity in general, and Simonini’s ambiguity in particular. 
Ambiguity allows for a self-reflexive encounter, which leads to both 
provisionality and negotiation. When I confront the other as ambiguous, I am able to 
reflect upon my own encyclopedia and cultural units <<difference>>, <<foreign>>, or 
<<enemy>>. In doing so, I recognize that knowledge, cultural or scientific, is provisional, 
which then allows me to negotiate a new cultural unit with different interpretants. A 
“moral sense” intervenes then, when one stops pretending that she has no enemies and 
                                                
535 Ibid., 18. 
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instead seeks understanding—to put herself in their situation.537 Confronting that which is 
different instigates the aesthetic process of ambiguity that results in either a 
reorganization of the cultural encyclopedia or the rejection of ambiguity as a form of 
epistemological growth. “Trying to understand other people,” Eco writes, “means 
destroying the stereotype without denying or ignoring the otherness.”538 Simonini is, of 
course, incapable of understanding. His confrontation with ambiguity resulted in a 
rejection of the aesthetic process of provisionality and negotiation. His concern was not 
to destroy the stereotype, but to deepen and manipulate it. Simonini profited by 
maintaining difference.  
And yet, Simonini’s complexity is that while he rejects ambiguity, he presents an 
opportunity for me to either accept or reject it, too. When confronted with his otherness, I 
can seek understanding—not to adopt his views, but to grasp a side of human behavior 
that I so often expunge as inhuman. Is he my enemy? Yes, in so far as he is different. But 
should his hate consign him to the dungheap of inhuman behavior? No. For to wrestle 
with Simonini’s hate in-so-far as it is ambiguous is to understand my own hate, bigotry, 
and racism better. It is to reconcile with my own fictional narratives that I strive to map 
onto reality.  
This leads me again to the well of judgment and how I choose one fictional 
representation over another, equiprobable representation. What gives me, you, or us the 
right to claim one reality over another? Eco, too, found this point essential. In his 
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538 Ibid. 
 
 
227 
following essay, “Absolute and Relative,”539 he lays out the various ways in which one 
can approach judgment or choice within what I call the aesthetics of ambiguity. For Eco, 
the answer lies in deciphering, in any given context, the “criteria of truth we are 
using.”540  
“Consider these statements,” Eco writes:  
1. I have a stomachache.  
2. Last night I dreamed that Mother Teresa appeared to me.  
3. Tomorrow it will certainly rain.  
4. The world will end in 2536.  
5. There is life after death. 
6. The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees.  
7. Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius.  
8. The apple is an angiosperm.  
9. Napoleon died on May 5, 1821.  
10. We reach the coast following the path of the sun.  
11. Jesus is the Son of God.  
12. The correct interpretation of the holy scriptures is decided by the teachings 
of the church.  
13. An embryo is already a human being and has a soul.541  
 
These statements are true or false only according to the rules of a given context, 
the subjectivity of the fact (statements one and two), or the verifiability of the statement 
(I can check to see if it is raining tomorrow, but I cannot know if the world will end in 
2536—even if that statement is true).  
For my purposes, however, I am most interested in the rules of a given context.542 
By way of example, “the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees only in the 
                                                
539 Umberto Eco, “Absolute and Relative,” in Inventing the Enemy: And Other Occasional 
Writings, trans. Richard Dixon (New York: Mariner, 2012), 22–43. 
540 Ibid., 32. 
541 Ibdi., 30–1. 
542 I have discussed this at length in Sigurd’s Lament, 55–8. 
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context of a Euclidean system of postulates” or “if the evidence of the Gospels is 
accepted as historical, the proof of the divinity of Christ would be accepted as such by a 
Protestant. But this would not be so for the teachings of the Catholic Church.”543 In both 
cases, as well as the other eleven statements, “it is on the very recognition of various 
degrees of verifiability or acceptability of a truth that our sense of tolerance is based.”544 I 
can begin to accept difference because I recognize that there is no all-encompassing 
context by which I can measure or judge the truths of the other. I must take them as they 
are, recognize that my own truths are provisional, and then negotiate a way to ratify the 
event into the encyclopedia. 
As I have said, I am responsible for and accountable to ratification or choice. Eco 
espouses it differently, however. An aesthetics of ambiguity, for him, needs maintain the 
philosophical position of “holism” in which “every statement is true or false (and 
acquires a meaning) only within an organic system of assumptions, a given conceptual 
scheme, or . . . within a given scientific paradigm.”545 These systems, schemes, and 
paradigms of Eco’s are, in my thinking, best situated under the heading of 
“encyclopedias” and, as such, are necessary to the process of ambiguity. Information as 
surprise, in other words, implies an organizing structure that cannot account for a 
particular event. So to rephrase Eco, I could say that statements are true, false, and 
meaningful only within a given encyclopedia.  
                                                
543 Eco, “Absolute and Relative,” 31. 
544 Ibid., 32.  
545 Ibid., 33. 
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Given the connection between holism and the encyclopedia, Eco’s next words are 
extremely important. “Holists are the first to tell us,” he writes, “there are systems that 
cannot actually explain a series of phenomena, and that some are far better because they 
succeed better than the others in doing so.”546 If an encyclopedia cannot explain all 
phenomena, then it is prone to ambiguity, provisionality, and negotiation. And, to the 
latter half of Eco’s statement, I can only recognize that an other’s encyclopedia succeeds 
better through the process of self-reflexivity. In this way, comparison is an important tool 
in the aesthete’s belt. For to instigate the process of ambiguity, I need something to 
encounter—object, other, event—to which I can compare the two or three or four 
organizing structures that are in play.547  
While Eco’s holism follows the line of perspective-based theories in which 
“reality can be given different perspectives and each perspective matches one aspect of it, 
even if it doesn’t exhaust its unfathomable richness,” it does not equate to moral 
relativism.548 I must recognize and respect another culture’s difference, but I do not have 
to abdicate my own cultural identity in doing so. I can, through ambiguity, recognize it as 
provisional, negotiate its borders, and embody the encyclopedia as it exists in fluidity. In 
doing so, I have not only employed the process of ambiguity, but also judged or chosen 
one encyclopedia over another, a choice to which I am both responsible and accountable.  
                                                
546 Ibid., 34. Yes, choice relies upon explanation, which may or may not be a valued criteria.  
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As Eco ends these two essays with an analysis of Nietzsche, he returns to the final 
point of judgment, the line of resistance. “An absolute does not perhaps exist,” he writes:  
or if it exists it is neither imaginable nor attainable, but natural forces do exist that 
support or challenge our interpretations. If I interpret an open door painted in 
trompe l’oeil as a real door and go to walk straight through it, the fact that it is an 
impenetrable wall will undermine my interpretation. There must be a way in 
which things are or behave . . . Death and that wall are the only form of Absolute 
about which we can be in no doubt.549  
 
On the one side then, I have the encyclopedia, ratification, and choice. And on the other, I 
have Fact with a capital “F.” Both limit my interpretations while also suggesting the 
provisionality of what I know. And, if I can be so bold, it is through these two criteria 
that I can judge Simonini’s encyclopedia or system of organization. As I encounter 
Simone Simonini as despicable, I self-reflexively recognize him as ambiguous. I notice, 
too, that I maintain a provisional encyclopedia that is in flux and self-analyze the 
categories that are in question <<Woman>>, <<Jew>>, and <<Jesuit>>. Based on the 
cultural units, interpretants, and connections of not only my encyclopedia but a more 
general encyclopedia (International Human Rights Law)550 and the requirements of the 
wall (I have personally met and encountered many women, Jews, and Jesuits), I am able 
to negotiate a judgment in regards to Simonini’s additions to the cultural units in 
question. In my rejection of Simonini, however, I not only utilize ambiguity to discover 
and analyze my own cultural units but also install Simonini’s egregious cultural units as 
part of the complex of interpretants swirling around mine. The latter is not an adoption, 
                                                
549 Ibid., 43. 
550 The United Nations, “The Foundation of International Human Rights Law,” Accessed on 
August 18, 2017: http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-
rights-law/. 
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but an awareness of the full scope of hate, prejudice, and injustice as it exists in that 
ultimate of encyclopedias—Borges’ Library of Babel. 
Conclusion 
 
Writing this chapter in the waning summer of 2017 has been a strange experience. 
It seems that everyday something is reported in the news that could have been included as 
an example of negotiating encyclopedias and the way in which a community chooses to 
either ratify or reject the fluidity of their cultural units. One example of this is the now 
infamous “Google Memo”551 sent by a software engineer to the rest of the company at 
Mountain View. Titled, “Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber,” it argues, among other 
things, that “women are underrepresented in tech not because they face bias and 
discrimination in the workplace, but because of inherent psychological differences 
between men and women.”552  
Both the memo and subsequent firing of the author resulted in a media frenzy. 
While some embraced the memo,553 others outright rejected or critiqued it.554 Some took 
                                                
551 Kate Conger, “Exclusive: Here's The Full 10-Page Anti-Diversity Screed Circulating Internally 
at Google [Updated],” Gizmodo.com, August 5, 2017, accessed August 18, 2017, 
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552 Ibid. 
553 Russell Brandom, “Google’s infamous manifesto author is already a hero to the online right,” 
The Verge.com, August 7, 2017, accessed August 18, 2017, 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/7/16107954/google- diversity-memo-antifeminist-manifesto-alt-right-
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554 Megan Molteni and Adam Rogers, “The Actual Science of James Damore’s Google Memo,” 
Wired.com, August 15, 2017, accessed August 18, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/the-pernicious-
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after memo controversy?,” BBC.com, August 9, 2017, accessed August 18, 2017, 
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issue with the memo, but were then distraught that the employee was fired.555 Some even 
sought, critically, to understand its point of view.556 Others, like David Brooks of the New 
York Times had a different response.557 According to him, there were four actors in this 
controversy that made it what it was: 1) the author, James Damore, 2) women in tech, 3) 
Danielle Brown, Google’s diversity officer, and 4) the media. “What we have is a 
legitimate tension,” Brooks writes: 
Damore is describing a truth on one level; his sensible critics are describing a 
different truth, one that exists on another level. He is championing scientific 
research; they are championing gender equality. It takes a little subtlety to 
harmonize these strands, but it’s doable. Of course subtlety is in hibernation in 
modern America. The third player in the drama is Google’s diversity officer, 
Danielle Brown. She didn’t wrestle with any of the evidence behind Damore’s 
memo. She just wrote his views ‘advanced incorrect assumptions about gender.’ 
This is ideology obliterating reason. The fourth actor is the media. The coverage 
of the memo has been atrocious.558 
 
While I do not side with Brooks in all of his points, I do find it illustrative that, 
according to him, both sides are describing truths. The question then, when filtered 
through an aesthetic of ambiguity, is not who is right or has the better truth, but how do 
these truths negotiate into a more general encyclopedia wherein the community can ratify 
a fuller cultural unit, though provisional, in regard to <<Women>>, <<Technology>>, 
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headlines labeled the document ‘anti-diversity,’ misleading readers about its actual contents,” Atlantic.com, 
August 8, 2017, accessed August 18, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/the-most-
common-error- in-coverage-of-the-google-memo/536181/. 
557 David Brooks, “Sundar Pichai Should Resign as Google’s C.E.O.,” New York Times, August 
11, 2017, accessed August 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/opinion/sundar-pichai-google-
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and the way in which the one is an interpretant of the other? What is also of interest in 
Brooks’ statement is his assertion leveled at Brown that her critique of Damore’s memo 
is “ideology obliterating reason.” Viewed through ambiguity, I can ask: Is that Fact or 
revelatory of Brooks’ own encyclopedia?  
I started this chapter by analyzing the way in which fictions map onto reality. I 
did this by situating Eco’s essay, “Fictional Protocols” in the larger argument of his work 
Six Walks. I suggested that by examining the theory behind The Prague Cemetery, I 
might more fully understand the ways in which an encounter with ambiguity can possibly 
lead to a reorganization of a cultural encyclopedia. In the second section of the chapter, I 
read two of Eco’s essays that helped me to answer the question: If fiction and reality 
blend together in equiprobable realities but it is still possible to judge between competing 
narratives, then why does something like The Protocols still exist? To answer to this 
question, I discussed provisionality, negotiation, and Fact with a capital “F.” The 
Protocols still exist because humans think knowledge is certain,559 refuse to negotiate in 
regards to their cultural units, and oftentimes eschew lines of resistance for far reaching 
interpretants.  
Judgment is possible within an aesthetics of ambiguity, but it cannot be forced. In 
the end, we are all responsible for and accountable to the choices that we make when 
moving through the process of ambiguity. Ratification is typically towards a more 
general encyclopedia, but local encyclopedias can and do exist that refuse to negotiate 
and ratify upwards.  
                                                
559 Cf. Sloman and Fernback, 256–65. 
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So why was the Google Memo such a controversy? Why did it become what it 
did? Because from nearly every perspective the memo was ambiguous. It provided all 
parties involved with an opportunity to examine the relevant cultural units in their 
encyclopedias. It highlighted the provisionality and fluidity of <<Women>>, 
<<Technology>>, <<Science>>, <<Diversity>>, and <<Anti-Diversity>>, to name a 
few. It was a cultural conversation about who we are, what we believe, and how we 
embody our knowledge. It was a negotiation carried out in real time. It was a dialogue 
about what we allow and disallow in the Encyclopedia America. It was an argument over 
the role of judgment in the aesthetics of ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE NARRATIVIZING THEORIES OF AMBIGUITY 
 
“Perhaps the mission of those who love mankind is to make people laugh at the truth, to 
make truth laugh, because the only truth lies in learning to free ourselves from insane 
passion for the truth.” 
—Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose560 
Introduction 
 
In Part I of this work, I defined ambiguity and described the role that it plays 
within aesthetics. In Part II, I employed my theory in the analysis of Umberto Eco’s 
protagonist in The Prague Cemetery. I argued that Captain Simone Simonini both 
encounters ambiguity in his life as well as represents ambiguity for me. Insofar as 
Simonini is ambiguous, he represents a tree in the forest of interpretation. When I come 
to him, I must choose—this path or that. But more than choice, an aesthetics of ambiguity 
also implies self-reflexivity, provisionality, and negotiation. In Chapter Five, I articulated 
the ways in which choice is limited both by lines of resistance and cultural encyclopedias.  
Running through this work, I have also argued, parallel to the aesthetics of 
ambiguity, that one aspect of religious aesthetics is to follow the trail of choice in any 
given community. All cultural encyclopedias are arranged into narratives that are 
embodied in the real world. This is not a one-way street, however, but an entangled web 
                                                
560 Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. William Weaver (New York: Harcourt, 1984), 491. 
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wherein thing, encyclopedia, and narrative overlap. Oftentimes, like Simonini outside 
Turin’s ghetto, these narratives are confronted by ambiguity. Some of the questions that a 
religious aesthetics informed by ambiguity asks is why is this event ambiguous for this 
particular community? What fictions is it seeking to map onto reality? And is either 
negotiation or ratification taking place? In answering these questions for Simonini, I have 
called these “fictions” narrativizing theories, stories that arrange encyclopedias even as 
the encyclopedia is arranging narratives for embodiment.  
It is with narrativizing theories and their role in an aesthetics of ambiguity that 
this chapter is concerned. First, however, in an effort to conclude and encapsulate my 
argument, I summarize what I accomplished in both parts of this work. Throughout, I 
seek to reconcile S. Brent Plate’s material, religious aesthetics to my theory of ambiguity 
before turning my attention to narrativizing theories and their importance for an 
ambiguity understood as coexistent incompatibility. I then discuss Eco’s well known wit 
and humor and the importance that both have in an aesthetics of ambiguity.  
In the final section of this chapter, as the culmination of my work, I argue that 
Williams’ comment in The Name of the Rose, as found in this chapter’s epigraph, is 
essential to understanding narrativizing theories. Why? Because humor is ambiguity in 
the face of certainty. If an aesthetics of ambiguity seeks to uncover the fictions that I map 
onto reality while also confronting me with the provisionality of my encyclopedia, then it 
also implies that its enemy is certainty—a knowledge that is convinced it has arrived at 
the proper ordering of the universal encyclopedia. For this chapter’s epigraph 
“summarizes Eco’s attitude to cultural ideologies. The demystifying aspect of laughter 
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works in him as an anti-fanatical and anti-dogmatic element of both psychological 
liberation and social affirmation.”561  
Narrativizing theories can be concrete, certain, and embodied in the most 
deplorable of ways—according, of course, to universal, Western encyclopedias. And, as 
Eco suggests, one of the only ways to disarm certainty is through a laughter or humor 
understood in the context of an aesthetics of ambiguity. It is this chapter’s goal, in the 
end, to not only summarize my work in a concluding fashion, but also to express humor’s 
role in ambiguity. 
A Summary 
In Chapter One, I set out to introduce ambiguity, religious aesthetics, and the need 
for putting both in conversation with Plate and Eco. I situated ambiguity in its larger 
academic discourse. I broke it into three parts and claimed that there is a literary, 
philosophical, and scientific ambiguity. The first can be summarized as a lexeme having 
two or more lexical entries or a word or cultural artifact capable of being understood in 
two or more ways. For many, this is the root of creative language, as poesis is playing 
with polysemy. It is important to remember, however, that ambiguity is not vague or 
unclear communication, but rather an awareness of the potentiality of a given word or 
sentence. It is through ambiguity, understood in this manner, that I am able to employ 
metaphor, make new connections, and expand both knowledge and worldview.  
The central question that literary ambiguity now sets itself, according to Susanne 
Winkler, is how do the tools that are used in the construction of the text influence the 
                                                
561 Cf. Cristina Farronato, Eco’s Chaosmos: From the Middle Ages to Postmodernity (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 124. 
 
 
238 
interpretation of the reader? In other words, literary ambiguity seeks to address the 
problem of multiple interpretations coexisting at the same time. Following from this, 
Winkler proposes a grid through which one can study the phenomena of literary 
ambiguity. Does ambiguity occur in the production or perception of a given percept? Is 
ambiguity—produced or perceived—strategic or nonstrategic? For Winkler and others, 
this resulted in four potentialities: 1) strategic production, 2) nonstrategic production, 3) 
strategic perception, and 4) nonstrategic perception. Throughout my work then, I 
explored the strategic production of ambiguity in literary texts. Because, as Winkler 
writes, “literary texts lend themselves extremely well to examining the functions of 
ambiguity.”562  
I concluded my section on literary ambiguity by briefly examining the work of 
Christoph Bode, and his notion that “the aesthetics of ambiguity offers access to 
<<meaning as an event>>, to the experience of experience.”563 This was important 
because it prepared a way for the introduction of Eco’s idea of ambiguity and the 
capacity of experience to call into question my cultural categories and concepts while 
also simultaneously probing the boundaries of that which I define as “reality.” 
In the following section, I tackled philosophical ambiguity in general and analytic 
ambiguity in particular, the latter of which analyzes lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic 
ambiguities. Lexical ambiguity is having more than one entry in the lexicon for a lexeme. 
                                                
562 Susanne Winkler, Ambiguity: Language and Communication (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 
2015), 18. 
563 Christoph Bode, “The Aesthetics of Ambiguity,” in Actas Del XII Congreso Nacional de La 
Asociacion Espanola de Estudios Anglo-Norteamericanos (Alicante 19-22 Dez. 1988, 1991), 82–3. 
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Syntactic ambiguity occurs when there are many Logical Forms that correspond to the 
same sentence. Pragmatic ambiguity deals with both speech acts and truth conditional 
pragmatics. As far as analytic philosophy is concerned, Logical Forms are the area that 
hold the most promise for theories of ambiguity.  
In the end, however, I turned my attention to John D. Caputo’s metaphysics of 
ambiguity and his idea that ambiguity is “the condition that makes meaning possible by 
making pure and unambiguous meaning impossible.”564 While Caputo foreshadowed my 
later exploration of provisionality, he also connected to what I examine at the end of this 
chapter—humor’s role in an aesthetics of ambiguity. Certainty, in other words, is a 
byproduct of ambiguity that refuses to account for the potentiality of the encyclopedia. 
Ambiguity is a constant reminder to analytic philosophy that its quest for clear, 
unadulterated meaning, while admirable, is ultimately quixotic. 
Turning my attention to scientific ambiguity, I argued that clarity and precision 
are good and necessary values. When I take Claritin to fend off seasonal allergies, I take 
comfort in knowing that my little white pills are appropriately measured and are not 
going to result in an overdose and subsequent trip to the emergency room. But “science,” 
as modern societies have anthropomorphized it, is better understood as an encyclopedia 
that contains cultural units, interpretants, and unlimited semiosis. Science, in other words, 
is ambiguous. It is rife with paradigm shifts, emergence, and indeterminacy. It is a fiction 
that seeks, through explanation, to map an ordered viewed of the world onto reality.  
                                                
564 John D. Caputo, “In Praise of Ambiguity,” in Ambiguity in the Western Mind, eds. Craig J. N. 
de Paulo, Patrick Messina, and Marc Stier (New York: Peter Lang, 2005): 20. 
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Examples of science as ambiguous are found in the quantum revolution, Thomas 
Kuhn’s “anomaly,”565 and the theories of chaos and information. It is also realized in 
theoretical physics and the boundary between science and philosophy or metaphysics.566 
But ambiguity also appears in everyday science and is exemplified in the conclusion of 
one recent study that seeks to articulate the ways in which literature evokes changes in 
physical dispositions.567 In this study, which was thoroughly researched and documented, 
the authors write:  
We have argued that, on balance, our results should be interpreted as a causal 
sequence in which the emotional response to a film influences pain threshold 
(interpreted as a signal of endorphin activation), and that this in turn influences 
the sense of bondedness. There are, of course, two other possible causal models. 
One is that the causal logic is reversed . . . The other is that an emotionally 
arousing film can influence bondedness indirectly via pain threshold changes as 
well as directly (although the mechanism for this remains unclear) . . . There 
remains a question as to whether the greater increase in pain threshold (and hence 
the putative endorphin effect) in the experimental condition could be attributed to 
an effect of taking the test in groups, such that individuals become more 
competitive against each other in the post-viewing test.568 
                                                
565 Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996) and Roald Hoffmann, The Same and Not the Same (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995). The latter is a study of ambiguity from the perspective of chemistry.  
566 Cf. Martin Meisel, Chaos Imagined: Literature, Art, Science (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2016); N. Katherine Hayles, “Turbulence in Literature and Science: Questions of Influence,” in 
American Literature and Science, ed. Robert Scholnick, 229–50 (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010); Michel Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, ed. Josue V. Harari and David 
F. Bell (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983); Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, 
Time, and the Texture of Reality (New York: Vintage, 2005, The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and 
the Deep Laws of the Cosmos (New York: Vintage, 2011), The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden 
Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010); Lee 
Smolin, Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe (New York: Mariner 
Books, 2014); Marcelo Gleiser, The Island of Knowledge: The Limits of Science and the Search for 
Meaning. New York: Basic, 2014); Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
567 R. I. M. Dunbar, Ben Teasdale, Jackie Thompson, Felix Budelmann, Sophie Duncan, Evert van 
Emde Boas, and Laurie Maguire, “Emotional Arousal When Watching Drama Increases Pain Threshold 
and Social Bonding,” Royal Society Open Science 3, no. 9 (2016): 160–288. 
568 Ibid., 9–10. Italics are mine.  
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I am in no way disparaging this particular study. But what I am pointing out is that even 
after all of the authors’ data collection and explanation, they were still unsure as to the 
possible cause of the effect that they were studying. While in many ways this admittance 
is a best practice in the sciences, it also raises the question of all such studies including a 
similar caveat. “We think we know,” in other words, “but we cannot be certain.” 
The scientific ambiguity that I articulated in Chapter One, however, was 
multistability, symmetry breaking, and Giuseppe Caglioti’s coexistence incompatibility, 
which is the “simultaneous presence of two aspects of reality that are incompatible with 
each other.”569 Moving forward, this was the notion of ambiguity that I employed as an 
operative framework when analyzing Eco’s theory of aesthetic ambiguity in Chapter 
Two. Through introducing scientific ambiguity, I claimed that Eco had more in common 
with scientific, perceptual ambiguity than either the literary or philosophical variety, 
though both are present in Eco’s work. 
Turning my attention to religious aesthetics and Plate’s materiality, I explored the 
roots of aesthetics as aisthesis (perception by the senses),570 τεχνή (craft, skill, or 
technical trade), ποιήσις (making, creation, or the poetic arts), and τὸ καλόν (beautiful, 
useful, or good). Sprouting from the Greek, aesthetics came to refer to theories of 
perception, cognition, or knowledge and theories of art, the Beautiful, or literature. Not to 
                                                
569 Paolo Fenoglio, “Preface to the Italian Edition,” in The Dynamics of Ambiguity, Guiseppe 
Caglioti (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), xv. Cf. Guiseppe Caglioti, 
“Perception of Ambiguous Figures: A Qualitative Model Based on Synergetics and Quantum Mechanics,” 
in Ambiguity in Mind and Nature, eds. by Peter Kruse and Michael Stadler (Heidelberg, Germany: 
Springer, 1995), 463–78. 
570 Alexander Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. 
Holther (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954). 
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be outdone, however, I also examined the rich tradition of theological and religious 
aesthetics that considers the role that the senses play in divine revelation,571 as well as, 
more recently, the materiality of religious practices.572  
For my purposes, it was important not only to define religious aesthetics, but also 
to explain the move that Plate made towards the material, why it was useful, and how 
ambiguity enlivens it. To this end, I defined two types of religious aesthetics—
transcendental religious aesthetics and material religious aesthetics—the one is 
epitomized by Hans Urs von Balthasar and the other by S. Brent Plate. The former 
engages the categories of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good, and considers how these 
transcendentals illuminate divine revelation. In its more contemporary versions, however, 
the operative transcendental religious aesthetic seeks to place a transcendental into 
conversation with culture, power, or identity. Frank Burch Brown’s “neo-aesthetics” 
exemplifies this approach.573 A transcendental religious aesthetic, in this way, focuses on 
neither religion nor art, but rather an integration of the two that has the power to 
formulate a theological ethic, which is preeminently concerned with how either God 
                                                
571 Cf. Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988); Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics 
(San Francisco and New York: Ignatius Press, 1983–1991); Jeremy Begbie, Voicing Creation’s Praise: 
Towards a Theology of the Arts (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991).  
572 S. Brent Plate, A History of Religion in 5½ Objects: Bringing the Spiritual to Its Senses 
(Boston: Beacon, 2015); S. Brent Plate, “The Skin of Religion: Aesthetic Mediations of the Sacred. 
Crosscurrents 62, no. 2 (June 2012): 162–80; S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion, and Aesthetics: 
Rethinking Religion Through the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2005); Manuel A. Vasquez, More Than 
Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Though not religious 
studies scholars, this trend towards materiality can also be seen, to name a few, in Bill Brown, A Sense of 
Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) and Bruno 
Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2010). 
573 Frank Burch Brown, Religious Aesthetics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), 13. 
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illuminates experience or experience engages, appropriates, or symbiotically relates to 
God. 
In carving out a niche for the aesthetics of ambiguity, I found little worth 
engaging in the transcendental camp. The latter, however, was a different story. 
Eschewing the transcendentals by articulating the desire “to see a religious aesthetic that 
does not take as its starting and ending point, Beauty, Truth, or God,”574 I found much 
with which to wrestle in a material, religious aesthetic. In Plate’s conception of 
aesthetics, there is both an aesthetica naturalis and aesthetica artificialis that roughly 
corresponds to what I call the material and the semiotic—things perceived and things 
known. Between the two is the skinscape, which is an-other place, “a dialectic between 
material culture and the human creative activities of religious practice.”575 A welcome 
move away from the transcendentals, I argued that a material aesthetic accounts for 
plurivocality in sense perception and meaning making, holds together both the material 
and semiotic worlds, and suggests new possibilities.   
Having engaged both transcendental and material religious aesthetics, I defined 
religious aesthetics as an approach to aesthetic theory that accounts for the meaning 
making processes—the commitments and narratives—of humans, grounded in the 
everyday, but takes into consideration the unknowable more, a provisional exploration 
into the meanings that humans create. In the end, I defined ambiguity as coexistent 
                                                
574 S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion, and Aesthetics: Rethinking Religion Through the 
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incompatibility. I carved out a niche in religious aesthetics that moved towards 
materiality without eschewing semiotics. And I defined religious aesthetics as the 
provisional exploration into the commitments and narratives that humans subjunctively 
embody. 
In Chapter Two, I turned my attention to Umberto Eco and his theory of 
ambiguity. The goal was both to situate Eco’s theory within his larger corpus and to 
clarify my own thinking in regards to ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility. To start, I 
looked at Eco’s The Open Work, and ambiguity’s birth in information theory, which, 
according to Eco, “calculates the quantity of information contained in a particular 
message.”576 If “quantity of information” is understood as surprise, then it is only a short 
leap from information theory to aesthetics. When I am confronted by a text that calls into 
question the rules of the code—through surprise, excess, or rupture—then I can be sure 
that I am dealing with an ambiguity informed by information theory.  
The same can be said of aesthetics as sense perception, and encountering a 
percept or event that does not sync with an encyclopedia. On this side of aesthetics, I 
know I am dealing with ambiguity when I am confronted by something to which I have 
no corresponding category. It is key that a receiver selects from a probable field or set of 
cultural units and could, in fact, select otherwise. An aesthetics of ambiguity as sense 
perception sets out to highlight that which is otherwise, again, not with a telos of rupture, 
but so that any given cultural system stretches, grows, evolves, and, most importantly, is 
revealed as a selection. For Eco, foreshadowing my notion of choice, the aesthetics of 
                                                
576Umberto Eco, “Openness, Information, Communication,” in The Open Work, trans. Anna 
Cancogni (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 45. 
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ambiguity resulted in perception being a “form of commitment” in that there are 
“different ways in which one can commit oneself or refuse to commit oneself.”577 
Aesthetics, rooted in information theory, and seen as a violation of the rules of the 
code has two important consequences. One, ambiguity ruptures and then expands any 
given cultural code. Two, ambiguity highlights perception as commitment. Both 
instances furthered my notion of coexistent incompatibility and laid the groundwork for 
Part II, where I eventually argued that surprise creates self-reflexivity and perceptual 
commitment leads to choice as aesthetic judgment.  
Turning my attention to the encyclopedia, I claimed that the encyclopedia is best 
understood as a collection or web of world knowledge that is filled with cultural units 
circumscribed by numerous interpretants. Utilizing Peirce’s unlimited semiosis, I 
discussed the phenomenon of making connections across the web, which are often 
disparate and unconnected outside the chain of interpretants that either I or a culture give 
it. This leaping from cultural unit to unit should always tell me something more, not else, 
about the unit from which I started making inferences.  
The encyclopedia, I continued, does not register the truth, but rather “what has 
been said about the truth or what has been believed to be true as well as what has been 
believed to be false or imaginary or legendary.”578 At its most general or universal level, 
the encyclopedia is the “sum total of everything ever said by humankind.”579 Introducing 
                                                
577 Ibid., 82. 
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tiered encyclopedias, however, I discussed the way in which local encyclopedias ratify 
upwards into more general encyclopedias.580 It is when local encyclopedias seek to make 
themselves actualized at more universal levels or when any encyclopedia is taken as 
natural that ideology is produced and, in fact, lays the groundwork for ambiguity. 
Poetic texts, echoing Winkler’s strategic production, utilize the encyclopedia by 
intentionally taking aim and seeking to destroy the most unchallengeable assumptions of 
any given culture. They can also, however, make new, unforeseen connections that result 
in a polydimensional network of possibility that changes the nature of the universal 
encyclopedia.581 
Given both information theory and the encyclopedia then, I argued that ambiguity 
is an encounter with that which, though relying on a preexistent order (code or 
encyclopedia), allows me either to see something new in the preexistent order, an 
opening, or to create something altogether unforeseen from the matter of that which came 
before. This is different from coexistent incompatibility, which is a superposition of an 
encounter with an aesthetic object or percept. In my conception, clarified by both surprise 
and encyclopedia, ambiguity is less a violation or challenge and more of an awareness of 
                                                
580 It is important to stress that “tiered” does not necessarily mean hierarchical, but rather more 
general.  
581 A wonderful example of this can be found in Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok, eds. The 
Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 204: “Two 
different kinds of abduction: the former starts from one or more surprising particular facts and ends at the 
hypothesis of a general law (this seems to be the case of all scientific discoveries), while the latter starts 
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supposed to be the cause of the former (this seems to be the case of criminal detection) . . . One can say that 
the first type concerns the nature of universes and the second one concerns the nature of texts. I mean by 
‘universes,’ intuitively, worlds such as the one which scientists use to explain the laws, by ‘text’ a coherent 
series of propositions, linked together by a common topic or theme . . .  I think that the general mechanism 
of abduction can be made clear only if we assume that we deal with universes as if they were texts and with 
texts as if they were universes.”  
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the potentialities of cognition and interpretation. As such, it has the potential to expose 
the rules by which any culture collapses from plurality to univocality. Ambiguity as 
coexistent incompatibility, I argued, also re-articulates Plate’s skinscape as not only that 
which is liminal, but also as a space of sought after uncertainty. It is, in other words, that 
place in which I refrain from judgment.  
Moving on, I summarized Eco’s A Theory of Semiotics in order to clarify 
ambiguity’s role within it. I claimed that signification necessarily relates to the cultural 
code and the way in which I decode any given message, while communication discusses 
the various ways in which any society or person constructs or creates its signs. To 
communicate is to assume that there is a probabilistic code or encyclopedia by which any 
message can be decoded or understood, and that this code or encyclopedia is filled with 
what Eco calls cultural units, which is the content to which any expression refers. This 
content is circumscribed, in Peircean fashion, by other content units that both facilitate 
definition and metaphor. Cultural codes tell me what expressions and contents (cultural 
units) I can and cannot match up for the purposes of sign production or concrete 
communication. 
Aesthetics, in regards to Eco’s semiotics, is a manipulation of the expression-
plane with the intended result being a reassessment of the content-plane.582 I speak, in 
other words, to call into question the encyclopedia. One can study aesthetics then, and 
this is important, to study all the aspects of sign-functions. An aesthetic text, like The 
Prague Cemetery, is the appropriate place to explore the consequences of ambiguity, 
                                                
582 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 261. 
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which, as I have already suggested, is both a violation of and challenge to the 
encyclopedias of culture. 
Summing up semiotics and ambiguity, I connected Eco to Winkler’s 
contemporary theory of ambiguity, and suggested that the Echian variety is an act of 
communication that is strategically produced, which enables the receiver to potentially 
view the world in a way different from the standard ways of viewing. This led me to 
claim that ambiguity also produces further knowledge because it compels one to rethink 
the usual codes and their possibilities. This “further knowledge” is ascertained by what 
Eco calls “aesthetic abduction,” proposing tentative codes to make the author’s message 
understandable but which the reader will not know directly. 
In Chapter Two then, I defined ambiguity as both space and encounter. It is a 
space wherein an aesthete refrains from judgment so that she can more fully acknowledge 
the plurivocality or potentiality of a given percept. It is an encounter with that which 
forces upon an aesthete the factuality of many, equiprobable realities. Ambiguity does 
not, however, provide a way forward. It is neither map nor guide. It is a hesitancy, a 
refusal to judge or, better yet, a position from which one can foresee the infinite 
possibilities of a possible future or ordering. Whereas Plate speaks of a skinscape, a 
mediating position halfway between the semiosphere and the material world, I articulated 
a nodal point in a network, from which I can foresee the many, possible paths of traversal 
without yet committing to one over against another. All are coexistent but, once chosen, 
incompatible.  
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A material religious aesthetic informed by an ambiguity seen as coexistent 
incompatibility would begin to articulate the possibility, given a set of cultural 
probabilities, that any percept potentially holds. A religious aesthetics informed by 
ambiguity would not view religious objects, rituals, or embodiments as univocalities. To 
do so, like von Balthasar, would be a labor of ideology. Ambiguity is concerned then 
with the ways in which religious aesthetics not only views or engages its subject matter 
as instances of violation, challenge, or further knowledge, but also as a coexistent 
incompatibility that has the potential either to create or highlight religious commitments 
and narratives as they mutually exist as polyvocal percepts. A religious aesthetic rooted 
in ambiguity would not only examine this phenomenon but also those narratives that 
allow any observer to choose one vocality over another. 
In Chapter Three, I posited that there is no one reality, but rather a multiplicity of 
possibilities overlying one another. An individual or a community makes or chooses one 
over the other by employing a fluid and dynamic encyclopedia. Another individual or 
community, however, could choose differently and instantiate a reality that exists 
simultaneously as an entangled universe. The question that arose was the possibility of 
employing a non-judgmental aesthetics that defers choice in order to remain in the state 
of ambiguity—not indefinitely, but so as to analyze the various, equiprobable paths. 
Ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility, I argued, is not a way out of subjectivity, but 
rather an admission that individual and collective representations of reality are the sum of 
all that is. And furthermore, that those representations are not outside the scope of 
interrogation. 
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After arguing for my definition of ambiguity, I then took steps to confine or 
articulate the boundaries of equiprobability. How do I choose, in other words, between 
one reality or encyclopedia and another? In order to answer this question, I examined 
Eco’s use of Peirce’s Firstness, Dynamic Object, and lines of resistance, as well as his 
essay “On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language.”583 I 
argued that any interpretation assumes a that-which-is-to-be-interpreted. There is 
something that induces me to produce signs. There is a thing, and I cannot know it 
outside the potentialities of my encyclopedia, which exist coextensively with other 
constructions of reality. I cannot know it, but it is there, pushing back, and instigating my 
interpretations of it. 
Chapter Three continued by elucidating Eco’s contractual realism, which is a 
negotiation (a word that arises in Part II as well) between the encyclopedia and the 
material world. If there is the Dynamical Object on one side and the encyclopedia on the 
other, then it is I who sits between, mutually interpreting and entangling the two, but 
always arriving back at that which started my inferential walk. When the poet arrives, 
however, her job is to reveal or redirect my attention to Peircean Firstness as if it were 
not mediated by Thirdness. She desires to crawl backwards “to persuade us to reckon 
with being,” even if, ultimately, being as Firstness cannot be known.584 This, ultimately, 
led to a surplus of interpretation, which, utilizing Winkler’s contemporary ambiguity 
theory, would point towards a poetic ambiguity that is both produced and strategic. The 
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poets—aesthetes of ambiguity—continually invite me into the task of recognizing the 
constructions I make of the world and the way in which I embody them “as if” they were 
reality. Given this unmasking, new potentialities arise for creating the world anew from 
the matter at hand—a world not ex nihilo but palimpsestuous.  
I concluded Chapter Three’s section on Eco and Peirce but introducing the 
concept of the “line of resistance,” which is that which is already given.585 This “already 
given” is neither completed nor finished, but it is a pure Limit or a pure No. Imagine 
pouring water over the surface of a coarse piece of wood. The water falls into the cracks 
and must, without exception, flow through the crags that are already given. “Wood,” the 
water might say, “change the trajectory of the crack that I am currently flowing through.” 
To which the wood can only say, “No.” This is the line of resistance to which even an 
aesthetics of ambiguity must account for or be responsible to. 
Connecting Peirce, Eco, and Plate, I wrote that a materially oriented religious 
aesthetic that takes ambiguity seriously would not only side with Plate in his desire to 
eschew Beauty, Truth, and God, but also it would approach the material realm as 
qualified by Peirce and Eco. The objects that I touch, taste, see, smell, and hear are 
Dynamical Objects known through representamens, Immediate Objects, and 
interpretants. What my senses engage is a line of resistance, an already given, that—
through ambiguity—has the potential to violate, challenge, and produce further 
knowledge. And perhaps most importantly, ambiguity reminds me that I am accountable 
to a reality, even if that reality is a co-constructed project maintained and policed by the 
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community in which I find myself. And yet, ambiguity, even then, has the potential to 
open, interrogate, and expand that very same community. 
I then explored Eco’s essay, “On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic 
Messages in an Edenic Language.” What Eco’s essay showed was that aesthetic 
messages are generated through contradiction and, as such, result in a rethought 
embodiment of the cultural code. It showed how ambiguity works and, placing it in 
Winkler’s frame, is both produced and strategic. Eco’s Eden also revealed the process of 
ambiguity wherein form (as material) shapes the content (as idea), even as the content 
(cultural unit) shapes the form (expression). In this ever and ongoing aesthetic process of 
ambiguity, potentialities emerge that were previously outside the scope of the already 
given encyclopedia and material artifact. Connecting this both to Plate’s skinscape and 
my coexistent incompatibility, I was able to argue that the plurivocality of this process 
defers aesthetic judgment in such a way that, standing in the intersection of aesthetic 
experience, many possibilities are seen, acknowledged, and exposed as judgments of 
choice.  
In the end, I defined ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility, which violates, 
challenges, and produces further knowledge. It is accountable to a reality, but not 
irreducibly so, as it also has the potential for opening significations of the material world. 
And finally, ambiguity is strategically produced and employed through creative 
contradictions in the already given cultural encyclopedia. In fact, I can even say that 
ambiguous contradictions in the code not only transform and expand it, but also change 
the material world, not just my perceptions of it. 
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Any aesthetic judgment of reality is a synchronic snapshot of that which is 
presented to me, which exists alongside and overlaps with an infinity of simultaneous 
snapshots. If ambiguity as encounter moves me into ambiguity as state (Plate’s 
skinscape), then it is there that the possibility exists to interrogate, transform, or renew 
my aesthetic judgments, insofar as they are judgments of narratival or world construction. 
I cannot maintain the (non-judgmental) skinscape of coexistent incompatibility 
indefinitely, however, and so must, at some point, “collapse” the state, choose, and travel 
a path. I traverse, analogously, one networked connection among many, though all are 
equally viable. Hopping from node to node, when I encounter ambiguity, I can stop, 
critique my position, and possibly alter my direction. In doing so, I have not only 
rearranged the network, but also the node in which I exist. 
 In Chapter Four, I followed the life of Captain Simone Simonini, the protagonist 
of The Prague Cemetery,586 and showed the ways in which narratives are both 
constructed and embodied, and the role of ambiguity in such narratives. I argued that The 
Prague Cemetery, read through ambiguity, is one instance wherein I could see the 
construction, destruction, and liminality of provisional knowledge, because it not only 
revealed the narrativization of reality but also represented, “the proof that fiction and 
reality can function together and that any fiction, once recorded, is able to create its own 
reality.”587   
                                                
586 Umberto Eco, The Prague Cemetery, trans. Richard Dixon (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011). 
587 Anca Andriescu Garcia, “Inventing the Enemy. When Propaganda Becomes History,” 
Philologica 5, no. 1 (January 2013): 65; and Capozzi, “Revisiting History,” 625. 
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 After summarizing the plot, I turned my attention to three pericopes of Simonini’s 
young life, in order to show the ways in which his cultural units were constructed, 
arranged, and embodied. The cultural units in question—shaped by his mother, 
grandfather, and father—were <<Woman>>, <<Jew>>, and <<Jesuit>>, all of which 
were stored in his encyclopedia and retrieved later in life to help him formulate The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Manipulating the populace, similar to the way in which 
he was manipulated by his family, Simonini wielded his own form of poetic power. He 
was able to shape the cultural encyclopedia out of the deplorable local encyclopedia that 
he had learned. In this way, <<Women>> were seductresses, <<Jews>> were sinister, 
and <<Jesuits>> were hypocritical pedophiles all contributing to the universal plot to 
overtake the world.  
And where was Simonini? He was outside of the encyclopedia pulling the strings 
of history, or so he thought. What he failed to realize was that his encyclopedia, too, was 
constructed, organized, and maneuvered in such a way that his narrative was already 
written. And it was that failure—his failure of self-reflection—that led Simonini to 
overlook his encounter with ambiguity and his confrontation with choice. Outside of 
Turin’s ghetto, Simonini confronted a young Jewish woman. She was striking. His 
encyclopedia was challenged, and presented him with an opportunity for rearrangement. 
But the Turin episode quickly devolved, Simonini rejected ambiguity, and the rest was 
history. 
What the Turin episode showed is that even someone like Simonini can be 
confronted with ambiguity and either choose to accept or reject it. When a confrontation 
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with a line of resistance happens, when an already given encyclopedia is confronted with 
that which is ambiguous, then my already arranged, as-if narrative has the potential to be 
unmasked as provisional. It is in that moment, in that space of ambiguity, that the 
possibility for choosing differently arises. I can traverse alternative paths. I can construct 
my encyclopedia otherwise. I can, through abduction, negotiate a new narrative that will, 
until I stumble upon another line of resistance, remain provisional.  
Simonini not only encounters ambiguity, I argued, but is also ambiguous himself, 
to me, the reader. As I confronted Simonini, I had to make my own choices, my own 
acceptance or rejection of Simonini’s effort to ratify the universal encyclopedia. Viewing 
him as ambiguous, I pieced together my own cultural units, arrangements, and aesthetic 
judgments in regard to that which I consider outside the boundary of appropriate human 
culture. But, as Eco suggested, approaching Simonini as an ambiguous event allowed me 
to understand my own fundamentalism better.588   
If religious aesthetics, as I conceived of it, allowed me to peel back the layers of 
an embodied, as-if narrative and its encounter with the world of things, then it was also 
an exercise in understanding. This understanding was not a stamp of approval, however. 
It was a negotiation in the ambiguous, cultural world of encyclopedias. Simonini’s choice 
was abhorrent, but a choice nevertheless. And it was this choice, and my willingness to 
condemn it, that revealed the judgmental side of ambiguity.  
I ended Chapter Four then, by posing the question: How is it that I could choose 
one narrative? What allowed me to call one encyclopedic arrangement abhorrent over 
                                                
588 Umberto Eco, Turning Back the Clock: Hot Wars and Media Populism, trans. Alastair 
McEwen (New York: Mariner, 2008), 244. 
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against another, equiprobable arrangement? I found that it was because of my reliance on 
my own arranged, as-if narrative and the community of interpreters in which I found 
myself. To put it differently, I argued that there is no standard of judgment that stands 
outside of all encyclopedias, and that accountability and responsibility are rooted in the 
choices of ratification. 
In Chapter Five, I tackled narrativizing theories. This allowed me to examine 
concepts that I had referred to throughout this work but had not yet made explicit. Among 
them were Fact, self-reflexivity, choice, provisionality, negotiation, and ratification. I did 
this by analyzing two of Eco’s works: Six Walks in the Fictional Woods and Inventing the 
Enemy.589 I argued that all knowledge is organized, limited, and idiosyncratic, and once 
confronted by ambiguity, provisional.  
One question I answered, which doubled as a helpful summary of the process of 
ambiguity, was what is the difference between theory and narrative? The former arranges 
the latter in an ongoing process but overlap in that ordering and embodiment is never a 
two-way street with a separating median. The process of ambiguity is an entangled, 
overlying network that is dynamic, connected, and simultaneous. I intuit, order, and 
narrativize in a tangled jumble of simultaneity. And it is that very simultaneity that 
allows me to not only account for ambiguity in “real time” but also to recognize my 
judgments as provisional. 
                                                
589 Umberto Eco, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994) and Umberto Eco, Inventing the Enemy: And Other Occasional Writings, trans. Richard Dixon (New 
York: Mariner, 2011). 
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It was my argument that this process mirrors the way in which religious aesthetics 
should seek to understand the role of embodied narratives in the lives of human 
practitioners. If Eco’s novel is the matter to his theory as encyclopedia, then I conjectured 
that his theories and narratives shuttle back and forth in a way similar to the entangled 
simultaneity of the semiotic and material worlds. I argued, finally, that ambiguity exposes 
the way in which knowledge and realities are constructed and arranged, in so far as the 
event of ambiguity leads to a state of ambiguity (better understood together as the process 
of ambiguity) in which I can analyze potentialities—or, to put it differently, how a 
religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge 
and the narrativization of reality. 
The key to my section on Six Walks in the Fictional Woods was that Simonini 
should be situated in the larger argument of that work. We all, Eco argues, map fictions 
onto reality. Simonini is no different than you or I in that regard. The question is how 
does one judge between one fictional map and another? For Eco, and an aesthetics of 
ambiguity, the answer was that narratival analysis enables me to understand the 
mechanisms by which fictions shape life, which constitutes a form of therapy against the 
sleep of reason that generates monsters.590 I suggested that if I could understand how 
encyclopedias are arranged and embodied, then I might also be able to participate in the 
correction or revealing of the dominant, oppressive, or ill-conceived narratives that shape 
a shared reality. Ambiguity is always self-reflexive, however, and so every analysis is 
also a questioning of the self and the rules by which I judge, embody, and analyze. This 
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allowed me to introduce Eco’s work on translation and negotiations, and the way in 
which community’s ratify knowledge, new or otherwise, into their encyclopedias. 
My final section on Inventing the Enemy, asked the question: What happens once 
the data has been collected and reported, the theory has been narrativized, and the final 
story has been told? It was my argument that “Inventing the Enemy” is analogous to the 
ways in which narratival arrangements of cultural encyclopedias are embodied in the 
world of things. And by examining it, I better understood the full process of intuition, 
cognition, and embodiment, which is continuous, fluid, and dynamic. In an ever-
continuing aesthetic process then, I encounter, I arrange, I negotiate, I narrativize, and I 
embody, even as any of those steps might usurp its place and begin the process anew 
from a new perspectival location. 
“Inventing the Enemy,” in other words, exemplified the process of ambiguity, in 
that enemy creation is a manipulation of the encyclopedia in order to construct difference 
and foreignness in the world of things.591 Thinking back to Part I, I could say that the 
enemy, to a given cultural encyclopedia, is high in information or surprise and, hence, 
ambiguity. An enemy will often, if not always, call into question the encyclopedia of 
those confronting it. 
Ambiguity’s call for self-reflexivity then, necessarily implied both provisionality 
and negotiation. When I confront the other as ambiguous, I am able to reflect upon my 
own encyclopedia and cultural units <<difference>>, <<foreign>>, or <<enemy>>. In 
doing so, I recognize that knowledge, cultural or scientific, is provisional, which then 
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allows me to negotiate a new cultural unit with different interpretants. Confronting that 
which is different instigates the aesthetic process of ambiguity then that results in either a 
reorganization of the cultural encyclopedia or the rejection of ambiguity as a form of 
epistemological growth. 
Through Six Walks in the Fictional Woods and Inventing the Enemy, I was able to 
summarize not only my interpretation of Simone Simonini, but also my conception of an 
aesthetics of ambiguity. Between the encyclopedia, ratification, choice, and Fact with a 
capital “F,” I suggested both the importance of provisionality and the limits of intuition. 
Through these criteria I was able to judge Simonini’s encyclopedic and embodied 
arrangement. But as I encountered Simonini as despicable, I self-reflexively recognized 
him as ambiguous. I noticed, too, that I maintained a provisional encyclopedia that is in 
flux, provisional, and riddled with its own failings. 
 
THE COMPOSER 
VI 
“This,” Gina pointed to her MacBook, “is garbage. I gave you a direct order, from 
Patrick no less, to write a piece that was accessible. That zipped with conspiracy. I 
wanted Dan Brown, and instead I got Edward Abernathy and whatever the hell this 
is.” She took a deep breath. “What do you have to say for yourself?”  
I slumped in my chair.  
“Do you know how many clicks we got, Ed? Do you?” 
“I’m optimistic.” 
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“Seven hundred and thirty two, Ed. Seven hundred. That’s it. How am I 
supposed to justify this crap to corporate?” 
“Don’t. Look,” I shifted in my seat, “I just got caught up in Martynov’s world. 
It was entirely my fault. I’ll take the blame. I’ll go to Patrick and—” 
“Oh, no you won’t, Ed. Because you no longer have a job. As of today, I’m 
revoking your credentials. You went too far this time. The Telescope needed a pick 
up, and you made it a laughing stock. ‘Antipode.’ ‘From which.’ Did you forget 
everything—” 
The door swung open. Patrick walked in, graceful as ever. He sat on the edge 
of Gina’s desk, hands in his Westmancott pockets. “Well,” he started, “that was an 
interesting read.”  
I looked to Gina, a chum amongst whales.  
“Patrick,” she smiled, “so nice of you to join us. I was just telling—” 
“Here’s the thing, Ed. I agree with you. With all of it. Martynov was a man 
ahead of his time. And, quite frankly, one from which we have much to learn. But 
clicks matter. And do you know why?” 
“Advertisers.” 
“That’s right. I don’t give damn about our readers or their intellectual 
stimulation. If they want that, they can read Diletsky. But us, The Telescope, we’re 
not in the business of curious excursuses. We have a standard and an expectation to 
which we must conform. And if we can’t do that, then we fail, Ed. You fail.” 
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He had a point. I had mistaken my audience. Ambiguity was a thing I couldn’t 
afford. There was a formula for this kind of thing, and I had forgotten it. Journalism 
101. 
I stood. “I’ll see myself out.” 
At the door, rising to an unexpected level of stupidity, I turned. “But here’s 
the thing, Patrick, Martynov instigated a discourse that proceeded him. He wanted to 
get people talking, to offer up their own composition. He wanted his audience to 
complete his work, to provide their own meaning. He desired to invent a thing with 
no beginning, to situate others in the already.”  
I stepped further into the room before continuing.  
“He offered his audience an alternate vision—one that they participated in 
crafting—one that they could choose over against the prevailing winds of the day. 
Don’t you see? How could I write of Martynov and not emulate him?” 
Silence filled the room.  
Patrick rose off his corner perch. Glancing at Gina, he then looked at me. 
“There’s no reason for you to lose your job over this, Ed. Not if you don’t want to. 
I’ll give you one more chance. Rewrite the piece, given the parameters we’ve set for 
you, and submit it by the end of the week. You’re a writer, after all. Follow 
directions, and get it done.” 
——— 
I left the office, hopped on the “Q,” and walked the final three blocks to the 
library. I loved the city. The anonymity of it.  
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The sounds of construction swirled around me as I ascended the steps. I found 
a table in a remote corner of an empty, echoing hall.   
I pulled out my laptop.  
The cursor blinked, toying with my anxiety. I couldn’t afford any wasted time. 
I had a deadline to meet.  
I closed my eyes, something I often did when writing, and stroked the keys.  
The cover up was easy, I wrote. It took the Tsar little effort to wave his ringed 
hand and banish a man to Siberia, condemning him to death. The man was Zuravel 
Ostrava Martynov, a man you’ve never heard of. He was innocent of his accused 
crimes, but what did that matter to those in power? Martynov had played a 
dangerous game—and lost.  
 
Wit and Humor in an Aesthetics of Ambiguity 
Ambiguity is many things. And while it would be easy to assume that ambiguity 
is pregnant with matters both serious and grave—the ground of meaning, choice and 
responsibility, or even coexistent incompatibility—it is poorer if understood in only those 
terms. When I confront Simonini as ambiguous, and I run through the process of self-
reflexivity, I reveal my own epistemological provisionality. My need for negotiation and 
ratification. But this does little for Simonini or those hell-bent on a destructive and 
dogmatic certainty. It does little, in fact, for that liberal scholar who is equally entrenched 
in her position. Ambiguity cannot force self-reflexivity any more than it can require a 
healthy awareness of one’s own provisionality.  
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But what ambiguity can do, especially Winkler’s strategic and produced variety, 
is reveal the codes that dominate any ideology.  It can accomplish this through wit, 
humor, and even an epistemological willingness to hold ontologies lightly. Ambiguity as 
playful—nowhere better explicated than in Eco’s essay, “On Truth. A Fiction.”592—
connects to narrativizing theories through Brian McHale’s work on postmodernity. For 
him and Thomas Pavel, ontologies are theoretical descriptions of universes.593 “An 
ontology is a description,” McHale writes, “of a universe, not of the universe, that is, it 
may describe any universe, potentially a plurality of universes.”594 If I can say that 
McHale’s “description” is my “ordering of the encyclopedia” that is a “narrative,” then I 
can also claim that my narratives are ontologies—descriptions of the universe that 
ambiguity problematizes, confronts, and humorously calls into question. 
This move towards narrative as ontology is unpacked by McHale in his later work 
Constructing Postmodernism. In the absence of “grounding, narrative becomes a means 
of building foundations, since storytelling contains its own self-legitimization.”595 This is, 
of course, similar to what I meant by “injected narratives” in Sigurd’s Lament: An 
Alliterative Epic.596 “We are no longer confident,” McHale writes, “that we can build 
                                                
592 Umberto Eco, Marco Santambrogio, and Patrizia Violi, eds. Meaning and Mental 
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intellectual structures upward from firm epistemological and ontological foundation.”597 
And so instead of theory discussing narratives, narratives discuss theory.598 While there 
may be a “world” underlying my disparate versions of it, that world is finally 
inaccessible, and all I have are versions. “Narrative,” McHale continues, “recommends 
itself as a means of building foundations by constructing constructions because 
storytelling . . . bears within it its own (provisional) self-grounding, its own (local, 
limited) self-legitimation.”599 
If ambiguity does anything then, it most definitely seeks to reveal the 
narrativizing theories that stem from any given culture’s encyclopedia, narratives that are 
all too often taken as “real,” dogmatic, or certain. Ambiguity as humor or wit can, in 
other words, be used to expose the self-legitimations of cultural narratives. Poets who 
utilize ambiguity in this way, Eco writes, suggest that humanity “needs to encounter 
being with gaiety (and hopefully with science too), to question it, test its resistances, 
grasp its openings and its hints, which are never too explicit.”600 
“Gaiety” here is an important word. How many religious studies or philosophy 
classes have you sat through that were bursting at the seams with gravity, weight, and 
seriousness? I imagine that if you are reading this book, then you are more than familiar 
with that sober, academic scene. But in the face of such heaviness—ontology, 
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epistemology, ethics, or “the other”—Eco suggests that I tread with a light and cheerful 
heart. And, in fact, as his protagonist William of Baskerville suggests: “Perhaps the 
mission of those who love mankind is to make people laugh at the truth, to make truth 
laugh, because the only truth lies in learning to free ourselves from insane passion for the 
truth.”601  
I can think of no better way to sum up ambiguity and its ability to unmask those 
narrativizing theories and self-legitimations that I so desperately embody as the natural 
order of things. Laugh at truth, approach Being with gaiety, and remember that 
knowledge is provisional.  
Italo Calvino, a contemporary of Eco, wrote much the same in his Charles Eliot 
Norton Lectures, Six Memos for the Next Millennium,602 which, as fate would have it, is 
mine. In his essay on “Lightness,”603 he suggests that  
Whenever humanity seems condemned to heaviness, I think I should fly like 
Perseus into a different space. I don’t mean escaping into dreams or into the 
irrational. I mean that I have to change my approach, look at the world from a 
different perspective, with a different logic and with fresh methods of cognition 
and verification. The images of lightness that I seek should not fade away like 
dreams dissolved by the realities of present and future . . . In the boundless 
universe of literature there are always new avenues to be explored, both very 
recent and very ancient, styles and forms that can change our image of the world. 
And when literature fails to assure me that I’m not merely chasing dreams, I look 
to science to sustain my visions in which all heaviness dissolves.604 
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In Calvino’s conception, ambiguity is dexterous. It is nimble, quick, and hungry to 
discover fresh methods of cognition and verification.  
He continues, relying on the imagery of Giovanni Boccaccio’s character, Guido, 
who, “so very light . . . vaulted over” a tomb, which was so large:605 
If I had to choose an auspicious sign for the approach of the new millennium, I 
would choose this: the sudden nimble leap of the poet/philosopher who lifts 
himself against the weight of the world, proving that its heaviness contains the 
secret of lightness, while what many believe to be the life force of the times—
loud and aggressive, roaring and rumbling—belongs to the realm of death, like a 
graveyard of rusted automobiles.606 
 
Can ambiguity do all of this? Can it be a philosophical aesthetic that laughs at 
truth, approaches Being with gaiety, and is light, nimble, and fresh? Can philosophers be 
poets and poets, philosophers? Cristina Farronato607 and I would, of course, answer 
“yes,” and point to Eco as a preeminent example. “If we wanted to find a unifying 
theme,” Farronato writes, “to illuminate Eco’s writings and personality, we would have 
to think of ‘wit.’”608 Eco, for his part, would point to both Joyce and Borges. 
The key for me, however, is that laughter defeats certainty. “Either you are 
Rabelais,” Farronato continues, “or you are Descartes. Either one accepts Order and 
laughs from within it with the intention of making it explode, or one pretends to reject it 
so as to restore it in different forms.”609 And yet, the restoration of certainty in different 
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forms is academia’s modus operandi. Anecdotal, perhaps, but I once had a Philosophy of 
Fiction professor spend an entire semester trying to convince his students (not necessarily 
me) to swap out their perceived conservatism for his anarchic atheism. And while I 
agreed with some of his positions, it was clear to me that he was playing Descartes to my 
desire for Rabelais. “Trust me,” he could have said, “my narratival certainty is better than 
‘theirs.’ So why not swap ‘theirs’ out for mine and see what happens?” But what was 
desperately missing from this scene was the self-reflexive provisionality that ambiguity 
can bring to any situation. The ability to laugh—through wit or irony—at all ordering that 
would ask us to swap one certainty for the other without any kind of critical assessment 
or awareness of the provisionality of knowledge.   
The comic then is a form of ambiguity in that it “rises from the violation of a 
rule,” but it does so in such a way that it confronts the Simonini’s of the world. For it 
violates a rule “among those who have absorbed the rule that they also presume it is 
inviolable.”610 And while much more can be said about humor’s connection to ambiguity, 
this is the key. Gaiety breaks lose my hold on certainty and reminds me, and all of us, 
that narrativizing theories are provisional. If I can laugh at my own truth, then perhaps I 
can facilitate the laughter of others. For the language game of wit “is not there for its own 
sake but involves a cultural critique.”611 
If ambiguity as wit takes aim at culture, then, to conclude this section, it does so 
to remind me of provisionality. That my ideas, beliefs, and, yes, even embodiment might 
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be false. “Belief in gods, of whatever description,” Eco once wrote, “has motivated 
human history, thus if it were argued that all myths, all revelations of every religion, are 
nothing but lies, one could only conclude that for millennia we have lived under the 
domain of the false.”612 If this is true, then “how is it possible that so much of our history 
has been controlled by false ideas?”613 How is it possible, he later asks, that the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion—a proven fake—has continued to inflame fanatics across the 
globe?  
It is possible because we all map fictions onto reality. We all live out of 
narrativized theories waiting to be expanded by ambiguity. But we, yes we, should be 
wary. “The fact that a big part of our history has been so biased should make us alert and 
ready to call into question the very tales we believe true, because the criterion of the 
wisdom of the community is based on a constant awareness of the fallibility of our 
learning.”614 Beneath ambiguity’s large umbrella then, it is wit, lightness, and gaiety—a 
feathered leap over a stern tomb—that “help us maintain a skeptical distance from the 
series of delusions constantly offered to humankind.”615 
Conclusion 
There are many examples of literary witticisms that help their readers maintain a 
skeptical distance. Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 is probably one of the most recognizable in 
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the United States.616 I would also add as illustrative examples Gabriel Garcia Marquez’ 
One Hundred Years of Solitude, Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, and the more 
recent Exit West by Mohsin Hamid.617 While all three novelists tackle serious issues—
historical repetition, India’s partition, or the crisis of the refugee—all three approach their 
respective topics in such a way that the issue is seen in a new light, from a slanted angle. 
And yet, the books are riddled with gaiety, wit, and lightness. Who can forget Marquez’ 
flying carpet618 or Saleem Sinai’s nicknames619 or even Saeed’s laughter at Nadia’s open 
hand?620 And if I have accomplished anything in this chapter, then I have shown how 
Eco’s gaiety, McHale’s narratival ontology, and Calvino’s lightness all wrap around my 
understanding of ambiguity as coexistent incompatibility and buoy it. 
 After a full summary of chapters one through five, I argued that Eco’s emphasis 
on wit and gaiety are necessary components to a fuller understanding of ambiguity. 
Because, when coexistent incompatibility is approached through the clarifying lens of 
laughter, it not only takes aim at culture but also conjures provisionality out of the 
encyclopedia’s thick and heavy air. Ambiguity as wit or lightness or laughter is a 
constant reminder to dogmatists (of which we are all included) that history is a series of 
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delusions about which we should remain skeptical. This chapter not only summarized my 
argument that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the 
provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality, but it also furthered it. 
Ambiguity is many things then, and not least among them is the comic, that violation of 
the rule.  
I began this chapter with an epigraph taken from The Name of the Rose. Make 
truth laugh, it said. But that was not the end of the conversation. “Where is all my 
wisdom?” William of Baskerville continued. “I behaved, stubbornly, pursuing a 
semblance of order, when I should have known well that there is no order in the 
universe.” Eco’s Watson, Adso, later responded to William:  
But how can a necessary being exist totally polluted with the possible? What 
difference is there, then, between God and primogenial chaos? Isn’t affirming 
God’s absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom with regard to His own 
choices tantamount to demonstrating that God does not exist?  
 
And to conclude this chapter, I will leave you with William’s response: “How could a 
learned man go on communicating his learning if he answered yes to your question?”621 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
621 Eco, The Name of the Rose, 288. 
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PART II: CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter Four, I employed my theory of ambiguity as outlined in Part I and 
answered the question: How does one construct or encounter an encyclopedia, twist it 
into a narrative, and then embody it? The answer to this question was given by a close 
analysis of The Prague Cemetery’s chapter, “In My Grandfather’s Day.” It was there that 
I showed how Simonini constructed his cultural units, arranged them into a valid 
narrative, and then embodied that narrative in the world of things. I argued that ambiguity 
reveals, highlights, and brings my attention to the provisionality or the as-if-ness of the 
narratives that I take for granted. It is also that space in which I can analyze my own 
provisional assumptions and begin to account for the potentiality of other ways of seeing 
and doing. I also suggested that the task of religious aesthetics is to peel back the layers 
of an already given cultural encyclopedia to reveal, analyze, and understand the as if 
narratives that humanity embodies. 
In this way, I claimed that Simonini’s ambiguity functioned within the literary 
world of The Prague Cemetery when he encountered the fiery gaze of the other, but that 
he also represented ambiguity for a certain kind of reader—namely, me, a male, Western, 
and liberal academic. Simonini’s repugnance forced me to ask myself why I discounted 
him, which led to the question: how do I choose or judge between competing, though 
equiprobable narratives? I answered this question through the notions of choice, 
 
 
272 
communal ratification, and responsibility, which all highlighted the provisionality of 
knowledge.  
In Chapter Five, I analyzed the way in which fictions map onto reality. I did this 
by situating Eco’s essay, “Fictional Protocols” in the larger argument of his work Six 
Walks in the Fictional Woods. I suggested that by examining the theory behind The 
Prague Cemetery, I might more fully understand the ways in which an encounter with 
ambiguity can possibly lead to a reorganization of a cultural encyclopedia. In the second 
section of the chapter, I read two of Eco’s essays that helped me to answer the question: 
If fiction and reality blend together in equiprobable realities but it is still possible to judge 
between competing narratives, then why does something like The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion still exist? To answer to this question, I discussed provisionality, negotiation, and 
Fact with a capital “F.” The Protocols still exists because humans think knowledge is 
certain, refuse to negotiate in regards to their cultural units, and oftentimes eschew lines 
of resistance for far reaching interpretants.  
I ended the chapter by suggesting that judgment is possible within an aesthetics of 
ambiguity, but it cannot be forced. We are all responsible for and accountable to the 
choices that we make when moving through the process of ambiguity. In this way, 
ratification is typically towards a more general encyclopedia, but local encyclopedias can 
and do exist that refuse to negotiate and ratify into a more universal arrangement.  
In Chapter Six, I provided a full summary of chapters one through five before 
arguing that Eco’s emphasis on wit and gaiety are necessary components to a fuller 
understanding of ambiguity. I suggested that when coexistent incompatibility is 
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approached through the clarifying lens of laughter, it not only takes aim at culture but 
also conjures provisionality out of the encyclopedia’s thick and heavy air. Ambiguity as 
wit or lightness or laughter is a constant reminder to dogmatists (of which we are all 
included) that history is a series of delusions about which we should remain skeptical. In 
the end, this chapter not only summarized my argument that a religious aesthetic rooted 
in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of 
reality, but it also furthered it. Ambiguity is many things then, and not least among them 
is the comic, that violation of the rule. 
Concluding the main part of this work then, I have argued the thesis that a 
religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge 
and the narrativization of reality. You have no doubt noticed, however, the strange 
interjections within each chapter, as well as the two excursuses. For a full conclusion and 
analysis of the various parts of this work, I would direct your attention to the final chapter 
titled, “Conclusion.” It is there that I will not only tie together the loose end of this work, 
but also briefly discuss the role of ambiguity in academic works.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
“When you’re around Athene what you think about is new ways of thinking about 
fascinating bits of knowledge you happen to have, and how you might be able to fit them 
together to make exciting new knowledge . . . The goddess inclined her head. ‘This is an 
experiment, and this is the best time and place for that experiment. Nothing mortal can 
last. At best it can leave legends that can bear fruit in later ages.” 
—Jo Walton, The Just City622 
 
In The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human, Jonathan Gottschall 
sets out to argue that fiction subtly shapes our beliefs, behaviors, and ethics and that brain 
circuits force narrative structure on the chaos of life.623 In doing so, he touches on 
religion or sacred stories.624 “If you want a message to burrow into a human mind,” he 
suggests, “work it into a story.”625 This has much in common, of course, with Walter M. 
Miller Jr.’s A Canticle for Leibowitz or Thomas Sebok’s “Atomic Priesthood.”626 
“Religion,” as Gottschall articulates it, “is the ultimate expression of story’s domination 
over our minds.”627  
                                                
622 Jo Walton, The Just City (New York: TOR, 2014), 13 and 45. 
623 Jonathan Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human (New York: 
Marines, 2012), xvii. 
624 Ibid., 118. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Walter M. Miller Jr., A Canticle For Leibowitz (New York: Bantam, 1972) and cf. Scott 
Beauchamp, “How to Send a Message 1,000 Years to the Future,” The Atlantic, Feburary 24, 2015, 
accessed on September 26th, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/02/how-to-send-
a-message-1000-years-to-the-future/38 5720/. 
627 Ibid., 119. 
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Not willing to take this for granted, however, Gottschall dives into the science 
behind story, seeking to discover what makes the human mind tick. One of the key points 
of Gottschall’s work is that he continually connects story and its mind-shaping ability to 
the way in which narrative gets embodied in the world. This amounts to running the 
power of story through the gauntlet of evolution. Why do humans still employ story if it 
is nothing more than escapism? Certainly, Gottschall claims, evolution would have 
weeded it out unless, that is, story is actually useful and has some explanatory purpose. 
Within this reasoning, story and religion cohabitate because religion, and tangentially 
story, provides society multiple benefits.628 It defines a group as a group. It coordinates 
behavior within a group. And it provides a powerful incentive system. If there is a 
downside to all of this, however, then it is that religions generally cause people to behave 
more decently toward members of the group “while vigorously asserting the group’s 
interests against competitors . . . religion draws coreligionist together, and it drives those 
of different faiths apart.”629  
Perhaps, throughout this text, I have unintentionally assumed Gottschall’s 
position. I cannot embody multiple stories at the same time. Yes, I can be an academic, a 
secularist, a church goer (sometimes), a father, and a husband. And, certainly, these 
claims or obligations can have competing ends. But often, in any given moment, I must 
choose one at the expense of the other. Identity, in so far as it is shaped by narrativizing 
theories, is a zero-sum game because it continually articulates coexistent incompatibility 
                                                
628 Ibid., 122.  
629 Ibid.  
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without a nod towards ambiguity’s provisionality. Identity leads to, in other words, the 
“breakdown of modern representative democracy into irreconcilable claims of ‘identity 
politics.’”630 And, for me, the question is how does one navigate between one 
irreconcilable claim over against the other? How does one choose? 
I have not, however, been talking about these kinds of identity stories throughout 
this book. I have been more interested in the implicit narratives of culture. What 
arrangements of the cultural encyclopedia lead to the embodiment of white nationalism? 
What narrativizing theory leads to the embodiment of a liberal, social-justice fighter? Are 
these embodiments trapped within their own horizon? Are cultural narratives infinitely at 
odds? Is it possible to invert the age-old desire of aesthetics? If aesthetics cannot open the 
potentiality of the other through its ambiguity—I cannot force someone to read Things 
Fall Apart like I did631—then can it self-reflexively inform me when confronting an 
embodiment shaped so differently from my own? 
Gottschall’s book is a good reminder that we are all shaped by stories, that these 
stories are often in competition, and that art does not always liberate. In his chapter, “Ink 
People Change the World,”632 he recounts the biography of Adolf Hitler and his love for 
Teutonic mythology and its transformation into Richard Wagner’s music and operas. It 
                                                
630 Carl Raschke, Force of God: Political Theology and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy 
(Columbia University Press, 2015), 13. 
631 Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (New York: Penguin, 1994). 
632 Ibid., 139–55. 
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was after seeing Rienzi, Gottschall writes, that Hitler became the Führer.633 In this way 
then: 
The ink people of [mythologies and] scripture have a real, live presence in our 
world. They shape our behaviors and our customs, and in so doing, they transform 
societies and histories . . . Fiction does mold our minds. Story . . . teaches us facts 
about the world; influences our moral logic; and marks us with fears, hopes, and 
anxieties that alter our behavior, perhaps even our personalities. Research shows 
that story is constantly nibbling and kneading us, shaping our minds without our 
knowledge or consent. The more deeply we are cast under story’s spell, the more 
potent its influence.634 
 
If the fictions that we map onto the world are at odds, then I have asked again and again, 
what is one to do? How do individuals, communities, religions, and even nation states 
arbitrate one against the other? My answer, of course, is ambiguity and the role that it 
plays in, self-reflexively, revealing the provisionality of any one narrativizing theory.  
I argued, in summary, that a religious aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes 
both the provisionality of knowledge and the narrativization of reality. I approached this 
directly through six academic chapters and tangentially through two excursuses and a 
short story. Now, however, I must tie together any remaining loose ends by integrating 
my academic chapters with my “spare parts.” In doing so, I argue for ambiguity’s role 
within a materially oriented religious aesthetics, as well as within the oft touted but little 
respected world of interdisciplinary studies.  
Early on, I defined ambiguity as a coexistent incompatibility, which highlighted 
the proliferation of meaning by holding multiple interpretations in tension, and religious 
aesthetics as the provisional exploration into the commitments and narratives that humans 
                                                
633 Ibid., 142–3. 
634 Ibid., 144 and 148. 
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subjunctively embody. I situated my definition in the contemporary work of Susanne 
Winkler before clarifying it through a comparison with Umberto Eco’s own theory of 
ambiguity. At equal points a violation of cultural codes, a challenge to cultural 
encyclopedias, and a production of further knowledge, I claimed that ambiguity is a space 
wherein one can defer judgment to more fully acknowledge the plurivocality of a given 
percept. 
Connecting my understanding of ambiguity to S. Brent Plate, I then suggested that 
a material religious aesthetic reveals and examines the religious commitments and 
narratives that mutually exist as polyvocal percepts. Religious aesthetics not only 
examines the material phenomena of any given religious community, practice, or ritual, 
but also the narrativizing theories that allow any individual or community to choose one 
vocality over another. Ambiguity is continually proposing the question of judgment and 
how any community chooses one encyclopedic arrangement over another equiprobable 
arrangement.  
Probing this notion of choice, I concluded Part I by looking at Eco’s relationship 
to Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of Firstness. I claimed that ambiguity is accountable to 
a reality, but not irreducibly so, and is strategically produced and employed through 
creative contradiction in the already given cultural encyclopedia. This resulted in an 
expansion of Plate’s material religious aesthetic in that ambiguity—as encounter, state, 
and process—reveals mutually existing, overlapping, and entangled universes. It is within 
ambiguity then that the possibility exists to interrogate, transform, or renew aesthetic 
judgments, insofar as they are judgments of narratival or world construction.  
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I further explored my understanding of ambiguity in Ursula K. Le Guin’s The 
Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia. It was in this first of two excursuses that I showed, 
through Le Guin’s protagonist, Shevek, the way in which religious aesthetics can peel 
back the layers of a given cultural embodiment to understand the ordering that lies behind 
it. I suggested that my encounter with the text also represented ambiguity and the 
possibility for me to rethink my own encyclopedia in a way that revealed its 
provisionality.  
In Part II of this work, I argued that ambiguity reveals, highlights, and brings my 
attention to the provisionality or the as-if-ness of the narratives that I take for granted. It 
is also that space in which I can analyze my own provisional assumptions and begin to 
account for the potentiality of other ways of seeing and doing. I also suggested that the 
task of religious aesthetics is to peel back the layers of an already given cultural 
encyclopedia to reveal, analyze, and understand the as if narratives that humanity 
embodies. 
I showed this through a close analysis of The Prague Cemetery’s chapter, “In My 
Grandfather’s Day.” It was there that I showed how Simonini constructed his cultural 
units, arranged them into a valid narrative, and then embodied that narrative in the world 
of things. Simonini’s repugnance forced me to ask myself why I discounted him, which 
led to the question: how do I choose or judge between competing, though equiprobable 
narratives? I answered this question through the notions of choice, communal ratification, 
and responsibility, which all highlighted the provisionality of knowledge. 
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I then analyzed the way in which fictions map onto reality. I did this by situating 
Eco’s essay, “Fictional Protocols” in the larger argument of his work Six Walks in the 
Fictional Woods. I suggested that by examining the theory behind The Prague Cemetery, 
I might more fully understand the ways in which an encounter with ambiguity can 
possibly lead to a reorganization of a cultural encyclopedia.  
I followed this by reading two of Eco’s essays that helped me to articulate 
provisionality, negotiation, and Fact with a capital “F.” Unpalatable narrativizing theories 
still exist, I argued, because humans act as if knowledge is certain, refuse to negotiate 
regarding their cultural units, and oftentimes eschew lines of resistance for far reaching 
interpretants. I suggested that judgment is possible within an aesthetics of ambiguity, but 
it cannot be forced. We are all responsible for and accountable to the choices that we 
make when moving through the process of ambiguity. 
I ended Part II by arguing that Eco’s emphasis on wit and gaiety are necessary 
components to a fuller understanding of ambiguity. I claimed that when coexistent 
incompatibility is approached through the clarifying lens of laughter, it not only takes aim 
at culture but also conjures provisionality out of the encyclopedia’s thick and heavy air. 
Ambiguity as wit or lightness or laughter is a constant reminder to dogmatists (of which 
we are all included) that history is a series of delusions about which we should remain 
skeptical. 
I further explored my understanding of narrativizing theories in Emmanuel 
Carrère’s The Kingdom. It was in this second of two excursuses that I showed the role of 
creative nonfiction in an aesthetics of ambiguity and academic interdisciplinarity. I 
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explored the way in which Carrère’s “I” entangled with the “I” of the historian, which in 
turn overlapped with the “I” of the reader. I ended by suggesting (or perhaps confessing) 
that we all set out to objectively recount data, but end up doing little more than telling a 
story wherein the academic embodies the “I” of the protagonist. An important reminder 
of provisionality, I claimed, because it allowed me to hold to the one, curious truth of 
interdisciplinarity—the truth of not knowing.  
By all accounts, my book should be over. I have argued. I have digressed. And I 
have summarized. And yet, there is more that remains. Injected into each academic 
chapter was one section out of the six that comprise the short story, “The Composer,” 
which tells of Edward Abernathy’s research into the events of Zuravel Ostrava 
Martynov’s infamous burning. While I will not comment on the story, I will—as best I 
can—justify its place within a book that sought nothing more than to articulate an 
aesthetic theory of ambiguity. To quote Edward: “How could I write of Martynov and not 
emulate him?” 
If ambiguity is that which violates, questions, and challenges to expose the 
provisionality of any given narrativizing theory, then how could I not play with the 
expectations—encyclopedic arrangement—that is the monograph? The success or failure 
of that opening into ambiguity is ultimately up to you, the reader, and the connections 
that you make across the various parts of this work.  
As Martynov desired, so too I. 
Martynov instigated a discourse that proceeded him. He wanted to get people 
talking, to offer up their own composition. He wanted his audience to complete 
his work, to provide their own meaning. He desired to invent a thing with no 
beginning, to situate others in the already. 
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Perhaps I failed. Perhaps I showed rather than told how I think religious studies, 
as an interdisciplinary discourse, should conduct its business. Perhaps, I am nothing more 
than a dilettante, writing fiction over against an involved and careful study. Or perhaps, 
like the epigraph suggests, this is just an experiment that cannot last. I cannot say one 
way or the other. But I hope to have showed, in many ways and voices, that a religious 
aesthetic rooted in ambiguity emphasizes both the provisionality of knowledge and the 
narrativization of reality. Other than that . . . I don’t know.  
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